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Preface
there is an official version of the Second world war that is 
relatively easy to unearth. alongside the paper record, the allied 
establishment happily proclaims its triumph in public monuments 
like the cenotaph in london. Public parades, films, books and tv 
series like Band of Brothers, also testify to allied victory. others are 
calmer. westerplatte, where the Second world war began outside 
Gdansk, Poland has a sombre atmosphere, as does the ruined Kaiser 
wilhelm church, which still bears witness to the power of aerial 
bombardment in the centre of Berlin. 
By contrast, the other war, the people’s war, is largely hidden. So 
unearthing it proved a challenge in time and space. It took as long as 
the Second world war itself to write this book and involved travel 
to the countries listed in the contents (as well as several excluded 
due to limitations of space). Sometimes concealment is deliberate, 
such as the resistance radio transmitter secreted in the roof of a 
warehouse in Bergen, norway. Sometimes the motivation is more 
pernicious. at the military museum, athens, there is absolutely no 
mention of the resistance movement that liberated Greece, because 
its politics was too radical. 
when it fits the official narrative there are resistance museums, 
ranging from the spectacular warsaw uprising museum, the 
futuristic Slovak national uprising museum in Banska Bystrica, 
to the Danish resistance museum in copenhagen and the vredeburg 
museum’s diorama in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. most resistance 
museums are tiny, however, sometimes in one or two rooms in 
obscure towns and villages. more often simple plaques tell the 
story – from the one dedicated to the Indian national army in a 
quiet park in Singapore, to the bustling main square in Bologna. 
other evidence can range from cemeteries, to the direct memory 
of participants, or even workshops for the disabled descendants 
of those genetically damaged by agent orange during the long 
vietnamese war. anywhere that fighting occurred, and that is almost 
everywhere, there is something to be found if it is looked for.
the difference between the two wars – the imperialist war and 
the people’s war – is well symbolised in my home town, edinburgh. 
towering above the streets on the castle rock stands Scotland’s 
ix
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national war memorial. hundreds of metres below, down a dark 
staircase, in a corner under a tree near the railway line, is a metal 
plate, hardly larger in size than this book. It is dedicated to those 
who died fighting fascism in the Spanish civil war. hopefully this 
work will put both aspects into a more balanced perspective.
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Introduction
The Image of The Second World War – a Paradox
The Second World War is unique among twentieth-century 
conflicts. Other wars, such as the First World War, Vietnam, Iraq, 
or Afghanistan, began with public support whipped up by a supine 
media, but lost it once the deadly reality and the true motivations 
of governments broke through the propaganda smokescreen. The 
Second World War escapes this paradigm. Its reputation was positive 
from start to finish and it remains untarnished even now. 
There was understandable joy at the defeat of the Germany, Italy 
and Japan in countries under the Axis heel. But pollsters in the 
United States found that the war’s popularity only increased as the 
death toll mounted. While approval for President Roosevelt never 
fell below 70 per cent, support for peace initiatives declined.1 
A similar situation prevailed in Britain, where Mass Observation 
volunteers measured public opinion. They assiduously recorded 
overheard conversations, and gauged attitudes. A ‘typical’ remark 
of the early ‘phoney war’ period (when hostilities had been declared 
but virtually no military action taken) was: ‘I cannot see why we are 
not doing something … Why don’t we go and attack Italy, or start 
something in Abyssinia.’ One Observer noted the ‘overwhelming 
acclamation with which the news of any offensive action is 
received’.2 Today’s imperialists do not shake cans in the streets 
to finance their bombing operations, but in 1940 a ‘Fighter Plane 
Fund’ was established whose ‘most striking feature was the way 
in which everyone joined in the collection …’.3 Years of gruelling 
struggle and enormous loss of life did not dim enthusiasm. News 
of the D-Day Normandy landings in 1944 evoked wild rejoicing:
The child excitedly exclaimed ‘Daddy – the second front’s started’. 
‘Daddy’ rushed downstairs; fumbles with the wireless knob and 
asks; ‘Did we invade? No jokes. You’re kidding.’ The family sits 
down to breakfast but are much too excited to eat. We had an 
urge to rush all over the place, to go knocking at neighbours’ 
doors to find out whether the invasion has started.4
1
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Till the end Mass Observation surveys failed to detect war weariness.5
Thousands of miles away Dmitriy Loza, a Red Army officer, 
eulogised the fight against Nazism as a ‘Sacred War’:
[W]ar came to us on 22 June 1941, bringing with it blood and 
tears, concentration camps, the destruction of our cities and 
villages, and thousands upon tens and hundreds of thousands of 
deaths … If it would have been possible to collect all the tears … 
that flowed during the four years of the war and to pour them 
out on Germany, that country would have been at the bottom 
of a deep sea… .6
Even with 70 years’ distance, fascination with the Second World 
War endures. As Loza predicted ‘ten or even a hundred generations 
of true patriots will not forget this war’.7 No other military event 
has spawned so many works of history, fiction, or drama. Nearly 
half of all war films made deal with the Second World War. The 
shares taken by the First World War, Vietnam and Korea are 12 per 
cent, 2 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. The rest – from Ancient 
Rome to science fiction – make up the remaining third.8
The Second World War’s popularity is surprising given its 
enormous destructiveness. In comparing casualty figures the warning 
of this Japanese commentator should be remembered: ‘We shouldn’t 
make deaths into numbers. They were each individuals. They had 
names, faces … My brother might just be a fraction of several 
millions, but for me he’s the only Elder Brother in the world. For my 
mother he was the only Eldest Son. Compile the dead one by one.’9
Nevertheless the statistics are staggering. The 1914–18 war 
generated up to 21 million deaths.10 The tally for 20 years of fighting 
in Vietnam was five million,11 while in three years the US-led war 
on Iraq cost 655,000 lives.12 Although firm figures for 1939–45 
are lacking, one source suggests 50 million people died, of which 
28 million were civilians. Chinese losses alone matched figures for 
Germany, Britain and France in the First World War combined.13
Why did such carnage not dent the Second World War’s reputation? 
The answer lies in the widely held and enduring belief that it was a 
‘good war’, when righteousness triumphed over injustice, democracy 
over dictatorship, tolerance over racism, and freedom over fascism. 
Terkel’s oral history of America captures this spirit: 
‘It was not like your other wars,’ a radio disk jockey reflected aloud 
… It was not, most of us, profoundly believed, ‘imperialistic’. 
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Our enemy was, patently, obscene: the Holocaust maker. It was 
one war that many who would have resisted ‘your other wars’ 
supported enthusiastically. It was a ‘just war’, if there is any 
such animal.14
On the Eastern front, Loza concurred: ‘The people put up a wall 
against suppressors, aggressors, thieves, torturers, debauchers, and 
fascist scum, the dregs of humanity. They threw all their antipathy 
into the face of this detested, hated enemy!’15
So one essential aspect of the Second World War was that millions 
upon millions were inspired to resist or fight against fascist genocide, 
tyranny and oppression and did not come to feel they were duped 
into this belief. Their absolute revulsion at the methods and aims of 
Hitler and his collaborators was completely justified. Frank Capra’s 
famous US propaganda film Why We Fight (1943) explained that 
the Axis powers ‘were out for world conquest’.16 This was true, 
whether it was Lebensraum for Germany, a revived Roman Empire 
for Italy, or the cynically misnamed Japanese Greater East Asian 
Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
A few examples demonstrate what a victory for the Axis powers 
would have meant for humanity. The Nazis used racism as the 
ideological cement for their movement, and the result was that 
Jewish women arriving at Treblinka death camp were shaved, so 
their hair could be sent off to Germany to make mattresses, before 
being cast into gas chambers, at a rate of 10,000–12,000 per day. 
The time from arrival to extermination was intended to be just ten 
minutes.17 However:
[B]ecause little children at their mothers’ breasts were a great 
nuisance during the shaving procedure babies were taken from 
their mothers as soon as they got off the train. The children were 
taken to an enormous ditch; when a large number of them were 
gathered together they were killed by firearms and thrown into 
the fire … When mothers succeeded in keeping their babies with 
them and this fact interfered with the shaving a German guard 
took the baby by its legs and smashed it against the wall of the 
barracks until only a bloody mass remained in his hands.18
Though Italian fascism was less overtly racist, the invasion of 
Abyssinia in 1935–6 saw abhorrent methods employed, including 
gassing. Mussolini’s son, a pilot, described this conquest as: 
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‘Magnificent sport … one group of horsemen gave me the impression 
of a budding rose unfolding as the bombs fell in their midst and 
blew them up. It was exceptionally good fun.’19
Japan’s attack on China culminated in the notorious ‘rape of 
Nanjing’ of 1937. Over a period of two months the army brutally 
violated as a minimum some 20,000 women (killing most afterwards) 
and murdered 200,000 men.20
However, even if Allied forces ended these particular barbarities, 
there is a problem with seeing the Second World War unambiguously 
as a ‘good war’. The Axis did not have a monopoly on inhumanity, 
the US bombing of Hiroshima being just one example. Moreover, 
it does not follow that those who commanded Allied armies shared 
the same goals as ordinary people. Their official rhetoric aside, it 
was preposterous to believe that the governments of Britain, France, 
Russia or the USA opposed the principle of ‘world conquest’.
Consider, for example, the fate of the Atlantic Charter which 
The Times hailed as: ‘Marshalling the Good Forces of the World. 
Freedom and Restoration for the Oppressed Nations’.21 In August 
1941 America’s President, Roosevelt, and the British prime minister, 
Winston Churchill, jointly pledged to respect ‘the right of all peoples 
to choose the form of government under which they will live’. Stalin 
too had no difficulty declaring Russia’s ‘full adhesion of the Soviet 
Union to the principles of the Atlantic Charter’.22 
Yet when Churchill presented the Charter to the House of 
Commons he stressed it did ‘not qualify in any way the various 
statements of policy which have been made [regarding] the British 
Empire …’. It only applied to ‘the States and nations of Europe 
now under the Nazi yoke’.23 Even this narrow interpretation was 
ignored when implementation became possible. In October 1944 
the British and Russian leaders met to take decisions that the 
former admitted were so ‘crude, and even callous [that] they could 
not be the basis of any public document…’.24 Churchill’s vanity 
eventually got the better of him and he published this account of 
the ‘percentages agreement’:
The moment was apt for business, so I said … how would it do 
for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Roumania, for 
us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty 
about Yugoslavia? While this was being translated I wrote out 
on a half-sheet of paper:
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Roumania
 Russia  90%
 The others  10%
Greece
  Great Britain  90%
  (in accord with U.S.A)




  Russia  75%
  The others  25%
I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the 
translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil 
and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all 
settled in no more time that it takes to set down … I said, ‘Might 
it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of 
these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand 
manner? Let us burn the paper.’ ‘No, you keep it,’ said Stalin.25
Although not party to the discussions in Moscow, the USA was 
equally cynical in its approach to peace. As one leading politician 
put it: ‘As things are now going, the peace we will make, the peace 
we seem to be making, will be a peace of oil, a peace of gold, a 
peace of shipping … without moral purpose … .’26 Devoid of moral 
purpose, maybe, but Hull, Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, explained 
the USA would lead ‘a new system of international relationships … 
primarily for reasons of pure national self-interest.’27
TWo noT one
It is the argument of this book that the gulf between the motivation 
of Allied governments and those who fought against brutality, 
oppression and dictatorship could not be bridged. Therefore, 
the world-shattering events of the 1939 to 1945 period did not 
constitute a single combat against the Axis powers, but amounted 
to two distinct wars.
Though unconventional, this premise is based on the well-estab-
lished dictum of Clausewitz that: ‘War is not merely a political 
act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political 
commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.’28
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As ‘a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes … none 
of the principal plans which are required for a War can be made 
without an insight into the political relations’.29 In the case of the 
Second World War political relations between states generated war 
between the Axis and Allied power blocks; but political relations 
between people and governments produced another war fought by 
the former for their own ends – this phenomenon being particularly 
evident in resistance movements which operated beyond the control 
of formal governments.
The thesis of two wars differs from other interpretations of the 
Second World War. The Allied establishments suggested that they 
and their populations were as one. For example, when Britain’s 
prime minister (PM) welcomed Russia into the Allied camp he 
insisted all previous disharmony had been effaced:
The Nazi régime is indistinguishable from the worst features 
of Communism [but] the past with its crimes, its follies and its 
tragedies, flashes away … We have but one aim and one single, 
irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every 
vestige of the Nazi regime … This is no class war, but a war in 
which the whole British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations 
is engaged without distinction of race, creed or party. [It is] the 
cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe.30
Despite claimed ideological differences, Stalin agreed the sole aim 
was ‘destruction of the Hitler regime’,31 and showed no resentment 
at the PM’s insult. The two men were dogged in their opposition 
to the Axis coalition, not because it threatened ‘free men and free 
peoples in every quarter of the globe’, but because Germany and 
its partners threatened Allied control of every quarter of the globe. 
A diametrically opposite account of the Second World War sees 
it as 100 per cent imperialist. Trotsky was a lifelong and bitter 
opponent of fascism and understood the ‘legitimate hatred of 
workers’ for it: ‘By his victories and bestialities, Hitler provokes 
naturally the sharp hatred of workers the world over.’ However, 
he denied that the Allies were fighting to end fascism. They fought 
to continue their own domination. Therefore:
[T]he victory of the imperialists of Great Britain and France 
would be not less frightful for the ultimate fate of mankind than 
that of Hitler and Mussolini … The task posed by history is not 
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to support one part of the imperialist system against another but 
to make an end of the system as a whole.32
Trotsky’s opposition to the Second World War was not on pacifist 
grounds. He supported ‘progressive, just wars … which serve the 
liberation of oppressed classes or oppressed nations and thus 
push human culture forward’.33 Furthermore, he was not rejecting 
democracy: ‘We Bolsheviks also want to defend democracy, but not 
the kind that is run by sixty uncrowned kings.’ So Trotsky argued 
that as an imperialist war the Second World War should be opposed, 
but that it should then be replaced by a people’s anti-fascist war: 
‘First let’s sweep our democracy clean of capitalist magnates, then 
we will defend it to the last drop of blood.’34 Trotsky was murdered 
by Stalin’s agent in 1940 and so did not live to see that the two 
processes he discussed ran in parallel rather than being separated 
in time. 
Howard Zinn and Henri Michel adopt a third position that 
recognises the simultaneous presence of both anti-fascist and 
imperialist elements in the Second World War. Zinn divides them 
into short-term and long-term factors. 
We can argue endlessly over whether there was an alternative in 
the short run, whether fascism could have been resisted without 
50 million dead. But the long-term effect of World War II on 
the thinking of the world was pernicious and deep. It made war, 
so thoroughly discredited by the senseless slaughter of World 
War I, noble once again. It enabled political leaders, whatever 
miserable adventure they would take us into, whatever mayhem 
they would wreak on other people (2 million dead in Korea, at 
least as many in Southeast Asia, hundreds of thousands in Iraq), 
to invoke World War II as a model.35
Michel’s Shadow War is an influential work on the resistance that 
also recognises the complexities of the Second World War, but still 
asserts its fundamental unity: ‘During the second world war two 
types of warfare were waged. The first ranged the vast regular armies 
of the two sides against each other … The second war was fought 
in the darkness of the underground … On the Allied side these two 
parts of a single whole were as different as night from day.’36
None of these explanations adequately resolve the contradictory 
character of the phenomenon.37 The ‘single whole’ (whether patriotic 
unity, pure imperialism, a combination of short- and long-term 
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factors, or of official and underground warfare) breaks down when 
each case is studied in detail. More than unity against the Axis there 
was an unstable blend of currents that, under certain conditions, 
could coagulate into separate, mutually exclusive elements. 
Cabinets and peasants, army HQs and barracks, boardrooms and 
workers: each fought a different war – one imperialist, the other 
a people’s war. 
These terms are used here to cover many different situations, 
and so they require definition and historical context. Imperialism 
encompassed both the state policy of foreign domination, and 
the internal economic and political structures that sustained and 
generated this foreign policy. With these in mind, one remarkable 
feature of the run-up to the Second World War was the degree to 
which Allied and Axis camps shared imperialist motivations. This 
does not mean that they were symmetrical. An individual chess 
player is involved in the same game as their opponent, even though, 
after a few moves, the pieces are arranged differently. 
Consider first the Allies. In 1939 Britain possessed the biggest 
agglomeration of land and people in history, covering a quarter of 
the world’s population and land area, an empire upon which ‘the 
sun never sets, but the blood never dries’.38 France had the second 
largest overseas empire at 10 per cent of the world’s surface. The 
USSR covered a sixth of the globe, the majority of its population 
being non-Russian. Under Stalin, as in Tsarist times, it was once 
more a ‘prison house of the peoples’, and afterwards it would add 
most of Eastern Europe. The heyday of US imperialism still lay 
in the future, but in 1939 it was busy establishing the economic 
pre-eminence with which to dominate the world and fund a military 
machine that today has 737 overseas bases, and over 2.5 million 
personnel across the globe.
Compared with Britain, France and Russia, the Axis powers were 
latecomers to the imperial game. Japan emerged from self-imposed 
isolation in 1867; Italy only unified in 1870; and Germany a year 
later. The globe had already been parcelled out and so they could 
only affirm their international status by aggressively dislodging 
established competitors. Germany tried, and failed to do this during 
the 1914–18 war and was punished by the peace treaty of Versailles 
afterwards. Italy and Japan had supported the Entente during the 
First World War in the hope of gaining scraps from the table of the 
victors, but were sorely disappointed. The Second World War would 
see a repeat effort by all three to gain imperial power.
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   8 04/05/2012   09:47
InTroducTIon 9
The face of imperialism on the national plane was less ruthless 
on the Allied side than the Axis. Britain and France played on the 
democratic instincts of their citizens because they were protecting 
the fruits of earlier aggression, and thus could adopt a defensive 
stance. The governments of the USA and Russia also pointed to 
external attack as the cause of their involvement. 
This was not the case for the Axis. The ruling classes of Germany, 
Italy and Japan knew that a renewed bid for world power needed an 
even more extreme right-wing and authoritarian ideology than before 
to mobilise their populations. This requirement was only intensified 
by lack of empire which left the Axis governments unable to shift 
the burden of inter-war economic crisis onto colonial peoples. They 
therefore faced huge stresses and severe class struggles exacerbated 
by the international Communist movement that followed the 1917 
Russian Revolution. Consequently, all the Axis powers acquired 
some form of fascist or militaristic regime. In Germany and Italy 
the establishment had to accept sharing hegemony with populist 
outsiders, such as Hitler or Mussolini. In Japan power emanated 
from within the military. All three Axis governments felt that to seize 
and consolidate land in the face of recognised imperialist powers 
left no room for a humanitarian facade either at home or abroad. 
Axis rule would be brutal. Britain, France and Russia had built 
their empires at a far more leisurely pace and so could deploy more 
sophisticated ideologies, whether religious, racial or political, to 
cover their actions. 
Stripped of rhetoric, from this angle the Second World War was 
not a fight against world domination. It was a quarrel between 
Allied and Axis governments about who should dominate. So 
the belief of ordinary people, that the issue was fascism versus 
anti-fascism, was largely irrelevant for rulers on both sides of the 
Axis/Allied divide. Events before, during and after the war, confirm 
this. The Axis powers’ intentions and methods were obvious, but 
their opponents did not form an order of chivalric knights dedicated 
to rescuing the world from the dragon of fascism. They were an 
accidental, and indeed unlikely, combination that only coalesced 
some two years after the war had begun. The very concept of the 
Allies actually being allies was a chimera. 
Before the Second World War the US was diplomatically 
isolationist and followed Coolidge’s motto that ‘The business of 
America is business’.39 President Roosevelt was ‘indifferent to the 
rest of the world’40 until it became obvious what an Axis victory 
might signify. Nazi control of Europe could not be confined to that 
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continent. Furthermore, Britain, which had been almost bankrupted 
by the First World War, was now dependent on US aid to survive 
the Second and could thus be made to cede its world-power status 
to America. In Asia Japan was in direct competition with the USA 
for influence. Zinn cites a State Department memorandum which 
warned that Japanese expansion meant ‘our general diplomatic 
and strategic position would be considerably weakened’ leading 
to ‘insurmountable restrictions upon our access to the rubber, tin, 
jute and other vital materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions’.41 
Accordingly, Roosevelt placed an embargo on oil to Japan forcing it 
to choose between abandoning its imperial ambitions or retaliating. 
It took the latter course at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. 
Until 1939 Britain saw communism as a greater danger to its 
power than Nazism. So it rejected Stalin’s pleas for an anti-Nazi 
alliance and consistently appeased Germany. It stood by while 
Hitler defied all the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty 
from 1935 onwards. First Britain signed an agreement approving an 
enlarged German navy; then acquiesced when, flouting restrictions 
on numbers, the Wehrmacht was increased five-fold and the banned 
Luftwaffe airforce was founded; and merely grumbled when 
Austria was annexed. In 1939 the British Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, simultaneously compelled Czechoslovakia to cede 
territory to Germany and declared ‘peace in our time’ with the 
Führer. Britain was reluctantly compelled to fight after the invasion 
of Poland showed a Nazi appetite for expansion that was insatiable. 
A pragmatic friendship with Russia only developed when Hitler 
invaded the USSR and gave both countries a common enemy. 
For his part, by 1939 Stalin had concluded that Britain and 
France were too prone to appeasement to assist him in opposing 
Nazi Lebensraum – a German empire occupying Russian soil. So 
that year he signed a notorious peace pact with Hitler and told 
the 18th Communist Party Congress that in a future conflict he 
would ‘allow the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war 
… to allow them to exhaust and weaken one another; and then, 
when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with 
fresh strength …’.42
The shared ordeal of the Second World War did nothing to 
overcome Allied tensions in the long run. This band of hostile 
brothers only lasted while the battles raged. After 1945, unable to 
retain its far-flung possessions Britain reluctantly accepted a role 
as an imperialist junior partner to the USA. That country, with its 
nuclear bombs, now asserted superpower status because, in the 
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words of Roosevelt’s successor Truman, the USA was ‘in a position 
to dictate our own terms at the end of the war.’43 Its former friend 
in Russia was now branded ‘the evil empire’, and a generation was 
subjected to fears of nuclear holocaust and the rigours of Cold War. 
This left Moscow racing to develop its own nuclear arsenal to both 
fend off and threaten its erstwhile allies.
The concept of imperialism applied to more than just the chief 
protagonists. Many states without empires must also be included 
because they acted as satellites for the chief powers. Indeed, 
several governments-in-exile operated from places like London or 
Cairo. Furthermore, imperialism was a system of society in which 
capitalism was closely intertwined with state policy. Occupied 
France provides one example of the ways national and international 
policy could intersect during the Second World War. From his exile 
in London de Gaulle stood for restoration of his country’s imperial 
grandeur through the expulsion of the Nazis, whereas the Vichy 
regime preferred collaboration with German imperialism in order 
to suppress its working class. Each represented a different aspect of 
imperialism. Imperialist war also had its own distinctive methods: 
the use of formal, conventional methods of warfare (often of the 
most barbaric kind). This was quite different to those employed by 
resistance movements.
‘People’s war’ is more problematic as an idea and might appear 
insufficiently rigorous. One only needs to recall that Stalin dubbed 
the East European states he controlled after 1945 ‘People’s 
Democracies’, to see how the word ‘people’ can be misused. 
Therefore, to hone down the definition of people’s war a number 
of searching questions must be asked. 
The first is, who exactly were ‘the people’? Such war did not 
entail universal activism. Under occupation the hurdle of contacting 
a necessarily secretive movement, plus the risk of arrest by the 
Gestapo or its equivalent, meant only a minority were directly 
involved. Nevertheless, organised resisters enjoyed the sympathy 
of wider layers for their heroism and self-sacrifice. In unoccupied 
Allied countries vast numbers enthusiastically fought for freedom 
and a better society, even if they were following the orders of those 
in authority who thought quite differently. In Asia populations 
battled to end colonialism (against both their European and 
Japanese masters). The key point is that whether or not the war 
was fought by the people to a greater or lesser extent, it was fought 
for the people. 
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A second question is: what distinguishes people’s war from class 
war or national war? The Marxist definition of class – a social 
group who share a common relationship to the means of production 
– did not apply to the people’s war, even where workers’ action 
was prominent such as Italy. Resisters came from across the social 
spectrum. Yet equally, people’s war was not national war. It was 
not limited to the goal of independence but always strove to go 
beyond merely preserving or resurrecting the old state and society. 
So neither class war nor national war, people’s war was an 
amalgam. As a class phenomenon its ideology was one of radical 
rejection of the pre-war social system and in favour of the lower 
classes (irrespective of individuals’ social origins). As a national 
phenomenon the people’s warriors insisted that the masses, rather 
than the old, discredited elites, represented the nation. The failure 
of Allied ruling classes to stand up to foreign oppressors, and their 
readiness to collaborate with the Axis (either through appeasement 
before the war, or after occupation) strengthened this conviction. 
Of course, it would be convenient to neatly separate class war 
from national war, but that was not possible, for the reasons given 
above. Similarly, it would be helpful if liberation struggles could 
be neatly split away from imperialist influences, but the two were 
often entangled in such a way as to rule this out.
Although the idea of parallel wars is hinted at in a number of 
excellent national studies, such as Angus Calder’s The People’s War 
(on Britain), the analysis has not been applied to the Second World 
War in its entirety because on the conventional battlefield those 
giving commands and those performing them acted in concert, 
however different their thinking. Thus the two wars were indistin-
guishable even to those involved. There were, however, particular 
instances where the split was illuminated, as if by lightning. In 
Axis-dominated countries mass resistance movements developed 
independently, to the dismay of Allied imperialists; in Asia colonial 
authority was undermined by the war in Europe or uprooted by 
Japanese invasion. Another revealing moment came in 1945. Allied 
governments wanted a settlement based on their victory in the 
imperialist war which meant reinstating the pre-war status quo, but 
local populations wanted a post-war world based on the successes 
of their people’s war. 
It is not possible to write a full standard history in the confines of 
this short work. Unlike books that concentrate on the Second World 
War’s battles, technology, generals and armies, or those that treat 
individual leaders (like Hitler, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill), or 
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nations, the focus here is on places where the two conflicts can most 
readily be discerned. Inevitably many countries have been omitted.44 
The most significant exemption is Russia. It played a decisive 
role in defeating Hitler, but did not experience parallel wars for 
two reasons. Firstly, the murderous policies of the Nazi invaders 
rallied the population to the Stalinist regime in its frantic struggle 
for survival. Unlike resistance movements elsewhere, the hundreds 
of thousands of Soviet partisans who fought courageous battles 
behind German lines never posed an alternative to Moscow. 
Secondly, the Russian state was intensely repressive. For example, 
entire ethnic groups which it believed might pose a threat, such as 
the Chechens, were deported eastwards under appalling conditions. 
That left no room for an independent expression of people’s war. 
The only sizable forces opposed to Moscow, such as the renegade 
soldiers who joined General Vlassov’s outfit, were passive tools of 
Nazi imperialism. This lack of people’s war would have doleful 
consequences for those who fell under the thrall of the Red Army 
when it drove the Nazis from Eastern Europe.
Although this book therefore offers no in-depth study of Russia 
itself, that country had a huge influence on the parallel wars. 
The foreign Communist Parties were prominent in almost every 
resistance movement, and they led, inspired, and died, for the 
people’s war. However, loyalty to Stalin’s Russia meant they were 
strongly influenced by its imperialist foreign aims. This led them 
to accept dramatic twists in policy. Until the mid-1930s the USSR 
advocated a ‘Third Period line’: open class struggle was the only 
issue of the moment, and all other parties – from fascist to left-wing 
reformist – were tools of capitalism to be opposed equally. When this 
disastrous analysis assisted Hitler’s accession to power the Popular 
Front policy was adopted. Class was now utterly irrelevant and 
everyone who was not a self-declared fascist (including right-wing 
supporters of imperialism in Britain, France and elsewhere) should 
unite in the national interest and also defend the Soviet Union. 
With a brief interruption occasioned by the Hitler–Stalin Pact in 
1939, Popular Frontism continued throughout the Second World 
War. It produced some extraordinary situations. More than any 
other grouping, communists organised and led mass resistance to 
fascism, and encouraged the hope of workers and peasants for a 
better post-war world. But they simultaneously constrained struggles 
so as not alarm the imperialist states with which Russia was allied. 
They both created and castrated the mass movements, assisting the 
defeat of fascism but allowing discredited ruling class groups to 
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regain power at the expense of ordinary people. That communists 
represented an intersection of the people’s war and the policies of 
an imperialist power shows the supporters of imperialism did not 
line up uniformly on one side, and those of the people’s war on the 
other. Both mingled together and co-existed within movements, 
organisations and individuals. So the notion of parallel wars cannot 
be treated simplistically. 
Another major country not dealt with here is China. Its 
three-cornered fight between Japanese, Nationalist Chinese and 
Communist Party armies bore features discussed elsewhere in this 
book. However, the key events, which culminated in the victory of 
Mao’s People’s Liberation Army in 1948, lie outside our time frame. 
Hopefully, despite these omissions, the examples covered, taken 
from a variety of contexts, are sufficient to justify seeing parallel 
wars as a valid general description of the Second World War.
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Spanish Prelude
To the extent that the Second World War was truly a fight for 
democracy against fascism, then it did not begin in 1939 in Poland, 
but in Spain three years earlier. This was when a people’s war 
against General Franco’s Nationalist rebellion was launched. He 
acknowledged as much in 1941, telling Hitler that in the Second 
World War ‘the first battle was won here in Spain’.1 From the opposite 
camp an American anti-fascist volunteer wrote: ‘To me, World War 
Two started on July 18, 1936. That’s when the first shot was fired 
in Madrid.’2 This is not the conventionally accepted starting point 
merely because Allied governments were yet to take up arms. Thus 
Americans who returned from the Civil War were dubbed ‘premature 
anti-fascists’ and hauled in front of the forerunner to McCarthy’s 
House Un-American Activities Committee.3 Their crime: opposing a 
coup which, according to the Nationalist daily, El Correo Español, 
‘was working … to liberate Europe from the filth of democracy.’4
Although Franco was more a military figure than a classic fascist 
leader on Italian or German lines, his link with fascism and Nazism 
was visible from the outset. Without Hitler’s Junkers 52 transport 
planes to fly soldiers from Morocco the rebellion might have 
fizzled out.5 Mussolini was also quick to provide planes, arms and 
ships.6 The Nationalists remained heavily dependent on the Axis 
throughout, receiving munitions supplemented by 16,000 German 
and 80,000 Italian military personnel. 
If Franco declared his movement ‘not exclusively fascist’, he 
nonetheless admitted that fascism was a component part and the 
‘inspiration of the new State’.7 Nationalists echoed the Nazi slogan – 
Ein Reich, ein Staat, ein Führer – substituting the Spanish equivalent 
– ‘One fatherland, one state, one caudillo’.8 Thus Francoist ideology 
has been dubbed ‘an amalgam of fascist corporatism and religious 
obscurantism’.9
Moreover, Nationalist methods prefigured the murderous policies 
enacted by the Axis elsewhere. One Falangist admitted: ‘The 
repression in the nationalist zone was carried out in cold blood, 
purposefully and methodically.’10 In Malaga, a city that surrendered 
15
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without resistance, 4,000 were shot in one week.11 So extreme and 
violent was this process that:
Even the Italians and Germans criticised such blanket repression 
as ‘short-sighted’ and suggested the Nationalists should recruit 
workers to a fascist party instead of slaughtering them … The 
decline in the number executed in the Nationalist zone during 
1937 has also been attributed to the fact that there was simply 
no one relevant left to kill.12
When the fighting eventually stopped on 1 April 1939, 300,000 
people lay dead.13
Though Spain did not join the Axis coalition and remained 
officially neutral, this was only because the country was utterly 
exhausted and Hitler was unwilling to pay Franco’s price for entry. 
The latter did, however, send the 47,000-strong Blue Division to 
fight alongside the Wehrmacht in Russia.14
The Spanish Civil War did not conform to the standard model 
of army versus army, but to army versus revolution.15 An anarchist 
who spent 20 years in Franco’s jails described how the people’s war 
took shape in Barcelona, not only to defeat the Nationalists but in 
opposition to the elected Republican government Franco wished 
to overthrow:
For months, the coup of the generals had been expected. Everyone 
knew they wanted to turn out their paymasters in the Republic 
and establish their own dictatorship, modelled on the lines of the 
Fascist powers. ‘The government can’t get out of it,’ everyone 
had said. ‘Now it has got to arm the people’. Instead, the Popular 
Front Government had called on the army to be loyal. When 
it had finally revolted, we had hit back. Barcelona was ours in 
twenty-four hours!16
This was therefore a people’s war combining resistance to Franco at 
the front and class war behind the lines. Militia columns marched 
off to fight the rebel army, but confronted their bosses on return. 
In Barcelona 80 per cent of enterprises were collectivised17 under 
a decree that said: ‘The victory of the people will mean the death 
of capitalism’.18 In December 1936 George Orwell experienced 
the results:
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the working class was in the saddle … Every shop and café had 
an inscription saying that it had been collectivised; even the 
bootblacks had been collectivised and their boxes painted red 
and black. Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in the face and 
treated you as an equal. Servile and even ceremonial forms of 
speech had temporarily disappeared… Tipping was forbidden 
by law … .19
One aspect of civil war was a transformation in the status of women, 
one of whom reported: ‘Women were no longer objects, they were 
human beings, persons on the same level as men … [This] was one 
of the most remarkable social advances of the time … .’20 
The conflict that began in 1936 was, in one sense, already a world 
war. For alongside the Spanish working class who battled against 
Franco, Hitler and Mussolini, were the International Brigades, 
totalling some 32,000 from 53 different countries.21 The largest 
contingent of volunteers came from neighbouring France, but 
significant numbers of anti-fascist exiles from Italy and Germany 
were enrolled. Formed in response to a call from the Communist 
International.22 Sympathy for the Spanish cause inspired liberals, 
socialists and democrats, although 85 per cent of Brigaders were 
Party members.23 In Britain, for example, the Labour Party initially 
pledged ‘all practicable support … to defend freedom and democracy 
in Spain,’24 while opinion polls showed an 8:1 ratio in support of 
the Republican Popular Front government over Franco.25 
Yet the future Allies of the Second World War had no need of this 
anti-fascist people’s war. Instead of siding with the democratically 
elected government, the French and British promoted a Non-Inter-
vention Committee. Formally backed by all European countries26 
it was supposed to deny weapons and combatants to both sides in 
Spain. Neville Chamberlain, claimed ‘we have no wish or intention 
to interfere with the internal affairs of any other nation.’27 In fact, 
such pretended neutrality assisted Franco because the Republic had 
lost its main armaments to the rebels and was now denied the chance 
to purchase weapons on the international market, even though it 
was the legitimate government. 
Furthermore, when Italy and Germany openly flouted the rules, 
nothing was done to stop them assisting France because even before 
1936 the British establishment had concluded that in Spain ‘the 
foundations of civilization are being undermined [because] the 
revolution is beginning …’.28 France had elected its own Popular 
Front government in 1936 under Blum and he originally wanted to 
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assist the Spanish Republic. However, not only did he fear provoking 
domestic right-wing forces,29 he needed Britain as an ally against 
Hitler. Warned of ‘strong pro-rebel feeling in the British Cabinet’, 
it was Blum, who initiated the non-intervention process.30 
The USA could have sold arms to the Republic as its Neutrality 
Law did not apply to civil war. However, Washington declared that 
it would: ‘of course, scrupulously refrain from any interference 
whatsoever in the unfortunate Spanish situation’.31 Roosevelt 
described events in Spain as ‘a contagion [and] when an epidemic 
of physical disease starts to spread, the community joins in a 
quarantine …’.32 Some sources suggest he regretted a policy which 
favoured Franco33 and dabbled in an abortive plan to send covert 
military supplies.34 Perhaps so. Yet in practical terms everything 
was done to discourage support to the Republic. For the first time 
in American history, restrictions were put on travel, with ‘Not 
Valid for Travel in Spain’ stamped on US passports.35 While the US 
government obstructed assistance to the Republic, its big businesses 
backed Franco with 3 millions tons of fuel, and thousands of trucks 
essential for his war machine.36 
The Spanish civil war gave hints of the attitude Russia would 
adopt towards people’s war in the future. Communist International 
Brigaders volunteered from a commitment to socialist interna-
tionalism, but Stalin was motivated by the needs of Russian state 
capitalism. He hoped to curb Hitler’s ambitions through an alliance 
with Britain and France that threatened war on two fronts. A 
Spanish Republican victory that brought ‘the death of capitalism’ 
would alienate these western powers; a victory for Franco, with Nazi 
backing, would be equally damaging. Hugh Thomas concludes: 
‘With crablike caution, therefore, Stalin seems to have reached 
one conclusion, and one conclusion only, about Spain: he would 
not permit the Republic to lose, even though he would not help it 
to win.’37 
Apart from Mexico, the USSR was the Republic’s only significant 
military backer, and to match fascist supplies to the Nationalists 
Stalin should have supplied six times more men and three times 
more tanks38 than he did.39 Even so help of any sort was manna 
from heaven, so Russia’s influence grew to the point where it could 
engineer the downfall of the beleaguered Republic’s leader, Largo 
Caballero, and his replacement by the more pro-Moscow Juan 
Negrin. Russia’s line was for ‘democracy’ (of the parliamentary 
sort acceptable to Britain and France), but opposed to the revolution 
that inspired the mass fight against Franco. 
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The interaction of imperialist war and people’s war was to be 
found in this clash between Stalin’s foreign policy needs and popular 
revolution. Herbert Matthews, the New York Times reporter, was 
no doubt justified in denying the communists ‘were mere robots 
obeying orders (except for the few Russian leaders involved). I still 
say they fought against Fascism and – at the time – for the democracy 
we know.’40 Nevertheless their loyalty to what they considered the 
world’s only socialist state trapped them in a contradictory stance: 
following Stalinism to extol conventional capitalist democracy, 
and yet fighting and dying for a people’s war that went so far 
beyond it. This position was brilliantly summed up by a Scottish 
communist Brigader:
at that time I literally worshipped the Soviet Union. And when one 
finally had a rifle on which one could depend for killing Fascists, 
and not killing yourself, with a hammer and sickle emblazoned on 
it, then one felt a real thrill of pride. Here was the great Workers’ 
Republic coming to the aid of the Spanish people in their effort 
to preserve democracy inside their own country. Because please 
bear in mind this fact: the struggle in Spain was not a struggle to 
establish communism.41
There was a technical, military, aspect to the interaction of the 
two wars in the Republican effort. Preston argues that: ‘After the 
early defeats of the enthusiastic and heroic, but untrained and 
disorganized, workers’ militias, many moderate Republicans, 
Socialists, Communists and even some anarchists advocated the 
creation of conventional military structures.’42
However, the fundamental issue was political. Should the war be 
conducted in a way that did not alienate the western powers (who 
sympathised with Franco), or defeat the rotten system which had 
given rise to so many Francos over the years? These two conceptions 
came to blows in Barcelona during May 1937. Communists, in 
alliance with socialists and bourgeois Republicans, repressed 
the anarchist CNT and the POUM (a movement loosely linked 
to Trotskyism). Hundreds died, the NKVD Russian secret police 
pursued the survivors, and the revolutionary hopes of the early civil 
war were crushed. 
It was always going to be difficult for the Republic to triumph 
given its continuing isolation, the calculations of Russia, the 
malevolent indifference of the Western Allies, and Axis aid to the 
enemy. But quashing the revolution sapped popular enthusiasm for 
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the fight, and proved no more effective in defeating the Nationalists. 
They won in 1939. 
Although Britain and France were officially at war with fascism 
from that year on they did not change their attitude towards 
the fascist-backed Spanish government. As Glyn Stone writes: 
‘[The Allied governments] had gone to war in September 1939 
to challenge Nazi Germany’s intention to dominate the European 
continent rather than to create a new democratic order in Europe 
and, accordingly, as long as Spain maintained its neutrality Franco’s 
regime had nothing to fear… .’43
In 1940 Churchill still waxed lyrical about the Nationalists: ‘As 
in the days of the Peninsular War, British interests and policy are 
based on the independence and unity of Spain and we look forward 
to seeing her take her rightful place both as a great Mediterranean 
Power and as a leading and famous member of the family of Europe 
and of Christendom.’44 Franco greeted these overtures by enthusias-
tically supporting Hitler’s war against ‘Russian Communism, that 
terrible nightmare of our generation’45 and despatching the Blue 
Division to assist. He warned the USA that entry into the war would 
be ‘criminal madness’ and affirmed that the Allies ‘have lost’.46
The British and French governments were unperturbed. They 
concluded trade treaties and continued to support the weakest of the 
fascist regimes because, in the words of the British ambassador, any 
change ‘would only lead to greater confusion and danger’.47 The civil 
war had left the country heavily dependent on food imports, and 
while Indians starved the Western Allies rushed to supply Spain’s 
shortfall with hundreds of thousands of tons of wheat,48 as well as 
sending large quantities of industrial goods and oil. One American 
commentator concluded that Spanish civilians enjoyed the highest 
level of petrol consumption in Europe.49
Allied policy may conceivably have been justified on purely 
strategic grounds. Formal Spanish neutrality left Gibraltar in 
British hands, safeguarding entry into the Mediterranean. However, 
that reasoning could not hold after 1945 when, as Britain’s 
ambassador commented: ‘With the elimination of other totalitarian 
governments in Europe the Spanish anomaly becomes more and 
more conspicuous.’50 When Russia called for Franco’s removal51 
and US and British experts talked of using dependence on Allied 
oil as a lever to moderate his tyranny, Churchill weighed in with 
this tirade: ‘What you are proposing to do is little less than stirring 
up a revolution in Spain. You begin with oil, you will quickly end 
in blood … If we lay hands on Spain … the Communists become 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   20 04/05/2012   09:47
SPanISh Prelude 21
masters of Spain [and] we must expect the infection to spread very 
fast through both Italy and France.’52
Leaving Franco untouched allowed the gruesome judicial murder 
of Republicans to continue unabated. In 1945 they were running 
at about 60 death sentences a week, with 23 carried out in Madrid 
on one day alone.53 
One possible objection to the concept of the Second World 
War involving a people’s war might be that, in propaganda terms, 
all modern imperialist wars are presented as ‘progressive’ and 
‘democratic’. The Spanish experience shows that the current of 
people’s war that manifested itself during the Second World War had 
independent origins, and indeed developed in the face of antipathy 
from Allied governments.
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yugoslavia, greece, Poland  
and latvia – Between the Blocs
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yugoslavia – Balancing Powers
At first glance Yugoslavia does not appear to conform to a pattern 
of parallel wars. In the final stages of combat Tito’s resistance army, 
supplied by Britain and assisted by the Red Army, took on and 
defeated the Axis. The appearance belies the reality, however. Before 
the triumphant conclusion there was a bitter armed struggle between 
Tito’s partisans and Mihailovich’s chetniks. It was a fight over the 
very meaning of the Second World War. 
In conquering Yugoslavia in March 1941, Hitler was entering one 
of the most backward and oppressed countries in Europe. Eighty 
per cent of its 16 million people were peasants. Land distribution 
was highly unequal: a mere 7,000 landowners owned twice as much 
land as a third of the rural population. The country’s 1.1 million 
workers worked the longest hours in Europe, while 500,000 were 
unemployed. All this was presided over by an authoritarian royal 
government that banned the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) as 
early as 1921.1 Eight years later King Alexander abolished parliament 
and seized full power. He was assassinated and was succeeded by 
Peter II who, being too young to rule directly, ceded power to his 
cousin, the Regent Prince Paul. In the run-up to the Second World 
War the country balanced uncomfortably between the Allied and 
Axis power blocs.2 In 1940 this led a British official to suggest bribing 
the General Staff because: ‘Rumour has it that several Yugoslav 
Generals have built themselves villas with money supplied by the 
Germans. Perhaps we could help them to add wings?’3 
At the outbreak of the Second World War the authorities were 
keen to be found on the winning side, but no-one knew which 
that would be. Eventually, in 1941 Prince Paul’s cabinet gambled 
on Axis victory and opted to sign its Tripartite Pact. Another 
section of the establishment, doubting the value of this alignment, 
launched a military coup. Prince Paul was deposed and replaced 
by the still under-age King Peter. Mass anti-fascist demonstrations 
welcomed this outcome, but, in a sign of its lack of conviction, the 
new government tried to play for time by adhering to the Pact and 
simultaneously negotiating with the Allies.4 British representatives 
25
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lamented the ‘somewhat puzzling and rather discouraging news 
from Belgrade. Government seems to have put out a statement that 
their foreign policy isn’t changed!’5 In this chaotic situation Hitler 
showed a typically brutal decisiveness and launched ‘Operation 
Punishment’ to conquer the country. 
Military defeat was swift because the regime refused to arm the 
population or accept left-wing assistance. It was privately admitted 
that the government feared the occupiers less than the people, 
something shown by its treatment of the population in Belgrade.6 
Djilas, a leading communist, described how under a hail of bombs: 
The police and the [Serbian nationalist] Chetniks, roaming the 
streets in trucks, were trying to establish ‘order’ in a city that had 
been reduced from 300,000 to 30,000 inhabitants. They were 
shooting people, allegedly purging the city of its ‘fifth column’ and 
its deserters … The very same policemen who had manhandled 
students and workers in recent years were rushing all over the city 
with Chetnik insignia. We Communists had to hide, even though 
we were the staunchest defenders of the country.7
Djilas added that when King Peter’s government fled to London it 
left a feeling of ‘great bitterness’: ‘There was something rotten in 
this government. A profound moral disintegration that was seeping 
down from the state apparatus, from the top military ranks.’8
The Axis then dismembered Yugoslavia. A puppet state was 
established in Croatia/Bosnia-Herzegovina under the ferocious rule 
of Pavelic’s Ustasha militias; Slovenia was split between German 
and Italian zones of influence; Italy took Montenegro. Serbia, under 
full German occupation, and ruled by the quisling Nedic regime,9 
lost territory to Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. 
Out of this turmoil emerged two resistance forces. The chetniks 
of Serbia were a group of army officers who took their name from 
squads who fought the Turks during the First World War. They were 
led by Colonel Mihailovich, who was duly appointed Minister of 
War by the exiled royal government.10 Although he claimed that 
as a soldier ‘politics never interested me’,11 he soon adopted the 
slogan: ‘With faith in God, for King and Fatherland!’12 A fuller 
programme emerged later:
1. Struggle for the freedom of the whole country under the sceptre 
of His Majesty King Peter II;
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2. To create a great Yugoslavia and in it a great Serbia, ethnically 
pure within the frontiers …
3. The cleansing of state territory from all national minorities and 
non-national elements.13
Like pro-imperialist currents elsewhere, the logic of the chetnik 
programme was to recover national independence, so as to restore 
the pre-war social order with its divisive ethnic contours. However, 
military collapse and flight into exile had discredited the old state 
machine. This both emboldened its domestic opponents and 
decreased the ability of the chetniks to suppress them. Mihailovich, 
like King Peter, dared not fight for independence by mobilising the 
home population. Without that option his only hope of success was 
to wait for the Allies to expel the invaders. Such a policy, which 
appeared in many countries, has been labelled ‘attentism’.
In 1941 Mihailovich had reason to expect large-scale British 
aid. With the Hitler–Stalin pact in force, France defeated, and the 
USA neutral, Britain was isolated and unable to conduct military 
operations on the Continent. So Churchill created the Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) to encourage resistance movements 
which might ‘set Europe ablaze’.14 Reports of Mihailovich’s activity, 
which reached Britain in the spring of 1942, were the first news 
of guerrilla warfare behind Axis lines. This made the Serb a ‘hero 
of European resistance, and … a shining example to the rest …’.15 
Churchill had an additional motive for helping the chetniks. 
When Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of Soviet 
Russia) Stalin pleaded for a second military front to be established 
in France, to relieve German pressure on the eastern front. The 
British PM needed an alibi for refusal. He told Roosevelt: ‘The 
paramount task before us is, first to conquer the African shores of 
the Mediterranean [from which] to strike at the under-belly of the 
Axis in effective strength and in the shortest time.’16 The Balkan 
area was that under-belly and it also lay conveniently on Britain’s 
strategic route to India. 
Tito’s partisans were a rival resistance group to the chetniks. 
Views of this movement tend to be sharply polarised. For 
example, one American historian has recently ridiculed their claim 
to be a ‘coalition of all democratic and progressive parties’ and 
suggested their aim was ‘the imposition of a Communist regime 
on the people of Yugoslavia.’17 At the time an opposite view of 
the partisan movement was expressed by Jones, a Canadian major 
who parachuted into their camp as a liaison officer: ‘It was the 
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unity of the community, symbolised in the local committee that 
was the strength of the Freedom Front Movement in Jugoslavia. 
It was democracy at its best. People in any free community were 
absolutely free to do as they wished … .’18
The partisans were communist-led so an understanding of the 
YCP is essential. Djilas has described his conversion. It began with 
‘a deep dissatisfaction with existing conditions and an irrepressible 
desire to change life…’.19 ‘[We] began by gossiping and spreading 
inflated news of insignificant and serious matters alike: the cost of 
the Queen’s evening dress, gold teeth in the mouth of a government 
minister’s dog … Should my country be ruled by such people? 
Should I live like a slave all my life? ... At every step one faced 
misery and luxury, brute force and despair… .’20
Despotism only strengthened the feeling of ‘solidarity, a fighting 
spirit, dedication to the ideals of the working people and to the 
efforts to improve their lives.’21 
The YCP’s secret conference of 1940, demonstrated how 
much its 8,000 members had sacrificed. Pijade, who had recently 
completed over 14 years in prison and concentration camps, opened 
proceedings. Of the 101 delegates 80 per cent had been arrested 
and 40 per cent had served average sentences of two years.22 War 
brought no respite. When Belgrade was liberated in October 1944, 
by a combined Red Army/partisan operation, the latter encountered: 
not one – literally not one – member of the party. There were 
thousands of sympathizers, even wildcat non-party groups, 
but the party members had been wiped out in camps, in gas 
extermination trucks, and on execution grounds. At the execution 
ground in Jajinici night after night – every night in the course of 
three and a half years – hundreds of hostages and patriots, mostly 
communists and the sympathizers, were executed … .23
The communists had a unique attitude to the thorny issue of 
ethnicity. When Yugoslavia was formed in 1918 the monarch and 
army command were Serbian, a tradition Mihailovich wished to 
continue. However, as its formal name indicated – ‘the Triune 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’24 – Yugoslavia contained 
many groups, the main ones being Serbs (39 per cent) and Croats 
(24 per cent). One reaction to Serbian dominance was to assert 
ethnic autonomy, here expressed by the leader of the Croatian 
Peasant Party: ‘the whole Croat peasant people are equally against 
your centralism and against militarism, equally for a republic…’.25 
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Tito and his supporters rejected the ethnic exclusiveness of both Serb 
chetniks and Croat Ustashi. He himself was the son of a Slovenian 
mother and Croatian father,26 and in the most diverse region – 
Bosnia – the partisan rallying cry was: ‘neither Serbian nor Croatian, 
nor Moslem, but Serbian and Moslem and Croatian.’27
Strengthened by a desire to urgently draw Axis forces away from 
the Russian front, Tito also opposed the chetnik strategy of waiting 
for a British/American landing. The importance of the USSR for 
communists cannot be underestimated. As Djilas put it: 
We were not taught the Biblical ‘truth’ that a just life in this 
world prepares a man for the next. We were taught something 
far greater: to expect a paradise in this world… that was what 
people who had been to the Soviet Union and seen the ‘truth’ in 
practice told us. And we believed it. Misery and despair were all 
around us, and the more unbearable life became, the closer we 
were to the new world.28
This adulation had a contradictory result. Although the partisans 
rejected both Axis occupation and a return to pre-war conditions, 
the YCP swallowed the Russian line that social demands must 
be laid aside until the defeat of the occupiers and their quislings. 
Tito was explicit: ‘It was incorrect to call the National Liberation 
Struggle an antifascist revolution’.29 The struggle was ‘not on class 
lines but on the lines of the National Liberation struggle.’30 If that 
limited the role of people’s war, in the sense of discouraging social 
and economic demands, it was nevertheless true that beneath a 
shared rhetoric of unity against the invader, chetnik and partisan 
movements struggled for fundamentally different goals. 
This emerged at the first meeting between Mihailovich and Tito, 
when the communist leader held out the hand of friendship. He 
explained later: ‘Our idea, desire and intentions were to unite all 
forces in the struggle against the invaders. Mihailovich was an 
intelligent and very ambitious man. I offered him the supreme 
command.’31 Mihailovich ostentatiously refused the offer, 
rebuking the partisans for destroying land ownership records and 
supporting disorder.32 
Even military co-operation was rejected. Mihailovich claimed 
there was little point in mounting joint chetnik/partisan operations. 
Firstly, Axis defeat appeared so far off.33 Secondly, though he was 
forced to defend Serbs from Ustasha violence, he justified inaction 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   29 04/05/2012   09:47
30 a PeoPle’S hISTory of The Second World War
against the Nazis by referring to Hitler’s vow that one hundred 
Yugoslavs would be sacrificed for every German loss. He could 
point to the 5,000 civilians massacred at Kraljevi and Kragujevac 
in retribution for 20 German casualties.34 
The fact that Tito brushed aside such fears has led one critic 
to accuse him of using Nazi atrocities for his own ends: ‘people 
escaping from such fearful retribution made useful recruits and 
the breakdown of normal society is one of the keystones of 
revolution …’.35 This charge is unfounded. The communists were 
involved in all-out combat with the Axis because the longer they 
ruled the more innocent civilians would die. Mihailovich’s refusal 
to act alongside Tito arose because he feared partisan victory would 
threaten the social order, something which took precedence over 
his desire for national liberation. 
Mihailovich is reported to have said: ‘His main enemies were 
the partisans, Ustasha, Muslim and Croats – in that order – and 
only when he had dealt with them would he turn his attention to 
the Germans and Italians.’36 This policy was confirmed in chetnik 
practice and justified the suspicion expressed by Djilas in March 
1942 that:
To protect their privileges, the Greater Serbian gentlemen in 
London have begun a class war, their tactic being to destroy the 
most dangerous opponent – that is, the Communist Party and the 
partisan movement – while temporarily collaborating with the 
remaining opponents … The adherents of the London government 
have had to take the path of open collaboration with the invader 
because of the force and scope of the national uprising against 
that invader.37
An important difference between chetniks and partisans was the 
backing for their movements. If Mihailovich looked to the exiled 
government in London, Tito’s forces depended on mass support 
from below. The process began with a spontaneous uprising in 
Montenegro during July 1941. Djilas was on the spot:
The entire population – those with rifles and those without – rose 
up against the invader. Gathering at customary meeting grounds, 
the men came – young and old, grouped by families, villages and 
clans – and set out against Italian garrisons in towns. Poorly 
organized but enthusiastic, they were given leadership by the 
Communists. Not everyone agreed to Communist leadership, but 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   30 04/05/2012   09:47
yugoSlavIa 31
no one was strong enough to challenge it. The Communists were 
not only the sole organized force, but a new one, uncompromised. 
Their propaganda concerning the rottenness of the ruling parties 
had been confirmed in the recent war. No other political movement 
could have waged the struggle, for all were confined by regional 
bounds or carried away with excessive ethnic nationalism.38
In September 1941 further attempts to bridge the widening gap 
between Tito’s and Mihailovich’s positions failed. On 1 November 
chetnik forces attacked the partisans’ headquarters at Uzice. The 
counter-attack came within 1km of Mihailovich’s base at Ravna 
Gora on 12 November.39 The very next day his representative 
sat down with the head of German Intelligence to ask for aid to 
fight Communism.40 
The die had been cast and soon the Mihailovich camp was sending 
out messages like this:
The attempt of the Communists to penetrate into Serbia has 
been repulsed by us and now we are to further our operations 
until their extermination, which can be accomplished if our units 
are not in conflict with outer forces. German forces have not 
interfered with us in this last operation even though we do not 
have any contact or agreement with them. So that we will not 
make difficult or jeopardise the arranged operations against the 
Communistic group, it is necessary to stop all operations against 
the Germans, but the propaganda must continue.41
The ‘extermination’ of the partisans required arms, and the chetniks 
were not fussy about where these came from. An officer of the Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS – the US equivalent of Britain’s SOE) 
attached to the chetniks reported instances where the Wehrmacht 
left them truckloads of weapons.42 Another alleged that chetniks 
were ‘fighting with the Germans and Italians against the partisans’.43 
Intercepts proved that ‘the Germans were receiving intelligence on 
a routine basis from some chetnik units in relation to the location 
and movement of Partisan forces’ and identified ‘particular 
chetnik commanders in joint operations with the Germans against 
the partisans.’44
Despite this, it is important not to bracket Mihailovich with 
quisling figures like France’s Marshal Pétain or Yugoslavia’s own 
Nedic. The chetnik leader reflected the interests of an Allied 
government-in-exile, and was driven to collaborate by the logic 
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of the parallel wars. The Germans may have worked with the 
chetniks against the partisans, but they did not want the 60,000 
chetnik soldiers45 to increase in number. So not long after the 1941 
meeting with German intelligence Mihailovich faced a near fatal 
German assault. 
Far from turning to action against Nazism, this only strengthened 
his determination to wait for the Allies and he directed his followers 
either to return to their villages and await orders, or take cover 
among Nedic’s forces. Historians have debated whether this move 
signified open collaboration or self-protection. Apologists talk about 
how bearing arms for Nedic was necessary ‘camouflage’46 and ‘most 
of the men in these units were loyal to Mihailovich’.47 Critics see it as 
a policy that ‘the chetniks and Nedic government should cooperate 
in the struggle against the partisans …’.48 Whatever the correct 
interpretation, the chetniks were not primarily anti-fascists, but 
fought to re-establish the old order in league with the imperialist 
Allied powers.
What of the partisans? They were involved in a fight whose 
savagery was shocking even for the Second World War. The overall 
death toll in Yugoslavia exceeded 1.7 million victims or 11 per cent 
of the population.49 In a partisan stronghold he visited, Jones found 
women scarred by: ‘the memory of their menfolk being enticed to 
the local church by appeals for labour from Italian officials, and 
there locked in, petrol poured in through the windows and the 
church set on fire, with machine-guns surrounding the pyre that 
none might escape’.50 The murderous Croat Ustashi exhibited ‘a 
ferocity that horrified even the German and Italian authorities’.51 
By the end of 1943 the 300,000 partisans were holding down 
some 200,000 Germans and another 160,000 auxiliary troops.52 
But the cost was high. The partisans lost 305,000 men and more 
than 400,000 were wounded.53 Yet they should not be portrayed 
as whiter than white. For example, Djilas himself felt uneasy about 
some of their methods, because: ‘imprudent, hasty executions, along 
with hunger and war weariness, were helping to strengthen the 
chetniks. Even more horrible and inconceivable was the killing of 
kinsmen and hurling of their bodies into ravines … .’54 
Furthermore, Tito himself was not above negotiating with the 
occupiers, who were always ready to use divide and rule tactics. 
In the spring of 1942 discussions of a prisoner exchange with the 
Germans developed into something more ambitious. The partisans 
had been on the run and just survived a crucial battle with chetniks 
on the Neretva River. They were hoping that the Wehrmacht might 
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accept a ceasefire that would allow them to return to Serbia, their 
original base. Djilas was one of the negotiators and he describes 
Tito’s approach in these terms: ‘There was not a word about the 
cessation of fighting between the Germans and ourselves, but this 
was understood.’55 In the end no truce materialised and only the 
prisoner exchange took place because: ‘The Germans couldn’t 
permit our stabilization and expansion, and we couldn’t permit 
them to gain strength … .’56
Discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the partisans, Basil 
Davidson, an SOE officer who spent time in Yugoslavia, has 
argued that:
I am not saying that they were saints, nor even extraordinary 
people in the general run of events, nor that fearful things were 
not done … [But] participation in the companionship of resistance 
to evil became, of itself and out of its own nature, more than 
a mere joining of wills. It became the shaper of a new state of 
mind. It became a mental and moral commitment to the good 
that opposes evil.57
In spite of Nazis, chetniks, quislings, and Ustashi, the partisans 
triumphed because they were a genuine liberation movement. Many 
accounts attest to their popularity: 
Poverty, backwardness, and the devastation of war were 
everywhere. But the local peasants were proud to receive their 
own army, though it meant depriving their children of milk and 
corn meal, and their sheep of lambs. The old men and young girls 
in the local government and organisations – the young men were 
all in the army – worked hard and competently. Everyone obeyed 
them without coercion, which kept the community together and 
carried on the war.58
As with all resistance movements facing organised state machines, 
the supply of weapons was crucial, and this depended on Allied 
recognition. One obstacle was Mihailovich’s reputation as the 
representative of a legitimate government-in-exile, a status which 
even Russia accepted. Tito found this infuriating and protested to 
Moscow: ‘Incessant fighting has left our Partisans exhausted … 
they have no ammunition left. The whole people curse the Yugoslav 
government in London which through Draza Mihailovich is aiding 
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the invader. On all sides the people are asking why the Soviet Union 
does not send aid.’
The communist leader objected to the BBC talking about the 
‘common fight’ of partisans and chetniks against the invader: ‘That 
is a horrible lie. Please do all you can to expose this terrible treachery 
and tell the whole world about it … .’59
Gradually, however, the Allies understood the relative 
contributions made by each resistance movement. In 1943 General 
Donovan, who led the OSS, concluded the partisan’s record stood 
‘in favorable contrast to Mihailovich’s relative lack of activity and 
narrow field’.60 That same year an OSS liaison officer reported 
the partisan movement was of ‘far greater military and political 
importance than is commonly realized in the outside world’ and 
their struggle against Axis forces was ‘at times almost beyond the 
imagination’.61
But this was already old news in London. In the summer of 1942 
the British SOE cynically reported: ‘As we know, any activities in 
Yugoslavia should really be attributed to the Partisans. But for 
public consumption we can see no harm in a certain amount of this 
going to the credit of Mihajlovic.’62 During the winter of 1942/3 
that line was still maintained even though, as the Foreign Secretary 
readily admitted, Mihailovich was ‘not fighting our enemies’.63 He 
should be backed ‘to prevent anarchy and Communist chaos after 
the war.’64 An official added that: ‘This support must, we feel, be 
given independently of whether or not he continues to refuse to 
take a more active part in resisting and attacking Axis forces in 
Yugoslavia … .’65 
The central issue of defeating the Nazis only displaced 
anti-communism when British plans for a Balkan landing matured. 
This made Mihailovich an increasing liability. He was given a 
last ditch opportunity to prove himself and was asked to mount 
anti-German sabotage operations. The chetnik leader briefly went 
through the motions but soon returned to inaction, using Allied 
military supplies against the partisans rather than the Axis. At 
last the Foreign Office concluded that people’s war was preferable 
to no war at all: ‘The only way we can put ourselves right, is to 
free ourselves at once from our commitments in connexion with 
Mihailovich for which we cannot possibly find any justification 
which we could put to the British public … .’66 The point was 
reinforced by a ‘blockbuster’ report from Churchill’s envoy Fitzroy 
Maclean, a Tory MP. In contrast to the chetniks, he painted the 
partisans as ‘a far more considerable military and political force 
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than we had imagined’67 who had the ‘whole-hearted support of the 
civil population’ and dominated ‘the greater part of Yugoslavia’.68 
So in November 1943 the Allies meeting in Teheran finally 
announced: ‘The partisans in Yugoslavia are to be assisted to the 
greatest possible extent in supplies and materials… .’69 That decision 
had been a long time coming.
From this point on the partisans received increasing military 
support from Britain. The shifting fortunes were reflected in arms 
drops. Mihailovich was the sole recipient between 1941 and June 
1943, when 23 tons were provided.70 From July and September 
1943 107 tons were delivered to Mihailovich and 73 tons to Tito.71 
In 1944 only the latter was supplied. A belated attempt was made 
to salvage the political situation by encouraging an accord between 
Tito and the Yugoslav King, but despite formal agreements the 
royalty was not to be re-established.
If the British took their time to break from Mihailovich and 
back the active resistance, the US prevaricated for even longer, 
maintaining a mission with him until November 1944. Once 
again, the determining factor was not which movement fought the 
Axis most vigorously. When British support tilted towards Tito’s 
communists the US State Department stuck with the chetniks 
because now ‘both the Russians and the British may have interests 
in the Balkan and Mediterranean area which we would prefer not 
to support.’72 It added later: ‘we disapprove of any plan for building 
up Tito forces at the expense of the Serbs’ [i.e. chetniks].73
While British and American policy was influenced by a heavy 
dose of anti-communism, one would not have expected Russia to 
show the same hesitation in respect of the partisans. Yet the history 
of its relations with the Yugoslav CP confirms the two-war thesis 
also. Stalin had a purely instrumental attitude towards the foreign 
Communist parties. In the late 1930s he had the emigré Yugoslav 
leadership in Moscow all but wiped out by purges, and its total 
dissolution was canvassed.74 Tito, the sole survivor, found that 
‘during the war it was easier because at least during war you know 
where your enemies are’. ‘When I went to Moscow I never knew 
whether I would come back alive.’75
Tito judiciously hailed ‘the victories of the Red Army’ and set 
his party tasks such as ‘a greater popularization of the USSR and 
the building of socialism’.76 But a problem remained. Stalin’s 
calculations were driven not by general political principles but the 
need for good relations with the Allies, and so he had recognised 
King Peter’s administration the day before the Nazi invasion. For his 
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part Tito realised that victory depended on popular struggle against 
both the monarchy (including its Minister of War, Mihailovich) 
and the fascists:
Our struggle would not be so stubborn and so successful if the 
Yugoslavia peoples did not see in it not only victory over fascism 
but also victory over all those who have oppressed and are still 
trying to oppress, the Yugoslav peoples … if it did not have the 
aim of bringing freedom, equality of rights and brotherhood to 
all the peoples of Yugoslavia.77
Moscow found this approach inconvenient. In August 1941 
the Kremlin criticised the formation of a partisan Liberation 
Committee.78 Further, Dimitrov, Tito’s Kremlin link, instructed 
him to ‘not raise the question of the abolition of the monarchy’ 
or ‘put forward any republican slogans’.79 For a long period the 
Moscow-run Free Yugoslavia radio station refused to mention 
chetnik collaboration with the Axis or publicise partisan struggles.80 
When the First Proletarian Brigade (composed of mobile shock 
troops from the core of the partisan army) was established, Russia 
complained that this would provoke British suspicions of ‘the 
partisan movement taking on a Communist character aiming at 
the Sovietization of Yugoslavia’.81 
It was not as though the pain of Moscow’s criticisms were 
assuaged by any practical aid. An exasperated Tito radioed Dimitrov 
that: ‘Hundreds of thousands of refugees are threatened by death 
from starvation. Is it really impossible after twenty months of heroic, 
almost superhuman fighting to find some way to help us?’ The reply 
was evasive: ‘The moment there are conditions we shall do all that 
is most urgent. Can you possibly doubt this?’82 In August 1942 
Tito asked why nothing was broadcast about ‘the traitorous role 
of the Yugoslav government and of the superhuman sufferings and 
hardships of our people, who are fighting against the invaders, the 
Chetniks, the Ustashi etc.? Don’t you believe what we are telling 
you daily?’83 
It took until the Teheran conference, when the worst of the 
Yugoslav fighting was over, for the Kremlin to go beyond carping 
from the sidelines. At last supplies were forthcoming and the Red 
Army joined partisans in liberating Belgrade. At that moment the 
parallel wars temporarily converged with Britain, the US and Russia 
all supporting the partisans’ efforts in the final act of liberation. 
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The fact that Tito was not dependent on a single imperialist 
power, but could balance them off against each other, proved 
significant in the long run combined with the success of a massive 
and dogged people’s war, that provided the basis for a genuinely 
independent state after 1945. Yugloslavia was able to steer clear 
of Cold War entanglements and stay outside of both Western and 
Russian-dominated blocs. In the 1990s this balancing act came to 
an end and the country was torn apart once again by internal crisis 
and inter-imperialist rivalry.
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greece – allies at War with  
the resistance
Although, like Yugoslavia, the Greek resistance successfully 
challenged German occupation, the result could hardly have been 
more different. While the Allies were celebrating Tito’s triumph, they 
were bombing Athens to destroy the main resistance movement – 
EAM (the National Liberation Front) and its military arm ELAS (the 
National Popular Liberation Army). This stark contrast originated 
in the different ways imperialism interacted with people’s war. 
Today oil makes the Middle East the world’s chief battleground. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was the Balkans 
which saw the fiercest conflicts. Here the tectonic plates of the 
Russian, British, Austro-German and Turkish empires overlapped. 
Greece held a unique place within this unstable zone. In 1821, 
inspired by liberal revolutions in America and France, it won a 
fragile independence from Turkey. However, to withstand the 
pressure of its Russian-influenced Slavic neighbours, it always 
depended on a close alliance with Britain. Support was willingly 
provided because Greece was a key transit point on the route to 
India, and so London defended the puppet monarchy in Athens 
even if this included suppressing its own people.1 
In 1936 the Greek King appointed a fascist dictator, General 
Metaxas, to forestall a general strike. He, like rulers before 
him, proceeded to detain some 50,000 Communist Party (KKE) 
sympathisers.2 The autobiography of one Central Committee 
member for the inter-war period records 15 separate arrests, often 
accompanied by long jail sentences, beatings and torture.3 Metaxas 
consciously emulated the Third Reich with his promotion of the 
‘Third Hellenic Civilisation’, and maintained that ‘if Hitler and 
Mussolini were really fighting for the ideology they preach, they 
should be supporting Greece with all their forces’.4 Woodhouse, an 
articulate liaison officer sent into wartime Greece to promote British 
interests, considered Metaxas had ‘benevolent’ and ‘high-minded 
motives for undertaking supreme power’. The dictator died in 
1941, much to Woodhouse’s consternation: ‘his five years were 
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not enough’.5 Woodhouse must have been relieved when the King 
declared that ‘all fields of activity, political and military … shall 
continue in the same spirit as before’.6 The British supported 
dictatorship because, as another liaison officer explained in 1944, 
Greeks ‘are a fundamentally hopeless and useless people with no 
future or prospect of settling down to any form of sensible life 
within any measurable time … [They] are not capable of being 
saved from themselves nor for themselves worth it. This is also the 
unanimous opinion of all British liaison officers who have been 
long in the country.’7
Despite its fascist government Greece entered the Second World 
War on the Allied side because Italy invaded what it thought was 
a target for easy conquest. Here was further evidence that, despite 
the rhetoric, rulers did not consider the Second World War to be 
a war between fascists and anti-fascists. Britain’s General Wilson 
was aware of the irony. It ‘was really a paradox in that in our 
struggle against totalitarianism we should be supporting one Fascist 
government against another’.8 However, in the first major setback 
any fascist army had experienced Mussolini’s forces were repulsed. 
To prevent further humiliation Hitler stepped in,9 whereupon the 
Greek monarchy fled to Cairo under British protection. 
The Nazi occupation of Greece produced suffering comparable 
to Russia, Poland and Yugoslavia. It cost the lives of 8 per cent 
of the population (550,000 people), and 34 per cent of national 
wealth. 402,000 houses and 1,770 villages were destroyed, leaving 
1.2 million homeless. Furthermore, 56 per cent of roads, 65 per cent 
of private cars, 60 per cent of trucks and 80 per cent of buses were 
put out of action.10 One particularly harrowing episode was the 
famine of 1941/42 that claimed some 250,000 victims and struck 
Athens particularly hard.11 An EAM spokesperson, Dimitros Glinos 
described how many ‘have been turned into skeletons … Suddenly 
they have all aged and black worry and mortal agony is etched in 
their eyes. The gap between their income and the most necessary 
expenditure has become fearful. [An] entire wage is not enough to 
buy food… .’12
The Greek ruling class was divided in its response to foreign 
occupation. There were open collaborationists like the quisling 
Prime Ministers Tsolakoglou and Rallis. More cautious members of 
the ruling class acted to ‘re-insure themselves by discreetly financing 
every possible winner’.13 The King and his ministers turned to 
attentism. Glinos, wrote that:
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the kindest interpretation that could be placed on the stand of 
these leaders is passive fatalism and biding one’s time. ‘Let us wait 
for others to liberate us …’ [For] above all they fear the people 
itself. They fear its awakening, they fear its active participation, 
they fear perhaps, as the people takes its liberties in its hands, 
that they will no longer be the leaders of its future political life. 
For they are used up to now to ruling from above… .14 
Unlike their leaders, the ordinary people of Greece could not enjoy 
the luxury of passive contemplation, and resistance movements 
emerged. The largest was EAM/ELAS. It found even less sympathy 
from the British than had Tito, who was eventually allowed to 
establish an independent republic, despite being less compliant than 
EAM/ELAS. This discrepancy is at first sight perplexing. Tito, an 
acknowledged CP leader, never accepted British orders. ELAS’s 
leadership, on the other hand, comprised three people of whom 
only one (the EAM representative) was closely tied to the KKE.15 
The others were Stephanos Sarafis, (initially) a non-communist army 
officer, and Aris Velouchiotis, a kapetan. The kapetans were a group 
of ‘bold, charismatic and fiercely independent [chieftains who] had 
appreciated the possibilities of armed resistance earlier than anyone 
else’.16  Aris was nominally communist but spent the war in revolt 
against its orders, being described by the KKE General Secretary 
as ‘an adventurist and suspect person [who is] helping the forces of 
reaction ... ’.17 Furthermore, unlike Yugoslavia’s partisans, ELAS, 
signed an agreement putting itself ‘under the orders of the Greek 
Government [and] the Supreme Allied Commander’.18 
Britain accused ELAS of brutality, as exemplified by Aris, who 
has been described as a ‘sadistically violent man’19 who executed 
people for stealing chickens,20 cattle-thieving,21 seduction and rape.22 
In mitigation, however, one British liaison officer recognised that 
Aris’s tactics instilled martial discipline and were ‘his effective way 
of putting life into the growing movement of resistance against 
the enemy’.23 People’s war inevitably had its share of excesses and 
cruelty, though these paled against the inhumanity of the imperialists 
at Auschwitz or Hiroshima.
Woodhouse voiced another objection to ELAS. He stated the 
chief aim of ELAS was to destroy rival resistance movements in a 
bid to monopolise post-war power. Stalinist methods were indeed 
ingrained and ELAS did compel smaller resistance groups like EKKA 
(National and Social Liberation) to merge with it or disband.24 
Yet this criticism should not be taken too far. In relation to its 
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largest rival, EDES, ELAS proposed unity by offering its leader 
the post of joint commander-in-chief.25 He refused. Ignoring this 
fact, Woodhouse concluded that for ELAS ‘fighting the Germans 
was a secondary, though not a negligible, consideration  …’.26 The 
truth was rather different. British antagonism to ELAS did not arise 
because it was ineffective against the Germans, but because ELAS 
was part of a much bigger enterprise. 
It was just the military wing of EAM, a broad-based political 
movement established in October 1941. This took resistance right 
into the heart of society. Glinos reported its ‘fight is daily and 
embraces all levels of existence. It takes place in the people’s market, 
in the soup kitchen, in the factory, on the roads and in the fields, 
in every kind of work.’27 By the end of the war EAM claimed up 
to two million members,28 and the support of about 70 per cent of 
the seven million population.29 
As we have seen, opponents accused EAM/ELAS of being no more 
than a KKE front. Though less directly tied to communism than 
the Yugoslav partisans, EAM/ELAS was certainly associated with 
the KKE. That Party began the war with just 5,000 members, but 
possessing a national organisation, knowledge of operating illegally, 
and above all a belief in mass struggle, the Party’s membership 
rose to 350,000 by 1945.30 However, to suggest the KKE simply 
manipulated the population for its own ends was unfair. Comprising 
just a fraction of EAM’s total membership31 the Party could only 
lead it if the masses freely accepted the Party’s policies. Furthermore, 
EAM included several other parties, such as the Union of Popular 
Democracy and Greek Socialist Party. Though the KKE was the 
largest component at EAM’s foundation in September 1941, by 
1944 the Agrarian Party had overtaken it.32 
Finally, the EAM was, as one writer puts it, an umbrella 
organisation for a vast network of other bodies ‘in each village, town, 
and orchard, it seemed’.33 Collectively this made up a resistance state 
which operated right under the noses of the Nazis. One entity was 
the Workers’ National Liberation Front (EEAM). Woodhouse, by 
no means a sympathiser, writes that ‘wherever there was a working 
population, EEAM inspired it against the occupying authorities’.34 
The most dramatic example of this came when Germany attempted 
to conscript labour for the Reich. Eudes’s account captures the spirit 
of the moment: ‘The Athenian sea was flowing into the centre of the 
city from all directions … 200,000 men, a quarter of the population 
of Athens, marching empty-handed through a hail of bullets … The 
Athenians charged, insane but irresistible, transported towards their 
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objective with a battle-crazy momentum that could not be touched 
by mere blood, by a scattering of deaths … .’35 
As a result of the demonstration Greece became the place where 
Nazi conscription of slave labour suffered its most comprehensive 
defeat.36 EAM took up other issues of immediate concern that 
connected with resistance to occupation. According to an eyewitness: 
‘The first goal EAM had set was to fight for life – against hunger 
… The first song that was heard was “For life and freedom, bread 
for our people”.’37 
Another feature which might, by comparison, seem a surprising 
distraction in the middle of a world conflagration, was the 
transformation of gender relations. Before the Second World 
War women were regarded as virtual slaves.38 Their lives were 
strictly regulated (with honour killings not unknown), and in 
the countryside three quarters were illiterate.39 One participant, 
commenting in the 1990s, recalled that thanks to the resistance: 
‘we women were, socially, in a better position, at a higher level 
than now … Our organization and our own government … gave 
so many rights to women that only much later, decades later we 
were given.’40 For the first time, women voted and shared in the 
clandestine election of a provisional government for Free Greece.41 
This body announced that: ‘All Greeks, men and women, have 
equal political and civil rights.’42 Women deputies and judges were 
elected, and equal pay decreed.43 
This was practical politics. EAM/ELAS could not afford to 
overlook the contribution of half the population and once involved, 
women changed themselves:
I couldn’t go anywhere without my parents knowing where I was 
going, whom I was going with, when I would be back. I never 
went anywhere alone. That is, until the occupation came and I 
joined the resistance. In the meantime, because we were right 
in the midst of the enemy, we had an underground press, there 
at the house … It was very dangerous [but my parents] had to 
support us.44
Equality was not a paternalistic gift: 
The minute you confront the same danger as a boy, the minute you 
also wrote slogans on the walls, the moment you also distributed 
leaflets, the moment you also attended protest demonstrations 
along with the boys and some of you were also killed by the tanks, 
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they could no longer say to you, ‘You, you’re a woman, so sit 
inside while I go to the cinema.’ You gained your equality when 
you showed what you could endure in terms of the difficulties, 
the dangers, the sacrifices, and all as bravely and with the same 
degree of cunning as a man. Those old ideas fell aside. That is, the 
resistance always tried to put the woman next to the man, instead 
of behind him. She fought a double liberation struggle … .45
Thus the partisans (known in Greece as andartes) included a women’s 
regiment.46 This perturbed Woodhouse who complained to London 
that ‘many weapons are wasted in the hands of women … .’47 But 
the new role of Greek women reflected a recurrent aspect of people’s 
war. It was also seen in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, because the fight 
was not only against Nazism but also for a different world. 
The Greek resistance generated mass activism in other arenas too. 
Areas under EAM control organised self-government on a grand 
scale. Villagers elected municipal councillors and judges in mass 
assemblies. A very popular move was to have courts dispense with 
expensive lawyers: both sides presented their own case, and natural 
justice prevailed.48 In the public administration of Free Greece 
demotic, literally the language used by ordinary people, replaced 
the formal Greek of the educated elite – katharevousa.
One of the most spectacular achievements was a general election 
involving one million voters49 conducted under the noses of the 
Nazi occupiers. Mazower warns against ‘idealising’ this event since 
‘voting procedures bore little relation to peacetime practice’.50 
Polling stations and ballot boxes were impossible so votes were 
collected door to door. But the ballot was remarkable nonetheless. 
It created the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) 
which, unlike pre-war official parliaments, was a representative 
cross-section of society. Its 250 delegates included two bishops and 
two priests, 22 labourers, 23 farmers, 10 journalists, 10 scientists, 
9 school teachers, and so on.51 
The resistance struggle was costly in terms of food and taxes. 
So there is no reason to doubt one writer’s claim that, ‘Under the 
thumb of andartes it must have seemed to many that one form 
of state had replaced another in the struggle for control of food 
supply’; and ‘you do not argue when you are faced with men with 
guns’.52 Yet even Woodhouse admitted: ‘The success of the rebel 
movement is bound up with the support of the villages: if the villages 
were disloyal to the movement it could not have made a successful 
start  …’.53 The benefits were reciprocal. EAM reforms encouraged 
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villagers to furnish ELAS, the military wing, with the wherewithal 
to exist, and this sustained the defensive shield that enabled EAM 
reforms to be implemented.
In a much-quoted passage, Woodhouse later wrote in grudging 
admiration that:
The initiative of EAM/ELAS justified their predominance, 
though not their tyranny. Having acquired control of almost 
the whole country, except the principal communications used by 
the Germans, they had given it things that it had never known 
before. Communications in the mountains, by wireless, courier, 
and telephone, have never been so good before or since … The 
benefits of civilisation and culture trickled into the mountains 
for the first time. Schools, local government, law-courts and 
public utilities, which the war had ended worked again … All 
the virtues and vices of such an experiment could be seen; for 
when the people whom no one has ever helped started helping 
themselves, their methods are vigorous and not always nice. The 
words ‘liberation’ and ‘popular democracy’ filled the air with 
their peculiar connotations.54
If EAM represented political struggle, the work of ELAS embodied 
the military side of people’s war. A German report on ‘The Political 
Situation in Greece’ in July 1943 described ELAS as ‘the main bearer 
of the entire resistance movement against the Axis powers [and] 
represents the greatest danger to the occupying forces’.55 Woodhouse 
agreed:
[B]etween October 1943 and August 1944, apart from purely 
punitive reprisals, nine operations serious enough to warrant 
codenames were launched [by Germany], all in northern Greece. 
Except for the last case (in August 1944), all these operations … 
[were] mainly directed against ELAS, because the Communists 
ignored the instruction of [Britain’s] General Headquarters 
Middle East to refrain from offensive operations.56
ELAS suffered four-fifths of all the casualties inflicted by the 
Axis.57 The Nazis themselves counted 19,000 dead and had to 
commit about 10 per cent of all their anti-resistance forces to ELAS 
alone.58 This was all the more impressive in that ELAS received 
little aid. Its commander affirmed that he could have doubled the 
50,000 andartes deployed if properly equipped,59 and Woodhouse’s 
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predecessor as chief British liaison officer, Myers, calculated that 
London provided less than one-sixth of ELAS’s arms.60 He wrote 
that despite ‘getting virtually no war supplies’, ELAS liberated 
four-fifths of the Greek mainland.61 
London hoped that in EDES (the Greek National Republican 
League) they could find an alternative resistance movement to help 
with its war. Unlike ELAS, EDES eschewed social radicalism and 
mass mobilisation and claimed to focus exclusively on the military 
struggle. Thus it evaded the key question of the monarchy and 
its fascist past. According to EDES’s political adviser, attempts to 
formulate a programme were always met ‘with stubborn opposition 
… Nothing was heard but the slogan “Faith in the leader. All for the 
leader. All from the leader”.’62 That leader was Napoleon Zervas 
who, according to Britain’s Military Mission, needed ‘persuasion’ to 
take to the field. After 24,000 gold sovereigns proved insufficient63 
tactics ‘little short of blackmail’ had to be employed to make 
him fight.64 
EDES’s 12,000 guerrillas were totally dependent on Britain’s 
generous assistance.65 When ELAS complained about inequality 
of treatment, one British officer replied: ‘It’s only natural that we 
should reinforce Zervas as he is our servant.’66 Although EDES did 
mount some serious anti-German operations,67 like the chetniks 
of Yugoslavia it was willing to collaborate with the occupier. One 
letter to the Wehrmacht read: ‘We are not fighting you Germans, 
we are fighting the Communists. We are ourselves true Fascists’,68 
and Woodhouse found EDES harboured ‘downright collaborators’ 
in Athens.69 So unsurprisingly EDES made little headway against 
the Germans. By the time ELAS drove them from Greece EDES 
held only ‘a tiny strip thirty-five miles long and twenty-five miles 
wide … a Greek San Marino’.70 Despite EDES’s Allied backers, it 
took just a fortnight for ELAS to rout Zervas’s force in a short civil 
war. His troops finally retreated to Corfu on board British ships.71
The difference in the treatment meted out by London to Tito’s 
partisans and ELAS arose from the calculations that produced 
the ‘percentages agreement’72 between Stalin and Churchill. This 
assigned respective British/Russian influence as 50/50 in Yugoslavia, 
but 90/10 in Greece. So its very strength as a resistance movement 
made London determined to crush ELAS. It was too effective! The 
strategy unfolded in two phases. At first ELAS and EDES were 
treated on a relatively equal footing. A spectacular operation to 
blow up the Gorgopotamos rail viaduct in November 1942 was 
carried out by four British agents, 45 EDES and 115 ELAS andartes. 
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They cut the supply line to Rommel for six weeks, depriving 
him of crucial deliveries during the battle of El Alamein.73 The 
greatest level of co-operation came in the summer of 1943 during 
‘Operation Animals’, a resistance offensive which fooled the Nazis 
into expecting Allied landings in Greece rather than Sicily. 
However, the British attitude was governed by a cynical 
calculation, so well described by Brigadier Barker-Benfield that it 
is worth quoting at length:
Our long-term policy towards Greece is to retain her as a 
British sphere of influence and that a Russian dominated Greece 
would not be in accordance with British strategy in the Eastern 
Mediterranean … Our present Political and Military policies 
are at first sight contradictory. The former, by propaganda 
and public speeches is designed to indicate our disapproval of 
EAM. Therefore, should EAM reach power we can expect them 
to be anti-British. Military considerations, however, demand 
that we should give maximum support to ELAS, who are the 
only resistance organisation in a position seriously to support 
our attempts to harass the enemy. Thus our military policy is 
bolstering up EAM.
Although these two policies appear to be diametrically opposed, 
this is not the case, as it is solely a question of timing.
Our immediate policy should be the purely military one of 
giving support to the guerrilla organisations to enable them 
to assist in liberating their country and ensuring that Greece 
continues as a British sphere of influence. This should give way 
to the political policy of no support to EAM as soon as liberation 
is achieved.
The changeover from one to the other is certain to cause 
opposition from ELAS and can only be carried out successfully 
if British troops are sent to Greece at the appropriate time. These 
troops would have two roles, firstly that of hitting the Germans 
where they are weakest, and secondly, that of ensuring a British 
military control of the whole country.74
The ‘change-over’ from ‘military policy’ to ‘political policy’ can 
be dated to mid-1943. Before that time General Wilson welcomed 
ELAS help, saying ‘Bravo to the guerrillas!’ Afterwards he ordered 
that: ‘all operations cease immediately [and] all guerrillas remain 
quiet …’.75 Churchill’s shift in attitude was equally marked. 
Once he described ELAS as ‘gallant guerrillas containing thirty 
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enemy divisions.’ Now they were ‘in many cases indistinguishable 
from banditti…’76
In April 1944 the exiled Greek army in Egypt were subjected 
to the new policy. Britain and the US insisted the King would 
be re-established, although they knew full well that apart from 
republicans there were ‘no other organisations in Greece visible 
without a microscope’.77 When the Second Brigade protested78 
Churchill accused them of an ‘undignified, even squalid, exhibition 
of indiscipline, which many will attribute to an unworthy fear of 
being sent to the front.’79 The reverse was true. They had long been 
asking to be sent into action and instead were now threatened with 
being disarmed. They replied: ‘We hold our weapons to liberate our 
country. We do not wish to surrender these arms which we glorified 
with our blood in Albania, in Macedonia, in Crete, and at Alamein. 
We request that the order for our disarming be rescinded and that 
we be sent immediately to the front to fight.’80
However, imperialist politics outweighed defeating fascism. 
Churchill ordered that the Brigade be ‘rounded up by artillery and 
superior force and let hunger play its part’.81 Starved into submission, 
up to 20,000 men were sent to North African concentration camps.82 
The rest of the Greek army was then purged of all dissidents.83
The lengths to which Britain would go to secure the defeat of 
ELAS were revealed when the Wehrmacht began to withdraw in 
late 1944. Neubacher, the chief German official in Greece, was 
perplexed by the strategy the Allies adopted:
[T]hey have hitherto allowed our forces to be moved from the 
islands to the mainland with almost no opposition by sea or in 
the air, but they mobilise the red bands against our escape routes 
on the mainland. By this they apparently intend to keep German 
forces on the Greek mainland until the moment when their own 
operation is possible, and in this way they hope to prevent a 
general revolution.84 
The commander of Germany’s Army Group F reported ‘repeated 
offers of negotiations concerning the evacuation of Greece’.85 In 
what Mazower calls ‘one of the most extraordinary and potentially 
explosive episodes of the whole war’86 an Allied officer, with the full 
knowledge of SOE Cairo, met the head of the German Secret Field 
Police to canvas possible joint action (though nothing came of this).
German reports were confirmed by statements from British 
officials: ‘it would be very awkward if the Germans in Greece were 
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anxious to surrender immediately, since we do not want them to 
collapse until we ourselves are ready to send in British troops to 
Greece. Otherwise, there will be a hiatus of which EAM will take 
full advantage.’87
Ultimately, this delicate plan almost broke down because the 
Germans beat an ignominious retreat. ELAS controlled large areas 
by September 1944 while the British reached Athens only on 14 
October.
That the British nevertheless attained their goal is very revealing 
of the politics of EAM/ELAS and the KKE. Like many wartime 
movements they had mobilised vast numbers to fight, not only 
against occupation, but for a different post-war world. Why, having 
succeeded with the former, did the leadership fail to implement the 
latter? The answer lay in Moscow where foreign policy was shaped 
by its Anglo-American alliance, and local communist parties knew 
it. The KKE’s leader, Zachariadis, saw Greece as between ‘two 
poles: the European Balkans with the Soviet Union at its centre, 
and the Middle East with its centre in Britain. A correct policy 
would be to tie together these two poles.’88 After Zachariadis was 
shipped off to Dachau concentration camp, it fell to Siantos to 
implement the updated line of 90/10 shares: ‘Greece belongs to a 
region of Europe where the British assume all responsibilities … .’89 
On his release in 1945, Zachariadis took charge once more and was 
proud to declare: ‘From the very first day, the people’s liberation 
movement invested sincere efforts, trying to achieve understanding 
and co-operation with Great Britain … to help that country master 
its great difficulties, the crisis through which it was going in the 
Mediterranean.’90
So leaders of the Greek people’s war were mentally disarmed 
before British imperialism. This was exemplified by the PEEA, 
the body created by the clandestine general election. It spoke in 
conciliatory terms, declaring support for the Atlantic Charter and 
the Allies’ Teheran Conference, and asked only that it be included 
in a future Greek coalition government.91 
At this point face-to-face encounters between the royal 
government-in-exile and the guerrillas became possible when a 
mountain airstrip permitted resistance representatives to travel 
abroad. When they met the government-in-exile, the Greek resistance 
(including both EAM/ELAS and EDES) discovered each inhabited 
different worlds.92 The Greek PM ‘was very uncertain about the 
continuance of the resistance movement at all … It might be better 
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to urge the guerrillas to return to their village [and] cultivate the 
land.’93 British officials on hand agreed: ‘There has never been any 
doubt that our long-term political interests would be better served 
by an inactive sabotage policy.’94 After hearing this the resistance 
delegation was abruptly dismissed. Even the EDES delegate was 
outraged: ‘We were transported like prisoners to the airport… 
Because we disturbed British policy and the plans of the King, we 
were “undesirables”.’95
EAM/ELAS now had to choose between continuing its Free 
Greece government, based on the aspirations of the people’s war, or 
co-operation with Britain. It chose the latter.96 The way was smoothed 
by a marginal shift from the monarchy. To regain any support at 
home it would have to temporarily work with the guerrillas. The 
result was the Caserta agreement, whereby PEEA members joined 
the government-in-exile (now renamed ‘Government of National 
Unity’). In return the resistance had to agree that: ‘All guerrilla 
forces operating in Greece place themselves under the orders of the 
Greek Government of National Unity, [which in turn] places these 
forces under the orders of [Britain’s] General Scobie who has been 
nominated by the Supreme Allied Commander as General Officer 
Commanding Forces in Greece.’97
To prove its sincerity EAM/ELAS forbade ‘any attempt by 
any units under their command to take the law into their own 
hands. Such action will be treated as a crime and will be punished 
accordingly.’98 Russia played its part. EAM/ELAS had awaited a 
Soviet military mission with great anticipation, not just because 
of apparently shared political beliefs, but as an alternative source 
of military aid.99 When it arrived the mission delivered an ‘abrupt 
shock’.100 It offered no support but ordered the resistance to enter 
the government of the detested King.101
This sacrificing of the people’s war was criticised from within 
the resistance itself. At a crisis meeting in the summer of 1944 
even the communist Secretary of EAM denounced the betrayal.102 
Woodhouse recounts that: ‘Inside the KKE, the apostles of direct 
action under Aris Velouchiotis were openly spoiling for a new fight; 
the apostles of political infiltration under Siantos were wondering 
whether to persevere with the government-in-exile’.103 
In Eudes’s account the argument has been interpreted as a division 
between imaginative partisan tactics and doctrinally correct urban 
struggle policy. The andartes and kapetans were ‘unorthodox … 
by comparison with the Stalinist ideal’ and ‘recoiled spontaneously 
from the centralism and quasi-industrial organization of the 
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orthodox Revolution’. The KKE’s Central Committee was ‘prepared 
to renounce [the guerrillas] at the decisive moment to preserve an 
abstraction’.104 There may have been an element of this in play. One 
of the built-in tensions in all anti-fascist resistance was between its 
social driving forces and the demands of military strategy. Though 
Clausewitz’s axiom is correct, politics and their military expression 
are not identical. In many parts of Europe communist organisation 
was based on the urban working class, but, until the final showdown, 
partisan warfare avoided Wehrmacht concentrations, which were 
located in towns. So there was a disjuncture between the two, 
which meant guerrilla resistance did not follow a conventional 
proletarian model. This was true in mainland Greece where the 
andartes operated in the mountains.105 
However, this town/country split was not paramount. A more 
important factor was the contradictory position of the KKE leaders 
caught between people’s war and imperialist war. That proved a 
fatal weakness at the moment of Nazi withdrawal. 
When the British arrived in Athens, just 48 hours after the German 
departure, the royal Government had virtually no representation 
on the ground. Apart from a tiny enclave controlled by EDES and 
disputed border areas, ‘the rest of Greece was in the hands of EAM/
ELAS, who occupied the towns, the villages and the provinces’.106 
The Nazi collapse had been rather too sudden for the Allies. 
Nevertheless, they had meticulously planned for this moment. 
As early as May 1944 Churchill was organising the despatch of 
thousands of British troops, ostensibly to ‘restore law and order’.107 
George Papandreou, the Greek Prime Minister, wished to 
participate in this enterprise. He wrote to Churchill that he was 
‘seriously disturbed’ by the success of EAM/ELAS. ‘Only the 
immediate appearance of impressive British forces in Greece, and 
up to the Turkish frontier, will suffice to alter the situation.’108 
This telegram was sent just three weeks after the formation of the 
‘Government of National Unity’ with EAM members included 
as ministers! 
However, such was their contempt for all Greeks that the British 
decided to carry off the coup alone. Churchill’s view was that: ‘It 
is most desirable to strike out of the blue without any apparent 
preliminary crisis. It is the best way to forestall the EAM: the Greek 
Government know nothing of this plan and should on no account 
be told anything’.109 Though Churchill threw up a smokescreen of 
democratic rhetoric to justify ‘Operation Manna’, General Alan 
Brooke was clear that the role of Allied forces ‘was to ensure the 
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setting up of a Government which we consider the most suitable, 
but there was no guarantee that the Greek people would be of the 
same opinion’.110 
This was not a simple policing operation as claimed, but classic 
imperialism. The British wanted to physically dominate a foreign 
land. The Allied commanders would have liked to emulate Nazi 
methods but feared opposition from their own soldiers. As one 
put it: ‘We could go quicker if we stormed our way through the 
streets with tanks and “Rotterdamed” the whole quarters by air 
bombardment as the Germans and Russians in a similar position 
would probably do. But, apart from other disadvantages of such a 
policy, the troops would refuse to do it.’111
Nevertheless, Churchill told General Scobie: ‘Do not hesitate to 
fire at any armed male in Athens who assails the British authority or 
Greek authority … [A]ct as if you were in a conquered city where a 
local rebellion is in progress.’112 Even the Greek PM was appalled113 
and threatened to quit. Churchill told his ambassador in Athens: 
‘Force Papandreou to stand on his duty … Should he resign he 
should be locked up till he comes to his senses.’114
To consolidate their hold the British forces and their Greek 
assistants employed the ‘Security Battalions’. One reason that ELAS 
agreed to disarm was this clause of the Caserta Agreement: ‘The 
Security Battalions are considered as instruments of the enemy [and] 
will be treated as enemy formations.’115 It was not honoured. These 
repressive forces came straight out of the era of Nazi occupation. 
Recruited by the previous quisling Government they had been 
equipped and commanded by Germans. The Battalion pledge of 
allegiance ran: ‘I swear by God this sacred oath, that I will obey 
absolutely the orders of the Supreme Commander of the German 
Army, Adolf Hitler’.116 
Churchill’s private view of these militias was extraordinary: ‘It 
seems to me that the collaborators in Greece in many cases did 
the best they could to shelter the Greek population from German 
oppression… .’117 In public he was no less forthcoming, telling 
Parliament: ‘The security battalions came into existence … to protect 
the Greek villagers from the depredations of some of those who, 
under the guise of being saviours of their country, were living upon 
the inhabitants and doing very little fighting against the Germans.’118 
In other words he preferred collaborators to anti-fascists, and Nazi’s 
auxiliaries to the people’s resistance! Other reactionary forces used 
included what remained of the Greek army after its purge – the 
far-right Sacred Company and Mountain Brigades.119 While these 
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forces ran rampage, ELAS was ordered to dissolve as a ‘private’ 
militia (that just happened to have the support of 70 per cent of 
the population). 
The head of EAM pleaded: ‘The British must give the Greeks 
at least the impression that they are a free people … .’120 but the 
KKE understood that the new government was deploying ‘Fascists, 
disguised Fascists or supporters of the Metaxas dictatorship’.121 
Nevertheless it still hoped to avoid confrontation, and in the face 
of open violence from the British and Greek governments told its 
members: ‘Communists. You stood as champions of the national and 
popular uprising. Stand now as … patriots, united in the struggle 
for the completion of the liberation of Greece along with the ELAS 
and our allies under our United Government.’122
Operation Manna was fully unleashed when a mass demonstration 
protested at the violation of the terms regarding new security forces. 
At least ten people were shot dead by police, the victims including 
unarmed children.123 In the uproar the British army indeed acted as 
if ‘in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress’. During 
the first 24 hours it fired 2,500 shells into residential areas of Athens 
causing 13,700 casualties.124 Scobie dropped the following leaflet:
All civilians are informed that as from 9am tomorrow all rebel 
guns firing, whether in the town or in the environs will be hit with 
all the arms at my disposal – that is to say, with land artillery, 
naval guns, aeroplanes, rockets and bombs. This attack will 
continue until the guns are destroyed. For their personal security 
all civilians in the areas concerned must immediately evacuate 
to a distance of 500 metres (545 yards) from the position of any 
rebel guns. No further warning will be given.125
By the time the ‘December events’ were over Scobie had been as 
good as his word. There were 50,000 Greek dead and 2,000 British 
casualties.126 Incredibly, Churchill claimed ‘our troops are acting to 
prevent bloodshed’.127
The clash between the two wars was so stark that it caused an 
outcry in Britain. One MP pointed out that: ‘British soldiers and 
Greek patriots lay dead side by side, each with an allied bullet in his 
heart [because] British policy seemed inclined to support many of the 
worn-out regimes in Europe, as against the popular forces which had 
emerged.’ Another suggested the Government backed ‘reactionary 
and often even quisling elements to delay recognition of the genuine 
democratic movements in Europe’.128 Even The Times found it 
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‘inconceivable that the British liberation armies … should be asked 
to coerce or conquer a section of a liberated and allied people which, 
only a few weeks ago, was engaged in active and gallant resistance 
to the Germans’. Repression in Athens came ‘at the expense of the 
war against Germany’ because its forces were, at that very moment, 
making a daring breakthrough in the Ardennes during ‘the Battle 
of the Bulge’.129 While the Gorgopotamus raid had assisted British 
efforts in North Africa, the attack on Athens drew numerous troops 
from Italy and hampered the Allied offensive there.130
The Americans later adopted the role of imperial arbiter in Greece, 
but at the time they were horrified. In Athens Ambassador McVeagh 
accused Churchill of handling ‘this fanatically freedom-loving 
country (which has never yet taken dictation quietly) as if it were 
composed of natives under the British Raj …’. He also understood 
that behind the conflict stood those ‘with possessions, on the one 
hand’ and those ‘without possessions but hungry, homeless and 
armed on the other’.131 
The battle for Athens was not as straightforward as Churchill 
had hoped. On 21 December The Times reported RAF headquarters 
‘overrun after an all-night battle … by a force which, it was officially 
announced to-day, included fully armed women, boys and girls’.132 
According to Woodhouse, ‘ELAS at one time held almost the whole 
of Greece but for a few square miles of Athens’.133 At home a 
beleaguered Churchill lamented: ‘there is no case in my experience 
… where a British government has been so maligned and its motives 
so traduced in our own country by important organs of the press or 
among our own people.’134 Facing a vote of confidence in Parliament 
he turned rhetorically to Stalin, his one remaining significant source 
of support, by suggesting that Britain was locked in ‘a struggle to 
prevent a hideous massacre in the centre of Athens, in which all 
forms of government would have been swept away and naked, 
triumphant Trotskyism installed’.135
Eventually Churchill had to fly to Greece himself to sort out the 
mess. Still EAM did not press home its military advantage. A Guy 
Fawkes style plot to blow up his hotel was therefore abandoned 
and ELAS battalions gave up their weapons.136 EAM’s Central 
Committee sent this grovelling message to the British PM: ‘Your 
Excellency, the Greek people experienced on the happy occasion of 
your coming to Athens a feeling of deepest relief …The Greek people 
has never ceased for a moment to look with unshaken faith and 
deep regard on our great allies and, in particular Great Britain… .’137
Unlike Yugoslavia, in Greece the issue of the two wars was 
settled decisively in favour of imperialism. It is true that the 
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British postponed the return of the King for a time, and under 
the Varkiza agreement of 12 February 1945 promised a regime 
of ‘free expression’, ‘an amnesty for political crimes’, a ‘purge’ of 
collaborators, plus a ‘plebiscite and elections’ to be ‘conducted in 
complete freedom’. But, in return, ‘the armed forces of resistance 
shall be demobilised and in particular ELAS, both regular and 
reserve …’.138 ELAS carried out its pledge, surrendering more 
guns than the agreement had stipulated.139 The other side failed 
to reciprocate. In the year following Varkiza a right-wing reign 
of terror murdered 1,289, wounded 6,671, arrested 84,931, and 
tortured 31,632 Greeks.140 Promises of a free election became a 
hollow joke. A delegation of British MPs reported that: 
Throughout our visit we found that, with the exception of the 
extreme right wing, everybody said that the election was carried 
through by means of forgery, perjury, terrorism, assassination, 
and every possible form of corrupt practice… [T]he giving of 
official positions in the state, gendarmerie and police to notorious 
collaborators with the enemy [means] no such thing as a fair 
election or fair plebiscite is a possibility.141
Women who had glimpsed liberation in the ranks of EAM/ELAS 
now faced rape, torture and death. Between 1948 and 1950, for 
example, 17 were executed for subversion, the youngest being 16 
years old.142 Others were in jail right up until the 1960s. Their 
persecutors, now working with US counter-insurgency forces, 
had flourished under the British, and previously under the Axis. 
A US Senator described what they were doing: ‘We had to back 
not the good guys but the bad guys in Greece, to put it simply in 
the vernacular. We did not back the people.’143 On the ground a 
resistance woman confirmed this: ‘After the liberation … we, who 
had fought the occupation, we were the bad guys, and those who 
had collaborated with the Nazis, they were now the good ones. 
The government rewarded them and punished us’.144 The civil war 
eventually cost 158,000 Greek lives,145 but it meant that in 1947 a 
US paper could report: ‘Churchill’s victory is complete – and neatly 
underwritten by hundreds of millions of American dollars. It could 
only be slightly more complete if Hitler himself had engineered it!’146
What happened in Greece was not a difference of opinion within 
a single world conflict. It was two types of war clashing to such 
an extent that bombs, tanks, torture, rape and prisons decided 
the outcome.
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Poland’s Warsaw rising
Greece’s experience might seem to indicate the key conflict on the 
Allied side during the Second World War was primarily between 
communists and non-communists, rather than involving parallel 
and sometimes opposed wars. The Warsaw Rising of 1944 provides 
a useful testing ground for such arguments because the chief 
protagonist of Allied imperialism was Russia itself. 
In the early seventeenth century Poland was an important 
European power with a population comparable to France and a 
territory rivalling that of Russia’s. However, as one historian puts it:
she lacked the asset of a peripheral geographic position such as 
had permitted Spain and Sweden, for example, to withdraw into 
hard and relatively immune shells once their bids for expansion 
had been defeated. Poland’s location being more central and 
pivotal, she was doomed to obliteration as a state in the second 
half of the 18th century … .1
The country was partitioned no less than three times (1772, 1793 
and 1795) with Russia, Prussia and Austria sharing the spoils. 
Despite a series of heroic revolts (in 1794, 1830, 1848, 1863 and 
1905) partition continued until the First World War.2 
Modern Poland only began to emerge after the Russian Revolution 
in 1917, when Lenin applied the principle of ‘self determination’: 
‘to recognise not only complete equality of rights for all nations in 
general, but also equality of rights in forming independent states, 
i.e. the right of nations to self-determination, to secession … .’3 This 
policy attracted criticism from an unexpected quarter. The Polish 
revolutionary, Rosa Luxemburg, argued that pursuing national 
independence, in which rich and poor combined to oppose foreign 
control, was less progressive than socialist internationalism – the 
uniting of Russian and Polish workers against a common capitalist 
enemy. Lenin agreed the latter was the ultimate goal, but asserted it 
would not be achieved if Polish workers felt their former imperialist 
oppressor denied them the right to independence.4
55
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Whoever was generally correct, Luxemburg’s warnings about 
the reactionary potential of Polish nationalism bore fruit when 
the country was fully re-established, following the collapse of 
the German and Austrian empires. Marshal Pilsudski, its first 
ruler, aided by France’s General Weygand (of later notoriety for 
capitulating to the Nazis), attacked Soviet Russia and seized an 
area inhabited by six million Ukrainians, land far beyond the 1772 
borders originally claimed.5 It even took advantage of the German 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939 to grab Cieszyn.6 Thus, at the 
outbreak of the Second World War one third of Polish citizens were 
from national minorities.7 On the domestic front Pilsudski founded 
Sanacja (Political healing), a dictatorship which outlived him and 
still ran Poland at the outbreak of the Second World War.
Ironically, sharing in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia 
was but the prelude to Poland itself becoming a target for Nazi 
aggression. At that point Britain and France resolved to back Polish 
independence, by war if necessary. Stalin distanced himself, however, 
saying he would not ‘be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who 
are accustomed to get others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire 
for them’.8 His reserve had nothing to do with the Bolshevik anti-
imperialism. The Stalinist counter-revolution had destroyed all 
traces of that. Instead Moscow was signalling its readiness for the 
Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939, a deal whose secret protocols 
divided Poland between Germany and Russia.9
Doubtless Anglo-French appeasement had convinced Moscow 
there was no alternative but to conciliate Berlin. Nonetheless, the 
Pact was an act of breathtaking audacity. Nazism and Bolshevism 
were polar opposites. The Nazis had murdered many thousand 
German communists. All this was brushed aside, the Soviet Union 
providing Hitler with vital raw materials in return for weapons.10 
On hearing the Pact was signed a jubilant Hitler ‘began to hammer 
on the wall with his fists, uttering inarticulate cries, and finally 
shouting exultantly “I have the world in my pocket!”’11 
When the re-conquest of Poland commenced, the Russians left the 
Wehrmacht to carry on the fighting, thus minimising their own risks 
and masking their avarice.12 The Nazis were asked to indicate ‘as 
nearly as possible when they could count on the capture of Warsaw’ 
as this would be the signal for Russia to grab its share.13 But they 
misjudged and Moscow attacked ten days too early. Embarrassingly, 
the joint Nazi-Soviet victory parade at Brest-Litovsk preceded the 
capital’s fall on 27 September.14 Nevertheless, Stalin still made the 
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outrageous claim that the Red Army had only intervened to ‘extricate 
the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they have 
been dragged by their unwise leaders, and to enable them to live a 
peaceful life’.15 In private he boasted that German-Soviet friendship 
had been ‘sealed in blood’.16 It was the blood of 216,000 Poles. In 
the campaign Germany lost 60,000 soldiers, and Russia 11,500.17
Once the fighting was over, Stalin held 52 per cent of Polish 
territory, and Hitler 48 per cent.18 Both agreed that they would 
tolerate ‘no Polish agitation which affects the territories of the 
other party’, and ‘suppress in their territories all beginnings of 
such agitation…’.19 A powerful fight-back developed despite this. 
It was distinct from both the Greek and Yugoslav resistance because 
the gap between the local imperialist government and anti-fascist 
resistance was minimal. The root of the difference lay in the unusual 
roles played by Poland’s communists and its ruling elite. 
While the Greek and Yugoslav CPs were central to the people’s 
war, Poland’s communists were not. In 1938 they had been physically 
liquidated by Moscow, and the Party was formally dissolved once 
Poland itself was extinguished.20 For good measure a quarter of 
the one million ethnic Poles in the Soviet Union were shot before 
the war began.21 The picture changed in 1941, when Hitler seized 
Stalin’s portion of Poland and invaded Russia itself. Now Moscow 
supported a surrogate CP, the Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia 
Robotnicza – PPR), though it made little progress due to its close 
association with a former occupying power.22
In other occupied countries elites shunned people’s war and 
favoured collaboration or attentism. In neither the German nor 
Russian sectors was this an easy option for the Polish ruling 
class. Hitler regarded all Poles as ‘more like animals than human 
beings’.23 In colonising Western Poland he eliminated or enslaved 
the inhabitants. A near genocidal approach involved Wehrmacht 
‘housecleaning’ – the displacement of some 900,000 people. Even 
speaking Polish in public was banned in some areas.24 Children were 
to learn only how to write their names, count up to a maximum of 
500 and know: ‘It is God’s command that they should be obedient 
to Germany … .’25
Eastern Poland experienced the brutality of Russian rule. 
Here Stalin was driven by a desire for absolute control not racist 
fanaticism. But, as with Nazi-occupied Poland: ‘No political 
distinctions were made, and Polish communists … worked and 
perished alongside Catholic priests and university professors, 
farmers and railwaymen … .’26 The most notorious incident of the 
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Russian occupation was the execution of several thousand Polish 
officers at Katyn.27 Up to two million people (9 per cent of the 
population) were deported as forced labour.28 Many never returned.
A recent study comparing the German and Russian occupations 
concludes that though the latter was less violent, ‘similarities 
persisted, particularly in the application of targeted collective 
terror’.29 Indeed the Nazi SS and Russian secret police (the GPU) 
co-ordinated their approaches.30 Between Scylla and Charybdis, 
Poland suffered over six million killed, the highest proportion of 
death for any country during the Second World War. Of these 90 
per cent were civilians31 and half were Jews. As a resistance leaflet 
of 1940 put it: ‘History has taught the Polish nation a dreadful 
lesson. For us, now, the road to freedom leads through the torture 
chambers and the Gestapo and the [Russian] GPU.’32 The Poles 
could therefore claim ‘the presence of Quislings, collaboration, and 
compromise [was] impossible’.33 A common calamity engulfed all 
sections of society.
Poland’s resistance therefore began in the key institution of 
the pre-war Sanacja dictatorship – the military.34 Major General 
Tokarzewki, a Pilsudskiite, organised what became the underground 
Home Army (Armja Krajowa, or AK).35 This shaped its future 
development. As one author puts it: ‘throughout its existence [the 
AK was] commanded and officered mainly by the members of the 
Polish pre-war military establishment [who] brought with them 
into the resistance ideas, attitudes, traditions and professional 
doctrines and standards acquired during their service in the pre-war 
army… .36 In other words, the AK command was tied to a tradition 
of reactionary dictatorship and imperialist policies.
While rightly emphasising the importance of the AK, Norman 
Davies goes so far as to subsume the entire anti-fascist movement 
into this military formation: ‘Europe’s largest Resistance movement, 
which in January 1940 adopted the name of the Union of Armed 
Struggle (ZWZ), and in February 1942 the Home Army… was a 
branch of the regular Polish armed forces ... .’37 Its achievements were 
outstanding. 380,000 fighters38 carried out 25,000 acts of sabotage 
in just three years,39 and by 1945 had killed 150,000 Germans.40 
However, if this were the whole story there would have been 
little room for a people’s war. Yet there were two other elements of 
considerable importance. One was the Underground State led by 
General Sikorski, an opponent of the Sanacja.41 Sikorski argued: 
‘The movement must not be confined merely to the function of 
[military] resistance, but must take shape as an actual state. All the 
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apparatus of a state must be created and maintained at all costs, no 
matter how crude it is.’42
The results were impressive. Although its Headquarters were in 
London, a full suite of government institutions were reproduced 
in Poland. The Ministry of Education, for example, educated one 
million children, as well as operating universities in Krakow, Lwow 
and Vilno. Thirty per cent of available funds went to social welfare.43 
The state had a shadow parliament – the ‘Political Representation’. 
A ‘Directorate of Civilian Resistance’ functioned as a court system 
that tried and sentenced collaborators.44 A vast clandestine press 
with numerous titles also operated.45
The third bloc in the resistance was made up of the Socialist, 
Peasant, Christian Labour and National Democrat parties. While 
the first three had been to the left of the Sanacja, the National 
Democrats were followers of Dmowski. He was a right-wing 
anti-Semite who denounced ‘the menace of Socialism inside the 
nation, as well as the threat coming from the Jewish element [who] 
represented international forces which could do no good, but might 
well do much harm’.46 It was a sign of Dmowski’s continuing 
influence, that even after the horrors of 1939–45 Bor-Komorowski, 
the commander of the AK, could pander to anti-Semitism in his 
memoirs, writing Jews ‘had undoubtedly been a foreign body within 
the Polish community’.47 These political parties together represented 
the bulk of politically active Poles.
Even taking into account those elements of resistance outside 
the Sanacja-controlled army, it might still appear that Poland’s 
resistance did not include people’s war. A recent history counters 
this impression:
Hundreds of underground organisations … were established 
‘from below’ in conjunction with existing ties of family, job, 
friendship, and neighbors. Hundreds of conspiratorial networks 
thus emerged as an expression of a spontaneous rebellion against 
this humiliation, and were not created ‘from above’, [though] 
the numerical ratio between the two types of organizations will 
never be clear.48
A direct participant reported that: ‘anybody who had some 
imagination, a little ambition and initiative, and a great deal of 
courage could, and often did, start an outfit of his own … .’49
It is a sign of the complex inter-mixing of imperialist and 
people’s war elements that the balance between right and left in 
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the resistance has been hotly debated. One Jewish woman declared: 
‘I wasn’t afraid of the Germans, I was afraid of the Poles.’50 At the 
same time members of the resistance assisted the Jewish Warsaw 
Ghetto uprising of April 1932, and sheltered survivors.51 Some 
15,000–20,000 Jews were hidden in Warsaw beyond the Ghetto 
walls52 and the Zegota organisation (for rescuing Jews) was linked 
closely to the Polish Government-in-exile.53 One book concludes 
that ‘there is no national group about which there are as many 
(frequently contradictory) reports and judgments as there are about 
the Poles’.54 
Poland was unique in having the active involvement of upper- and 
lower-class forces in its resistance, yet there were powerful internal 
stresses in play.55 The overlap of people’s war and imperialist war 
was never comfortable or complete. As well as the split between 
left and right parties, and movements from ‘above’ and ‘below’, 
army supporters of the Sanacja sat uneasily alongside civilians who 
blamed that system for Poland’s ignominious defeat.56 An example 
of the tension occurred at a critical point in the development 
of the Warsaw Rising. Poland’s military Commander in Chief, 
Sosnowski, absented himself in order to plot a coup against the 
head of the civilian Government, Mikolajczyk. Sosnowski feared a 
compromise with the Russians was in preparation.57 Another issue 
was the emphasis of the resistance on Polish nationalism which 
alienated the non-Polish third of the population living within the 
pre-1939 borders.
Despite the obstacles to attentism mentioned above, the AK 
was tempted to try it, and for the same reasons as other ‘official’ 
resistance movements: primarily fear that mass actions would unleash 
dangerous social forces, but also to avoid Nazi reprisals (which were 
especially horrendous in Poland). Thus Bor-Komorowski based his 
initial strategy ‘on the assumption that sooner or later the German 
western front would crack, giving us a favourable opportunity for 
a successful insurrection’.58 In other words Anglo-French success 
must precede serious action. He felt France’s defeat in 1940 to be 
‘the end of our organisation [as] all our plans were collapsing’ 
and determined on ‘a long-term policy. Our main task would be 
intelligence work and Press and propaganda action.’59 
Attentism proved untenable, however. When the Nazis began 
clearing all Poles from the Lublin and Zamosc regions to make way 
for ethnic German colonists there was no choice but to authorise the 
formation of partisan units. Their action stopped the expulsions. Yet 
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the AK still resisted more drastic steps.60 It was eventually dragged 
into adopting the tactics of people’s war by the pressure of events. 
One factor was betrayal of the Polish cause by Britain, the country 
where the government-in-exile resided, and in whom the attentists 
placed their hopes. Although defending Polish sovereignty was the 
ostensible reason for war in 1939, Britain was more concerned to 
woo Moscow, a fellow great power, the Hitler-Stalin pact notwith-
standing. As early as October 1939 London indicated its belief that 
Russia should keep 90 per cent of its ill-gotten gains.61 When Russia 
joined the Allied camp, Churchill pressured Sikorski into signing a 
treaty with Stalin that implicitly recognised this conquest.62 News 
of the massacre at Katyn scuppered the enforced friendship, but 
brought no change in overall British policy.
Would Roosevelt back the resistance, given the USA’s large Polish 
electorate? He was even more solicitous of Stalin than Churchill. 
Until 1944 no assistance at all was forthcoming. As the Warsaw 
Rising drew near the US allocated $10 million (the Poles had asked 
for $97m), on condition that they collaborated with the Red Army. 
It was not until the Rising was in its third week that any money at 
all was released.63 
An emissary of the Underground State, Karski, who reached the 
West at great risk to reveal its existence to the Allies, commented 
bitterly on their lack of sympathy: ‘I soon realised that the outside 
world could not comprehend … It never could understand or 
estimate the sacrifice and heroism entailed in our nation-wide 
refusal to collaborate … The whole notion of the underground 
state was often unintelligible to them.’64 This incomprehension was 
not caused by a lack of imagination, but by the common interests 
of the Allied imperialists.
The negative attitude of the Allies weakened the fighting potential 
of the Polish resistance. Although the underground army acquired 
some equipment from its own secret workshops,65 in 1944 its 
hundreds of thousands of volunteers held no more than 32,000 
guns.66 As Russia was unlikely to provide additional weaponry, 
the AK turned to Britain. Geographical distance was the excuse 
given for refusal, but direct discussions between the British and 
Russian secret services were probably more decisive. Thus, in the 
period up to the Warsaw Rising, the tonnage of supplies the AK 
received was one tenth and one eighteenth of that sent to Greece 
and France respectively.67 
Such disdain for Polish aspirations led to disagreements between 
the London exiles, who were closely tied to the Allied powers, and 
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the AK’s commanders who were subject to popular pressures at 
home. Compare government pronouncements to those made in 
Warsaw on the eve of the Rising. The former were squarely in the 
Anglo-French camp: ‘Free Poland … will become an effective prop 
to the Western-cultured Slavonic countries and other small nations 
situated between Germany and Russia.’68 This statement deliberately 
distanced itself from radicalism.
In Warsaw, General Bor-Komorowski might have been expected 
to speak in similar tones. He had been selected as AK commander 
because he was an aristocratic cavalry officer known for right-wing 
views.69 Furthermore, until fairly late on he tried to incorporate the 
fascist NSZ into his forces, even though they had been murdering 
left-wing supporters of the Government-in-exile, as well as 
communists.70 However, Bor-Komorowski had to contend with 
the fact that, as time passed, Red Army successes created a sense 
of impatience which allowed the communist PPR to begin making 
headway.71 One historian writes that Poland was experiencing a 
‘surge of radical feeling ... sharing the longing of all European 
resistance movements for a cleaner world after the war, for social 
equality and full employment.’72 A sign of the mood was that in 
August 1943 the right-wing National Democrats, of all people, 
agreed to a statement proposing ‘a planned economy … with the 
state having the right to nationalise public utilities, transport, key 
industries and banking … The requisitioning of all private estates 
over fifty hectares … full employment, health, education, and 
social services.’73
General Bor-Komorowski followed suit. He feared a rift between 
his ‘self-contained professional group’ of right-wing officers, and 
the AK rank and file – ‘people of all walks of life and professions 
…’.74 In July 1944 Bor warned London against inaction because ‘the 
initiative for fighting the Germans is liable then to be taken by the 
PPR (Communist) and a considerable fraction of the less-informed 
citizens might join them. In that case the country is liable to move 
in the direction of collaboration with the Soviets and no one will 
be able to stop it.’75
To place himself at the head of the people’s war, Bor-Komorowski 
called for a Poland ‘governed in the interests of the wide working 
masses’.76 He did not ask people to risk their lives to make Poland 
an ‘effective prop to the Western-cultured Slavonic countries’ like 
the exiles. Instead he called for expropriation without compensation 
of large rural estates, a welfare state, nationalisation of industry, 
and workers’ councils.77
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As Ciechanowski explains, by 1944 the AK was confronted with 
‘a dangerous and explosive situation. They tried to prevent the PPR 
from gaining ground and to maintain the loyalty of the masses by 
increasing their anti-German operations. They regarded as their 
supreme task the preparation of an anti-German insurrection.’78
Bor now stressed: ‘the only chance of gaining anything was a 
constant demonstration of our will to fight Germany to the last, 
sparing no effort, in the teeth of every adversity.’79 With Russia 
unfriendly and Anglo-American forces too far away to mount a 
D-Day style landing, attentism, that refuge of governments-in-exile, 
had run its course in Warsaw.
Conjuring up active mass resistance, however, put the domestic 
Polish leadership on a collision course with Allied imperialism, as 
represented by Russia. This first became apparent during Operation 
Burza (‘Tempest’). AK units were to emerge from underground the 
moment the Red Army entered Poland and greet Soviet commanders 
with these words: ‘Acting on the orders of the Government of the 
Polish Republic I approach you … with a proposal to coordinate 
military operations against the common enemy with the Soviet 
forces entering the territories of the Polish republic.’80
General Bor-Komorowski explained that Burza would 
demonstrate: ‘Our will to manifest our struggle against the 
Germans’, and ‘Our will to manifest to the Soviets the presence of 
elements representing the sovereignty of the Republic’.81 The relative 
importance attached to a people’s anti-fascist war or restoration of 
pre-war Poland was unclear in this formulation. Bor still balanced 
uncomfortably between the two.
Burza was launched in the Volhynia region, which Borodziej has 
discussed in detail. Here the population was five-sixths Ukrainian 
and only one-sixth Polish. This unfortunate area had endured 
centuries of imperialism – mainly Tsarist, then Polish, and now 
German. To win local co-operation Berlin cleverly exploited 
Ukrainian hostility to their Polish neighbours, of whom 50,000 were 
killed. Before Burza the AK’s role in Volhynia had not been to attack 
Germans but to defend the Polish minority through counter-terror 
– 20,000 Ukrainians perished as a result.82 It was here, and after 
these appalling events, that the AK proposed to re-establish the 
‘sovereignty of the [Polish] Republic’! 
A genuine people’s war, imbued with internationalism and 
emphasizing the common interest of ordinary people in opposing 
all ruling classes (or at least a Titoist emphasis on multi-ethnic 
resistance) could have generated mass support for Burza in Volhynia. 
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The AK was not about to go that far, and so when it appeared on 
the scene the Red Army easily brushed the resistance fighters aside.
The pattern set in Volhynia reappeared elsewhere: Red Army 
commanders welcomed AK assistance during the fight against the 
Germans, but the instant the battle was won they demanded the 
resistance dissolve or join a puppet Polish army under General 
Berling. Those who refused were interned or executed.83 Stalin 
wanted Eastern Poland back after the war; he did not want rival 
factions under arms. Not only was the AK weak in terms of military 
hardware, in the Eastern regions it could not appeal to Polish 
nationalism. So Burza failed wherever it was attempted.
Warsaw was another matter. The capital was less ethnically 
diverse, especially after the elimination of its considerable Jewish 
community. Yet throughout Operation Burza, and indeed up until 
the very moment when the Warsaw Rising erupted, no-one proposed 
large-scale fighting there.84 Bor-Komorowski was explicit: ‘I have 
issued directives aimed at preventing our diversionary activities 
from becoming a spontaneous attempt at an armed insurrection 
launched under unfavourable conditions.’85 Proof the AK leadership 
did not pre-plan the Rising was the fact that precious armaments 
were sent out of Warsaw in the preceding weeks.86 On 14 July Bor 
said: ‘In the current situation of the German forces in Poland and 
the preparations against the Uprising [it] has no chance of success. 
We can only rely on the case that the Germans collapse and the 
army falls apart.’87
A kaleidoscope of pressures rather than one single element 
changed this line. It was believed the Germans were about to deport 
large numbers of young Varsovians which would have crippled 
the AK. The Red Army was approaching the city, and on 29 July 
broadcast a Polish communist statement: ‘the hour of action has 
already arrived’. It appealed for ‘direct active struggle in the streets’ 
so that the moment of final liberation will be hastened and the 
lives of our brethren saved’.88 The next day the language was even 
stronger: ‘Warsaw is shaking to the foundations from the roar of 
the guns. Soviet forces are advancing forcefully and approaching 
Praga [the district facing central Warsaw on the other side of the 
Vistula River]. They are coming to bring you freedom … People of 
the Capital! To arms!’89 Colonel Monter, Bor’s subordinate, reported 
the same (as it turned out false) claim at a crucial meeting of the 
AK leadership.90 The decision for a rising in Warsaw was made, 
and on 1 August 1944 it began.
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That day the Home Army and civil population threw themselves 
into the biggest insurrection of the entire Second World War. 
Historians disagree on its wisdom. Davies sees it as a justified attempt 
to throw off the German yoke, on the reasonable expectation that 
Allied anti-fascist rhetoric would translate into concrete assistance. 
Kolko suggests the AK leadership and Government-in-exile were 
manoeuvring to preserve their role within the system of state 
powers: ‘The uprising was in reality against both the Germans and 
Russians, and therefore doomed to failure from the beginning. It 
was a ghastly outcome of the logic which the Poles, both in London 
and in the Home Army, attempted to employ for years as part of 
their diplomacy of grandeur.’91
There is evidence for both interpretations. For example, General 
Bor-Komorowski believed: ‘The general lust of revenge for the 
years of tragedy and humiliation suffered under the Germans was 
overwhelming and practically impossible to check. The whole town 
was waiting breathlessly for a call to arms … .’92 But he also hinted 
at ‘the diplomacy of grandeur’ when describing the insurrection as 
‘the last trump card we had in that game in which the stake was 
the independence of our country.’93 
The AK had weapons for only a fraction of its 40,000 troops and 
could hold out for little more than a week.94 However, with the Red 
Army nearby and the Polish Premier having arrived in Moscow just 
two days before, it was believed that Russian assistance would soon 
be forthcoming.95 The AK’s need for external help was obvious. On 
the very first day of fighting it lost 10 per cent of those mobilised, 
at a cost of four fighters for every German.96
This did not dim popular enthusiasm for a reckoning with the 
Nazis. An eye-witness would write of the:
joy which we felt at the time. It arose as a result of the torment 
of the occupation, as a result of the pain and humiliation suffered 
for nearly five years. We were prepared for anything …The years 
of the occupation had taught us to be indifferent to the dangers 
that threatened us with every step. But above all the belief that 
the Polish armed movement would hasten the moment of the 
crossing of the Soviet Army to Warsaw and immediately force 
the Germans to leave the town invigorated us.97
An AK officer described the:
fervour with which the inhabitants built anti-tank barricades, 
organised soup kitchens at short notice to feed soldiers and 
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those people not able to return to their homes, caught where the 
Uprising had surprised them. The mood in the street reminded one 
of a continuous holiday … Everyone in their own way and within 
the limits of their ability took part in this decisive struggle.98
Three days into the Rising Bor-Komorowski reported how 
women and men were rushing to join the AK, volunteering for all 
sorts of roles such as extinguishing fires, feeding the fighters, and 
producing homemade petrol bombs that compensated for the lack of 
armaments.99 Amongst many others, the ‘Grey Ranks’ – the Polish 
scout movement – played a prominent part and paid the price.100
Whatever the different factors behind the decision to act, an AK 
officer witnessed in Warsaw a crucial aspect of the people’s war: 
‘the boundary between fighters and participants has been erased.’101 
This was echoed by a British observer: ‘Today, a battle is going on 
that I think is very difficult for the British nation to understand. It 
is a battle that is being carried on by the civilian population as well 
as by the AK.’102 One in seven combatants were women, and, in 
Bor-Komorowski’s words, ‘the majority were workers, railwaymen, 
artisans, students and clerks in factories, railways and offices’.103 
So AK methods could not ‘be compared with the attack of any 
regular army. It had all the drive and enthusiasm of a revolutionary 
uprising [and] we attributed our success of the first few days to the 
impetuous fervour of this first onslaught. It more than made up for 
the poor quality of our arms.’104
This does not mean that the union of the movement ‘from 
above’ and ‘from below’, cemented by universal hatred of Nazi 
rule, was incapable of dissolving. A report to the Government-in-
exile from within Warsaw indicated that large numbers were less 
concerned with whether the Polish Government was associated with 
the Western Allies or Russia, than whether it could deliver social 
reforms. The report therefore warned that the radical promises 
must not be dropped.105 
Everything now turned on the Russians’ attitude. With Poland’s 
fate not yet pre-determined by the notorious blue-pencilled paper 
and its percentages, would they make common cause with the 
insurgents and promote people’s war, like communists elsewhere, 
or would Stalin treat Warsaw with the same hostility as Churchill 
did Athens? In comparing the two men we will use the British PM’s 
insider account from his History of the Second World War. 
On 4 August Churchill informed Stalin of British aid to the AK 
as this ‘may be of help to your operation’.106 Stalin’s reply the next 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   66 04/05/2012   09:47
Poland 67
day was that the Rising was ‘greatly exaggerated and does not 
inspire confidence’ because ‘they have neither artillery nor aircrafts 
nor tanks.’107 Precisely the point. The Rising was timed to coincide 
with the anticipated arrival of Red Army artillery, aircraft and 
tanks. The deadline of a week that the AK had foreseen as the 
limit of their endurance came and went, with no sign of any Russian 
advance or aid. So the insurgents improvised a host of ingenious 
techniques, and because guns were recovered from those who fell, 
the high death toll actually served to increase the proportion of AK 
troops with weapons. Meanwhile the strength of popular feeling 
maintained morale.108
But Nazi resolve strengthened too. German orders now read: ‘1. 
All rebels were to be shot after capture; 2. The non-fighting part of 
the population would be massacred indiscriminately.’109 The local 
Nazi ruler, Hans Frank, added: ‘Warsaw merits the fate of being 
utterly destroyed.’110
On 12 August Churchill tried to soften Stalin’s position by 
presenting an appeal delivered from Warsaw:
We receive from you only once a small drop [of supplies]. On 
the German-Russian front silence since the 3rd. We are therefore 
without any material or moral support, as with the exception of 
a short speech by the Polish Vice-PM (from London), we have 
not had from you even an acknowledgement of our action. The 
soldiers and the population look hopelessly at the skies, expecting 
help from the Allies. On the background of smoke they see only 
German aircraft. They are surprised, feel deeply depressed, and 
begin to revile…I repeat emphatically that without immediate 
support, consisting of drops of arms and munitions, bombing 
of objectives held by the enemy, and air landing, our fight will 
collapse in a few days.
Churchill pleaded: ‘Can you not give them some further help?’111 
On day 16 came Stalin’s response: ‘I am convinced that the Warsaw 
action represents a reckless and terrible adventure… .’112
It was true that Rokossovsky, the Red Army commander on the 
Polish front, faced stiff resistance from the Wehrmacht at this time. 
Even Davies, the historian most sympathetic to the Rising, finds that 
initially there was ‘a determined German counter-attack to the east 
of the Vistula … [and] little chance that Rokossovsky could easily 
have crossed the Vistula in force’.113 However, the Rising continued 
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until 2 October and in that time numerous opportunities arose for 
the Russians to provide assistance.
Air drops were an option and Churchill and Roosevelt sent this 
joint appeal to Stalin: ‘We are thinking of world opinion if the 
anti-Nazis in Warsaw are in effect abandoned …We hope that you 
will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the patriot Poles 
in Warsaw, or will you agree to help our planes in doing it very 
quickly?’114 The Soviets put no obstacle in the way of British and US 
supply planes flying the 1,250km from their nearest bases in Italy, 
but they were not permitted to land or refuel in Russia. Equally, the 
Russians had no intention of flying the 30km from their positions 
to aid Warsaw.115 The Western Allies mounted a series of virtually 
suicidal missions but it could not radically alter the outcome.116
In mid-September the Russians eventually deigned to provide 
limited aid. Churchill saw through this belated manoeuvre: ‘They 
wished to have the non-Communist Poles destroyed to the full, but 
also to keep alive the idea that they were going to their rescue.’117 
Harriman, the US ambassador in Moscow was appalled by the 
Kremlin’s approach: ‘These men are bloated with power and expect 
they can force their will on us and all countries to accept their 
decisions without question … .’118 
After two months the insurgents finally capitulated. The Polish 
Government explained the disastrous outcome in these terms: ‘We 
received no effective support… We have been treated worse than 
Hitler’s allies in Romania, Italy and Finland … [Our] Rising is going 
under at a time when our armies abroad are helping to liberate 
France, Belgium, and Holland… .’119
Without any sense of irony the British PM, who bombed Athens to 
break the Greek resistance, echoed their argument:
Immortal is the nation that can muster such universal heroism… 
These words are indelible. The struggle in Warsaw had lasted 
more than 60 days. Of the 40,000 men and women of the Polish 
Underground Army about 15,000 fell. Out of a population of 
a million nearly 200,000 had been stricken. The suppression of 
the revolt cost the German Army 10,000 killed, 7,000 missing 
and 9,000 wounded… When the Russians entered the city three 
months later they found little but shattered streets and the 
unburied dead. Such was their liberation of Poland where they 
now rule.120
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The tragic end of the Warsaw Rising was the result of many 
factors, including miscalculations by the AK, and the unexpected 
strength of the Wehrmacht. However, there is no doubt that 
Deutscher’s accusation against Russia was accurate. The blocking of 
aid to Warsaw ‘sent a shudder of horror through the allied countries 
[as] a demonstration of callousness [that] shocked even Stalin’s 
admirers in the West’.121
Poland saw a repetition of the pattern seen in Greece, in spite 
of the very different political context. Irrespective of the formal 
ideological position of the Allied governments involved, imperialists 
opposed resistance movements when these did not suit their purpose. 
This reinforces the idea that the Second World War experienced 
parallel imperialist and people’s wars which could find themselves 
in direct opposition. In Greece Britain attacked the population. In 
Poland Russia allowed the Nazis to do their dirty work for them. 
The outcome was the same in each case. It was a bitter consolation, 
as one Polish broadcast put it, that ‘at least the Germans cannot 
take Warsaw again. All that is left is a heap of rubble … Warsaw 
no longer exists.’122
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latvia – Standing history on its head
Although the Second World War encompassed two distinctly 
different conflicts, they were not manifested everywhere. Latvia 
experienced only imperialist war and so, as one writer has put it: 
‘the good war narrative simply will not work’.1 It is an informative 
case because, when taken alongside Yugoslavia, Greece and Poland, 
the prerequisites for people’s war are revealed.
The peculiarity of Latvia’s role is confirmed by the quagmire 
contemporary historians fall into if they apply the conventional 
categories of the Second World War to their country’s past. Thus a 
recent anthology by ‘the Commission of the Historians of Latvia’ 
states the only party ‘that came near to being a resistance movement 
in the West European sense’ was the Perkonkrusts. This word is 
Latvian for Swastika,2 and in a country where a quarter of the 
population were from ethnic minorities, the policy of its leader, 
Celmins, was: ‘in a Latvian Latvia there will only be Latvians 
[because] the question of minorities will not exist ... ’.3 Perkonkrusts 
members sought that goal by organising the notorious auxiliary 
police battalions and Commando squads at the behest of the 
Nazis. These butchered 70,000 Latvian Jews.4 Is it not strange to 
describe the Swastika Party as ‘a resistance movement in the West 
European sense’? 
Valdmanis is presented as another resister. As a minister in Latvia’s 
Nazi-appointed quisling regime, he publicly invited his compatriots 
‘to participate in the war for the liberation of Europe and put the 
fate of the Latvian people in the hands of Adolf Hitler.’5 In private he 
wrote: ‘we would prefer to receive our Latvian independence from 
Germany instead of from other powers …’.6 Valdmanis’s biographer 
finds ‘collaboration became increasingly indistinguishable from 
resistance’.7 An official history concurs: ‘One could simultaneously 
be both a collaborator and an active member of the resistance.’8
Such a bizarre, indeed chilling, approach is only explicable (though 
not any more justifiable) because Latvia was occupied by Russia 
from 1939 to 1941, and 1944 to 1991. Accordingly, these historians 
regard those who opposed Russia as the true ‘resisters’. Conversely, 
70
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Latvians who fought Nazism are dubbed ‘collaborators rather than 
members of the resistance movement’.9 The historians reject the 
‘Nuremburg consensus’, believing the trial of Nazi war criminals 
represented a ‘winners’ position’ that ignored the Soviet misdeeds.10
This topsy turvy argument has repercussions even today. One 
dissident Latvian historian warns that: ‘The truth about the Holocaust 
and mass murders that took place also in Latvia during the German 
period is still being ignored deliberately or unintentionally’.11 As 
recently as May 2010, at the urging of the Latvian government, 
the European Court upheld the conviction of Kononov, the only 
anti-Nazi partisan to be successfully prosecuted as a war criminal. 
He led an attack on a village suspected of harbouring German 
collaborators, in which nine people, including a pregnant woman, 
were killed. The state of Latvia argued that ‘the Court should take 
into account the broader historical and political events before and 
after the Second World War’ including Soviet occupation.12
The confusion arises from the absence of a people’s war in Latvia, 
which was rooted in its geographical and historical position. With 
a landmass one-264th the size of Russia’s, and one-seventh that 
of Germany, it was long oppressed by these powerful neighbours. 
Teutonic knights took control in the thirteenth century, and though 
Baltic Germans formed a mere 4 per cent of the population by 
the start of the twentieth, they still dominated economically and 
socially. Above them was an authoritarian Tsarist regime which 
pursued aggressive Russification policies. Even after independence 
in 1918, ethnic minorities controlled over three quarters of 
private enterprise.13
In this situation one’s attitude to imperialism was critical. The 
approach adopted by the country’s first and largest political party, 
the Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (LSDWP) was left 
internationalism. The LSDWP had a policy akin to Luxemburg’s. 
It argued that so long as Russian or German imperialism existed 
the demand for independence was impractical in a country as weak 
as Latvia. Only an alliance with revolutionary workers fighting to 
overthrow these imperialist powers from within could succeed. So 
Stucka, the LSDWP leader, did not want ‘the struggle of nationalities 
but of classes’.14 This policy meant that during the 1905 Russian 
Revolution workers in Riga joined in mass strikes that shook 
Tsarism. Simultaneously peasants (the most numerous social group) 
challenged the power of the local German landowners.15
But imperialism recovered, and during the First World War Latvia 
became a battleground fought over by Germany and Russia. It 
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only escaped the carnage when the 1917 Bolshevik insurrection 
brought Russia’s withdrawal from the War. During this episode 
Latvian riflemen played a key role as Bolshevism’s ‘praetorian 
guard’. However, at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 Moscow 
was forced to cede the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
to Germany. While the Bolsheviks were too weak to do anything 
else, this act probably prevented a successful revolution in Latvia 
with broad popular backing.16 
In 1918, with left-wing influence on the wane, the initiative shifted 
to Latvia’s nationalists, who tended to be middle and upper class. 
They feared the Latvian workers and their internationalism and 
would ally with whichever capitalist power guaranteed them a state 
with the jobs, status, and power to restrain domestic opponents. 
Britain was hostile to both communism and the Kaiser and so 
in October became the first country to accord Latvia diplomatic 
recognition.17 Full independence was granted by the victors of the 
First World War just days after Germany’s capitulation.
Latvia began the inter-war period with a parliamentary 
democracy, but after President Ulmanis visited Nazi Germany in 
1934 fascism was introduced.18 His first target was the communists, 
whose support for a foreign government was styled ‘unpatriotic’. 
Eventually all political parties (including the Perkonkrusts and his 
own formation) were banned. While Ulmanis avoided virulent 
anti-Semitism, he clearly aligned himself with the Perkonkrusts 
general motto by promoting slogans like ‘Latvia for the Latvians’19 
and ‘Latvia is a Latvian State’.20
The Hitler-Stalin pact granted the Baltic States to Russia, and 
in 1940 Soviet troops toppled Ulmanis. In a statement worthy of 
Orwell, the newly founded ‘People’s Government of Free Citizens 
of Latvia’ asserted: ‘The Red Army being in the territory of Latvia, 
and the happy reception that our inhabitants gave the Red Army, is 
solid proof and a guarantee of our stable relations and our brotherly 
friendship with the USSR… .’21 An election produced a resounding 
98 per cent vote of confidence for the ‘Working People’s Bloc’. 
However, this was the Latvian Communist Party’s grouping and 
the only one allowed to stand. At the time the Party had just 400 
members, of whom only 50 were themselves ethnic Latvians.22 In 
August 1940 Latvia was admitted into the USSR and its ‘community 
of brother and great socialist lands and fortunate nations’.23 
Some Latvians swallowed the rhetoric. Swain’s excellent history of 
the town of Daugavapils shows how they believed Russian control 
was a green light for soviets – workers’ and soldiers’ councils. At 
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the Italia works the soviet cut hours, reinstated a worker victimised 
under the fascist regime, and ensured payment of wages for the 
days of the ‘revolution’. In the barracks food quality improved, 
‘fascist elements’ were purged, and equal rights for all nationalities 
to promotion and holidays were promulgated.24 However, the 
illusions were swiftly destroyed. Russian Latvia was given what 
Swain calls ‘a five year plan in five months’.25 The power of factory 
managers was restored and party committees replaced broad-based 
soviets.26 Rationing accompanied a 300 per cent rise in food prices. 
Through the Stakhanovite movement workers were enjoined to 
multiply productivity and spied on by the secret police.27 While 
the Hitler-Stalin Pact held communists were told: ‘their task was 
no longer to be part of the world wide struggle of communism 
against fascism, but to persuade a sceptical populace of the benefits 
of incorporation into the Soviet Union… .’28 
The Baltic economies were to be rapidly integrated into the 
USSR’s war preparations. In July 1940 the government seized 
(‘nationalised’) all major enterprises and banks.29 Changes to land 
ownership followed, which, though they fell short of full collectivi-
sation, made many peasants suspect the state would soon confiscate 
their farms.30 
As the Baltic States were close to Leningrad and contained German 
minorities which Hitler might use to justify invasion31 the decision 
was taken to remove them, and any other ‘dangerous elements’. 
Thousands of citizens were deported causing intense bitterness. 
The process came in four waves,32 culminating on 13/14 June 1941 
when 15,000 people (including 2,400 children under the age of ten) 
were shipped off to Siberia in appalling conditions.33 This was the 
regime’s last major act.
Official Latvian circles today class the period of deportations as 
‘the year of horror’,34 and some implicitly blame the Jews for what 
happened. One writes: ‘part of the Jewish population, especially 
members of the Jewish socialist movement, welcomed and actively 
collaborated with the Soviet power’.35 Given the alternative of Nazi 
rule this was hardly surprising. Another points to ‘the conspicuous 
position of the Jews in the new regime [which] caused the Letts 
to identify the whole of the Jewish community with the hated 
Soviet regime’.36 A third points out that ‘three of the main figures 
in the security apparatus were of Jewish origin, and this fact 
created the stereotype common in occupied Latvia …’. A more 
measured account notes that ‘Latvians in Latvia noticed only that 
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the perpetrators were not just Russians and Latvians, but also Jews 
– “again those Jews!”’37 
As usual, the stereotype was false. Latvia’s Jews suffered relatively 
the most. They were 5 per cent of the population, but constituted 
11 per cent of the deportees.38 Their larger numbers were due 
to their position in the economic structure, which was regarded 
as an impediment to Russia’s monopoly: ‘The Soviets viewed all 
conquered peoples as a possible threat, to be forcibly incorporated 
into the communist system. With regard to the Jews, who were not 
granted the status of a nation in Soviet ideology, the aim was to 
assimilate them as soon as possible, by uprooting Jewish communal 
and religious organizations.’39
Yet the Jews were to be the victims once more when, in the 
absence of a viable alternative to imperialism, the actions of one 
oppressor (Russia) pushed many of the Latvian population straight 
into the arms of another (Germany). One book explains that as 
a result of the deportations: ‘in a very short period the common 
view of the Germans (“the black knights”) as the Latvia’s primary 
enemies – developed over the centuries – was suddenly replaced by 
the view that the primary enemy was Russia and the Communists. 
This change of perspective defined the reception the Germans 
received when they invaded.’40
Latvia’s Soviet regime collapsed in June 1941, under the Wehrmacht 
onslaught. As before, when Ulmanis’s regime was overthrown, 
there was a brief transition period when neither imperialism held 
full sway. However, nothing resembling a resistance to Nazism 
appeared. Those on the left who had not been broken by Ulmanis’s 
fascist rule were disoriented or discredited by the Stalinist phase. 
Instead, a ‘national partisan’ movement spontaneously emerged to 
harass the retreating Red Army, assist the German advance, and 
arrest communists and Jews.41 Nazi sympathisers set up a Centre 
for Latvian Organisations to take power at the local level, but it 
was ignored by the new masters.42 
The Nazis found willing collaborators in most states they 
conquered, from Quisling in Norway, to Pétain in France, and so 
on. However, in the swathe of territory that experienced recent 
Soviet deportations, such as the Baltic States and the Ukraine, this 
phenomenon was particularly intense. Here, writes the American 
author, Dean, ‘it was relatively easy for the Nazis to recruit people 
locally who were prepared to carry out their terrible policies …’.43 
Latvian historians are at pains to point out that their countrymen 
did not turn to genocide without external encouragement. In most 
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places the ‘interregnum’ between Russian and German control lasted 
less than one day, and there seems to be no evidence of spontaneous 
mass murder of Jews during that brief time.44 However, the speed 
of events was nevertheless startling. 
The Holocaust is generally dated to the late summer of 1941, 
becoming large-scale from October. In Latvia, however, the Final 
Solution was underway on 23 June, just two days after the Germans 
took charge. By mid-August a high proportion of Jews in rural areas 
were dead. In the Zemgale region the toll was 100 per cent. This 
thoroughness was only possible with close collaboration and local 
knowledge. As Dean asserts more broadly, there was an ‘element 
of the perpetrators personally knowing the victims [which] lends a 
gruesome intimacy to the massacres’.45 The (once again Orwellian 
sounding) ‘Latvian Self-Defence Commands’ identified and rounded 
up victims. 700 such units had formed in just a few weeks.46 Clearly 
the invaders had little difficulty finding volunteers. A study of the 
Krustpils area describes how things worked at the micro level:
Both those who executed and those who gave orders came from 
Krustpils or adjacent parishes. Germans usually were not present 
in such operations involving small groups of Jews. Instead they 
allowed their local henchmen ‘initiative’ and gave them ‘free rein’. 
In all Latvian regions the local murderers helped to relieve the 
psychological pressure on the executors from the ranks of ‘the 
supreme race.’ Regretfully, they often tried to please the occupation 
authorities by doing more than they were expected to.47
Latvian collaboration was self-organised. Alongside German 
Einsatzgruppen there were bodies like the 1,600-strong Arajs 
Commando led by a former Perkonkrusts member.48 It was directly 
responsible for killing 26,000 people and was implicated with the 
deaths of 34,000 more.49 While factors ranging from greed, sadism 
and anti-Semitism may have motivated the Arajs Commando, 
the court testimony of one volunteer was telling, and typical. He 
joined ‘to fight against the units of the Red Army that have fallen 
behind, against Soviet activists and other supporters of the Soviet 
regime …’.50
The entire population did not necessarily share the genocidal 
intent of the ‘Self-Defence’ squads. Another of Arajs Commando 
suggest that while its members ‘realized that a countless number 
of people would be killed’, they also knew that amongst the wider 
population murdering women and children was not supported, 
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even though anti-Semitism was prevalent.51 German officials 
complained that Latvians ‘behaved passively towards the Jews’ 
and that contrary to expectations local forces had spontaneously 
liquidated only ‘a few thousand’.52 Indeed, some 400 individual 
Latvians have been identified who, at great personal risk, shielded 
Jews from persecution.53 
Nazi–Latvian relations were determined by the fact that the Baltic 
States were the only part of Eastern Europe intended for inclusion in 
the Reich after ‘Germanisation’ (a combination of assimilating the 
50 per cent considered ‘racially suitable’, but exile or extermination 
for the rest).54 The Nazi authorities therefore privileged Latvians 
over other East Europeans, but opposed their independence by the 
same token. Could this blocking of national aspirations be the basis 
for a people’s war?
In Riga the Germans established a ‘Self-Administration’ under 
General Dankers. Most historians treat such bodies as quisling 
regimes, yet some Latvian historians describe the Self-Administration 
as a source of ‘resistance’. Is this the case? When the occupiers 
called for police battalions to be assembled, minister Valdmanis 
suggested that the Latvians should demand concessions from the 
German side in return for co-operation.55 It is difficult to allege that 
putting a price on collaboration (as opposed to offering it for free) 
amounted to resistance as such, but Dankers overruled Valdmanis 
in any case. By the end of the war 49 battalions, consisting of 
15,000 individuals, were in operation. In fact, ‘Police battalion’ 
was a misnomer since the duties they performed included fighting 
on the Eastern front, guarding the Warsaw ghetto, and transporting 
Jews to the Treblinka death camp.56 
The craven approach advocated by Dankers did not lessen the 
exploitation Latvia endured. The Nazis treated it as brutally as 
the Russians. When Audrini village hid Red Army soldiers all 235 
inhabitants were killed and the buildings burned.57 The anti-partisan 
Winter Magic operation on Latvia’s Russian border involved 
flattening a 40km no-man’s land. All women and children who 
did not leave went to concentration camps or to Germany, while the 
men were deported or shot.58 Economic exploitation was equally 
shameless. The Germans retained property seized under Soviet 
occupation ‘as spoils of war’.59 It was subsequently calculated that 
Germany cost Latvia $660 million (compared to Russia’s $1,000 
million):60 265,000 Latvians were used as labour in the Reich.61 
After willing participants ran out there was, what Swain calls, a 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   76 04/05/2012   09:47
laTvIa 77
‘hunt for people … Snatch squads would grab whoever was closest 
and load them on to the lorry at gun point.’62
Contemporaries made a direct comparison with the Russian era. 
One German official considered his country’s ‘activities were so 
brutal that the methods used can certainly be compared to the 
methods of the [Russian] Cheka’.63 A communist prisoner told his 
jailors: ‘We have treated our people badly, so badly that it would be 
a true art to treat them worse. You Germans have managed that.’ 
Another suspected the Nazis ‘were not German at all but merely 
Russians who had donned other uniforms’.64 All this should have 
given ample reason to fight the Germans.
Yet opposition is difficult to find. In a desperate bid to unearth 
it, some Latvian historians claim to have discovered the elusive 
anti-fascist element in a body proposed by Himmler in May 1943 
– the ‘Latvian SS Volunteer Legion’, a 150,000-strong force.65 This 
is described as ‘the legal centre of resistance to German rule’.66 
Why? Firstly, they insist it was not a volunteer force because the 
bulk of the Legion was conscripted.67 Even if correct this does not 
make the conscripts resisters. The second ploy is to suggest Latvians 
confronted Germany over its formation. When the Self-Adminis-
tration first considered Himmler’s proposal it renewed the earlier 
debate about ‘more recruits as a price for concessions, or concessions 
as the reward for more recruits’.68 Valdmanis wanted Germany to 
give Latvia an improved puppet status, in return for drumming up 
100,000 soldiers,69 but the Self-Administration put a more modest 
proposal – that Latvia’s General Bangerskis be given command. This 
was refused but the Self-Administration caved in and approved the 
Legion anyway. The Nazis made the smallest concession possible in 
return. Bangerskis was appointed General Inspector with the rank 
of SS Gruppenführer and Waffen-SS Lieutenant General.70 
So what is left of ‘the legal centre of resistance’? Only this: ‘A 
Latvian spirit prevailed in the Legion from the outset. For example, 
orders were given in Latvian, the ranks, roll-calls and prayer hymn 
were the same as the old Latvian army’.71 We are supposed to believe 
fighting alongside Nazi Germany was resistance, just so long as 
hymns were in Latvian! 
A marginally more credible analysis of the Legion is that: ‘Though 
fighting with an unwanted ally, Latvian soldiers fought heroically 
against their greater enemy, the Communists.’72 This has been 
confirmed by a study of foreign veterans of the Waffen-SS which 
shows that while few Finns and Norwegians were enthused by the 
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Nazi ‘crusade against Bolshevism’, 100 per cent of the Latvians 
cited anti-communism as their motivation.73 
Does the notion of resistance gain a scintilla of plausibility 
through the fact that Germany repressed certain leading Latvians? 
It is true the Nazis disliked those who put a price on collaboration. 
When Celmins opposed his Perkonkrusts party being banned he was 
sent to Flossenburg concentration camp. Valdmanis was deported 
in 1943. But Celmins was treated as ‘an inmate of honour’,74 unlike 
the 1,100 Latvians who were killed at the camp.75 Valdmanis’s 
deportation meant his being rehoused in Berlin’s most prestigious 
hotel.76 Surely it is ridiculous to compare these people to genuine 
resistance fighters elsewhere, who faced torture and death.
Our final candidate for anti-Nazi resistance was the Central 
Council of Latvia (CCL). Bilmanis, the pre-war Latvian ambassador 
to the US, affirmed it stood for ‘the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
[and] followed a policy based on the coming victory of Great Britain 
and the United States … .’77 Backed by Latvia’s four largest pre-war 
parties the CCL was, according to a current official history, ‘the 
largest and most influential resistance organisation [whose] most 
important stand… was to fight against both occupying powers 
– Nazi and Soviet’. Unfortunately, the evidence offered for such 
even-handed opposition to totalitarianism is scanty. Even those who 
make the claim admit the CCL did not fight the Nazis78 because 
‘military action would only serve to weaken Nazi Germany and 
therefore hasten the return of the Soviet regime’.79 
The CCL’s policy statement, signed by 190 prominent individuals, 
is much lauded but rarely quoted. In fact, it was anything but a 
declaration of opposition to Nazism. The opening warns: ‘The 
enemy from the East is again threateningly approaching Latvia.’ It 
then complains that Nazi blocking of nationalist aspirations was 
hindering ‘complete mobilization of Latvia’s inhabitants into the 
German armed forces’.80 And the statement was a plea addressed 
to none other than Latvia’s very own SS Gruppenführer and 
Waffen-SS Lieutenant General, Bangerskis. This was the man to 
whom the Germans turned in their final hours to head an ‘“ersatz” 
administration which could act as a cover for their illegal acts’.81 
It is surely a sign of the weakness of resistance that the Nazis in 
the Courland (Kurzeme) region of Latvia surrendered a day after 
Germany itself had done so and thus officially ended the Second 
World War in Europe.
There was another force claiming the mantle of resistance in 
Latvia – the pro-Soviet partisans. That they were a tool of Moscow, 
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and consequently found recruitment problematic, is suggested by a 
detailed study showing they had great difficulty striking roots beyond 
the cities of Riga, Liepaja and the Russian border area of Latgale.82 
When the exiled Latvian CP Central Committee tried to establish 
bases within the country, partisans on the ground declared this to 
be impossible, so for a prolonged period operations were launched 
from neighbouring Belorussia.83 Eventually Nazi brutality brought 
recruits, first from the ethnic Russian population, and then more 
broadly.84 By 1943 there were more volunteers than arms to equip 
them because, according to a partisan report: ‘in Latgale everyone 
is waiting for the Red Army to return, because of the taxes, the high 
prices and the demands of the Germans’.85 By the end of the war units 
like the Red Arrow, composed of Red Army paratroops, Latvian 
communists and deserters from the Legion, were on the offensive 
in several areas.86 In the Stalinist era the figure of 20,000 for the 
partisan movement was quoted,87 but a more realistic figure was that 
given by its own staff on its dissolution in October 1944 – 5,900.88 
Finally, the 40,000 plus Latvians who fought in the ranks of the 
Red Army’s Latvian Riflemen Division and its other units must be 
mentioned. But they were no more independent of imperialism than 
the Latvian SS Legion. In that respect the clash of imperialisms and 
lack of a people’s alternative, resulted in a Latvian civil war in which 
both sides killed their compatriots on behalf of a foreign oppressor.89
The pro-Soviet regime that replaced the Nazis after the Second 
World War so clearly lacked local support that it had serious 
difficulty finding sufficient native speakers to staff its offices. Half 
the key postholders in Daugavapils District were Russians and only 
one in six ethnically Latvian.90 And its actions did nothing to garner 
popularity. The deportations started again, with 150,000 people 
sent to Siberia in the first five months of 1945.91
The experience of ordinary civilians makes clear the reason for 
the lack of a people’s war. They were caught between two mighty 
imperialist blocs. This was brought home to the author by an 
interview in Riga with a woman who had a grandfather in the SS 
Legion and another in the Red Army. Her grandmother’s farm was 
overrun by the Soviets in 1940 and by the Wehrmacht in 1941. Each 
plundered it, and in the last days of the war the partisans joined 
in. Another woman describes her family history after the arrival of 
the Nazis in these terms: 
[M]y father was put in prison; my youngest brother was deported 
to Germany at the age of 18 years. After a while he was put into 
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a camp of concentration at Stutthof in Danzig. I was deported 
to Germany to work on the land at the age of seventeen years. 
In 1944 the Communists occupied Latvia for the second time. In 
the confusion of war I did not hear anything about my family. 
Later I got news that my father had been deported on foot to 
Russia at the age of seventy-one and died somewhere on the side 
of the road.92
The postscript to the Second World War in Latvia was equally 
dismal. Without a people’s war to counterbalance it, imperialism 
completely determined the people’s fate. Latvian nationalists 
withdrew allegiance from the defeated Germans at the last minute, 
in the hope of finding a sympathetic response from the Allies. It made 
no difference. The Teheran and Potsdam conferences rubber-stamped 
the gains Stalin made through his pact with Hitler. That undermined 
the ‘national partisans’, some 20,000 of whom challenged Soviet 
control after 1944. Many had been trained by German counter-
intelligence and by 1953 had killed 3,242 Red Army soldiers, a 
number roughly matched by losses in their own ranks.93 
Latvians who had been fighting alongside the Germans constituted 
the largest single group of captured non-German enemy personnel.94 
When the Cold War got underway Britain announced that such 
Baltic Waffen-SS veterans were not war criminals after all, but 
‘displaced persons’. It accepted the argument of the pre-war Latvian 
ambassador that people like Arajs ‘were great national patriots, men 
of quite modest means; anti-Bolshevik of course, but certainly not 
to be described as fascists’.95 The US employed Valdmanis on the 
grounds that he had ‘never participated in politics and his character 
and background are excellent.’96
Latvian historians have tried to normalise their country’s 
experience by trying to tack a ‘resistance’ on to its past. This cannot 
be done because, unlike most other places, there was no movement 
independent of imperialism of whichever stripe. The result was 
annihilation for the Jews and devastation for the local inhabitants 
who remained alive. Latvia is a sort of negative proof for the parallel 
wars argument. It shows just how bad the Second World War might 
have been, and just how important people’s war was elsewhere.
concluSIon
In this section we have seen four very different patterns of interre-
lationship between people’s war and imperialist war. The common 
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context was that each country was occupied by the Axis, though 
the response to that problem varied enormously. 
At one end of the spectrum lay Yugoslavia where the people’s war 
was able to take advantage of splits within imperialism to triumph. 
In Greece ELAS successfully confronted Axis imperialism, but was 
robbed of victory by British imperialism. The Polish people’s war 
– the Warsaw Rising – lacked the weaponry to defeat the Nazis 
unaided, and was cynically abandoned by the imperialist power that 
could have helped. Latvia’s case is perhaps the most tragic, if not 
the largest in scale. The crushing weight of successive imperialist 
invasions made it impossible for a people’s alternative to emerge. 
The consequence was a horrific miniature Holocaust in which 
sections of the local population mistakenly took the side of one 
imperialist camp – the Nazis, in the belief they could punish Russian 
imperialism by murdering Jews.
The next examples to be considered are Allied countries. Neither 
Britain nor the USA endured Axis occupation such as Yugoslavia, 
Greece or Poland. Yet the phenomenon of the two wars emerged 
there too.
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Part II
france, Britain and the uSa –  
divisions Within the allied camp
The co-existence of imperialist war and people’s war in Western 
Europe during the Second World War was closely linked to the 
outcome of the First, which saw a monumental struggle between 
the established powers of Britain, France and Russia, against 
an ambitious newcomer – Germany. That clash of the rich and 
powerful caused enormous suffering to ordinary people, so that 
when proletarians and peasants seized the property of Russia’s 
capitalists and landowners in 1917 it inspired a wave of international 
revolution. Although working class power was not secured in any 
other country than Russia, the establishment had been sufficiently 
frightened to back a right-wing backlash. 
In Germany and Italy, where frustrated imperial ambitions and 
post-war class struggles were particularly concentrated, rabid 
counter-revolutionary movements came to power. Hitler and 
Mussolini had a dual goal: to build new empires at the expense 
of the old ones, and smash working class organisation. Thus in 
Western Europe the Axis offensive signified both a renewed bid for 
hegemony and a naked assault on labour. Twin threats inspired a 
twin response: inter-imperialist war and people’s anti-fascist war.
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france – Imperial glory versus 
resistance Ideology
Germany’s stunning defeat of France in 1940 was one of the most 
dramatic events of the twentieth century. A mighty European power 
was humbled in just six weeks of Blitzkrieg. Much criticism has been 
made of the conservative mindset of French generals who thought 
in terms of the First World War trenches rather than the latest 
technology. Hitler’s forces relied on planes and armoured columns 
that overcame these obstacles with terrifying ease. However, the 
rout cannot be understood simply in military terms. After all, 
the opposing forces were evenly matched: Germany fielded 114 
divisions and 2,800 tanks; France 104 divisions and 3,000 tanks.1
France’s fate was also influenced by a history of class war at 
home. On 6 February 1934 extreme right-wing groups attempted 
to storm the French Parliament but were blocked by police. In 
the melée 15 died and 1,400 were wounded.2 Although the riot 
failed to reach its target it brought down Prime Minister Daladier. 
A united left demonstration of protest followed. The movement 
became unstoppable and a general strike of 4.5 million showed 
the determination of the working class to resist fascism.3 This was 
but the prelude to still larger walkouts. In June 1936 alone there 
were 12,142 separate strikes. One participant described his feelings: 
‘Going on strike is joy itself. A pure joy, without any qualification 
… The joy of standing before the boss with your head held high … 
of walking among the silent machines with the rhythm of human 
life re-established.’4 The same year a Popular Front government 
was elected. 
The close linkage of anti-fascism, workers’ struggle and 
communism led significant elements of the establishment to conclude 
that the threat to French state sovereignty from Hitler was the 
lesser of two evils. De Gaulle, France’s future leader, described the 
phenomenon in this way: ‘some circles were more inclined to see 
Stalin as the enemy than Hitler. They were much more concerned 
with the means of striking at Russia … than with how to cope with 
the Reich.’5
85
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This explains France’s hesitancy during the first days of the 
Second World War. Despite formal declarations of belligerency 
over Poland in September 1939, both Britain (which had reluctantly 
given up appeasement only just before) and France fought a ‘drôle 
de guerre’ (phoney war). This involved fairly nominal military 
action against Germany. There was no such timidity when it came 
to opposing Russia’s attack on faraway Finland. General Gamelin’s 
plan to send forces was only thwarted when the Finns sued for 
peace in early 1940.6
Meanwhile the French government witch-hunted the Communist 
Party (Parti Communiste Français – PCF). On the eve of the Nazi 
invasion 300 Communist municipal councils with 2,778 councillors 
were suspended. Following 11,000 police raids the mass circulation 
L’Humanité and Ce Soir newspapers were banned along with 159 
other communist publications.7 For the first time, elected represen-
tatives of the Third Republic were expelled and jailed, and seven 
communist leaders were condemned to death.8 Employers used 
this climate of intimidation to victimise the activists and strikers 
of 1936.9 
It was against this background that Germany attacked in the 
summer of 1940. Its tactics were frighteningly effective, but more 
importantly, the French government was in a predicament aptly 
summarised by a refugee from the fighting:
the ruling class in any democratic country … has to rely on 
the forces of the whole nation, it has to call upon all classes, it 
has to appeal above all to the working class. Or else it may try 
to come to terms with the threatening aggressor, appease him, 
strike a bargain with him – so as to avoid any shock to the 
social structure … .10
France’s leaders were conscious of the choice. General Weygand, 
Commander-in-Chief, told de Gaulle of his fear that the country’s 
military organisation ‘might collapse suddenly and give a free run 
to anarchy and revolution’.11 He was ready to capitulate, but one 
nagging doubt remained: ‘Ah! If only I were sure the Germans 
would leave me the forces necessary for maintaining order!’12 
Finally putting this behind him, Weygand stampeded his colleagues 
into surrendering by claiming that Maurice Thorez, the PCF leader, 
had begun the revolution and seized the presidential palace – a 
pure invention!13
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In the midst of this turmoil Marshal Pétain exhibited a sure sense 
of French history. Ever since the 1789 revolution governments had 
had to decide between mass mobilisation to repel foreign threats, 
or suppressing the population to maintain class rule. In 1871, when 
the radical Paris Commune refused to compromise with German 
invaders, Thiers had worked with the latter to drown the Parisian 
working class in blood. Seven decades later Pétain argued that faced 
with Hitler: ‘the only thing was to end, negotiate, and, if the case 
arose, crush the Commune [i.e. popular resistance], just as, in the 
same circumstances, Thiers had already done.’14
In an attempt to instil some backbone Churchill proposed a 
Franco-British Union with joint citizenship for all.15 The French 
Cabinet reacted with comments such as: ‘Better be a Nazi province. 
At least we know what that means.’16 This wish was fulfilled. On 22 
June 1940 an armistice with Germany was signed giving the Nazis a 
northern zone (covering about 55 per cent of the country) under their 
direct control. Pétain’s collaborationist Vichy regime ran the South.
Among the working class a different view had been evident since 
the demonstrations of 1934 and strikes of 1936. When the British 
and French governments appeased Hitler over Czechoslovakia 
this drew a storm of cheers from the Centre and Right in France’s 
parliament. The PCF leader countered: ‘France had yielded to 
blackmail, betrayed an ally, opened the way to German domination, 
and perhaps irretrievably jeopardized her own interests.’17 Five 
hundred and thirty five deputies backed the government position, 
while 75 (of which 73 were communist) voted against.
However, the left was thrown into disarray by the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact. While Russia and Germany savaged Poland, the PCF leadership 
called for peace with Hitler. When this came and Nazi jackboots 
echoed through the streets of Paris, the PCF wrote:
French imperialism has undergone its greatest defeat in History. 
The enemy, which in any imperialist war is to be found at home, 
is overthrown. The working class in France and the rest of the 
world must see this event as a victory and understand that it now 
faces one enemy less. It is important that everything is done to 
ensure that the fall of French imperialism is definitive. 
There was a qualification added to this amazing statement:
A question to consider is whether it follows that the struggle of the 
French people has the same objective as the struggle of German 
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imperialism against French imperialism. That is true only in the 
sense that German imperialism is a temporary ally.18
Not all communists accepted this nonsense. One third of the 
PCF’s MPs rejected the idea that France was now occupied by ‘a 
temporary ally’.19
In one respect the PCF was correct. French imperialism had 
been defeated by German imperialism, though its demise was 
not ‘definitive’. On 18 June, Charles de Gaulle, a young French 
brigadier-general who had escaped to London, announced the 
existence of ‘Free France’ on the BBC: ‘Whatever happens, the fire 
of the French resistance shines and flames.’20 
De Gaulle’s idea of what this resistance would consist of was 
rather strange. He appealed to the French Commander in Chief of 
North Africa, the High Commissioner of Syria/Lebanon, and the 
Governor General of French Indochina to form a ‘Council for the 
Defence of the Empire’.21 A week later he said ‘powerful forces of 
resistance can be felt in the French Empire’. On 3 August de Gaulle 
reported: ‘at numerous points in the Empire courageous men are 
standing up and are resolved to preserve France’s colonies.’22 
It is no surprise that Commanders in Chief, High Commissioners 
and Governor Generals did not rush to respond, and de Gaulle 
was forced to re-think how he might save French imperialism. He 
added two new components to his strategy. Firstly, the Nazis must 
be expelled and there was no alternative to mobilising the masses, 
but they must be kept from going too far. He did not abandon his 
initial defence of empire. Here is de Gaulle’s own formulation:
There would be the power of the enemy, which could be broken 
only by a long process … There would be, on the part of those 
whose aim was subversion, the determination to side-track the 
national resistance in the direction of revolutionary chaos … 
There would be, finally, the tendency of the great powers to take 
advantage of our weakness in order to push their interests at the 
expense of France.23
De Gaulle elaborated on the last point when he called on France’s 
colonial administrators to ‘defend her possessions directly against 
the enemy [and] deflect England – and perhaps one day America – 
from the temptation to make sure of them on their own account’.24
Though the brigadier-general would become its figurehead, in 
France the resistance developed independently. It began as a ‘chain 
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of solidarity’ – escape routes for prisoners fleeing the occupier. Then 
‘networks’ appeared to pass on information to the Allies. Movements 
organised around clandestine newspapers soon followed.25 
In 1941, after Hitler’s attack on Russia, the PCF joined the struggle 
and the level of direct action and sabotage rose dramatically. In one 
three month period, for example, the communists alone claimed 
to have mounted 1,500 actions – 158 de-railings; 180 locomotives 
and 1,200 wagonloads of materials or troops destroyed; 110 train 
engines and 3 bridges sabotaged; 800 German soldiers killed or 
wounded.26 In 1942 an attempt to draft French labour for Germany 
drove many young men into joining the maquis guerrilla bands. 
Finally, in 1944 the resistance mounted important diversionary 
actions to assist the D-Day Normandy landing. This level of 
action required courage. Resisters were hunted by the Gestapo in 
the North, and Vichy’s vicious Milice in the South. Torture, the 
concentration camp, or execution, were real possibilities: 60,000 
PCF members were killed.27 
The resistance functioned both ‘as a movement’ and ‘as an 
organisation’.28 As a movement it had a huge following. The daily 
circulation of its press was 600,000 in 1944, even though possession 
of a clandestine newspaper could mean arrest by the Gestapo.29 
Organised resisters were fewer, amounting to no more than 2 per 
cent of the adult population.30 
Who were these individuals who, as an influential northern paper 
put it, were ‘totally uncompromised, people who have proved 
their worth under the German occupation’?31 Although the French 
resistance has been thoroughly studied, the question is difficult to 
answer because no-one carried membership cards. The evidence 
there is appears to be contradictory. Regarding social composition, 
Georges Bidault, president of the National Resistance Council 
(CNR), wrote:
The Resistance included all types, all classes, all parties. There 
were workers side by side with peasants, teachers, journalists, 
civil servants, aristocrats, priests, and many more. For the most 
part they joined after making an individual choice born from 
their conscience in revolt.32
This diversity seems to challenge the assertion that there was 
an imperialist war pursued by the ruling class, and a people’s war 
backed by the masses. That conclusion is incorrect, however.
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The composition of the resistance was heterogeneous because the 
fight for national independence, and the betrayal of it by the ruling 
class, enraged many sections of the population. The national struggle 
and the class struggle overlapped. But, the social composition and 
the social outlook of the resistance were not identical. 
However wide its membership, it was markedly left-wing 
in outlook, because the French establishment was thoroughly 
‘compromised by their solid public adherence to Vichy, and 
consequently German domination.’33 Isolated resisters bore 
right-wing, even extreme right-wing ideas, but fighting fascism came 
more naturally to left-wing circles:34
because it was a matter of pursuing a battle in which they 
were already engaged … Those who had voted for the Popular 
Front in France and wished for a Republican victory in Spain 
were immediately hostile not only to Hitler’s Europe, but also 
Pétain’s France.35
The PCF component would be expected to use radical language, 
but it was not alone. The rest of the resistance produced documents 
that, as one historian puts it, ‘are virtually unanimous in predicting 
and declaring revolution’.36 Time and again the radicalising effect 
of occupation and capitulation was illustrated by resistance 
publications. One article entitled ‘This War is Revolutionary’ 
explained that it was ‘a fight between two conceptions of the world 
… authority and liberty’.37 It went on: ‘the masses will not act unless 
they know what the aim is, and it needs to be an ideal that will 
justify their efforts and great enough to encourage supreme sacrifice 
… THE LIBERATION OF HUMANITY’.38 This involved much 
further than expelling the Nazis:
•	 Liberation	 from	material	 servitude:	hunger,	 squalor,	 the	
machine
•	 Liberation	from	economic	servitude:	the	unfair	distribution	




Libération, the paper of d’Astier, an ex-army aristocrat linked to 
trade union and socialist circles, took a similar position:
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We will fight and struggle, with weapons in our hands for liberation 
from both internal and external enemies war and national 
imperialism, the power of money and economic imperialism 
dictatorship of any sort, whether state, social or religious.40
Such sentiments could not have been more distant from de Gaulle 
whose instincts were authoritarian through and through. His self-
proclaimed motto was: ‘Deliberation is the work of many men. 
Action, of one alone.’41 However, he understood the need to blend 
radical language into his defence of French imperialism if he was 
to have any hope of controlling the movement. So he peppered 
speeches with phrases like this: ‘In uniting for victory [the French 
people] unite for a revolution … For us the ending of the war will 
mean not only the complete restoration of our national territory 
and its Empire, but the complete sovereignty of the people.’42 But his 
words lacked conviction and a power struggle developed between 
de Gaulle in exile and the resistance in France.
Until his death at the hands of the Gestapo in 1943, de Gaulle’s 
emissary was Jean Moulin. He commanded respect because, 
when Prefect of the Department of Eure-et-Loire at the outbreak 
of war, the Nazis locked him in a room with the mutilated torso 
of a woman and tortured him to sign a document blaming black 
French soldiers. Fearing he might succumb to pressure he attempted 
suicide.43 De Gaulle wanted Moulin to ensure the resistance would 
work for the interests of imperial France rather than the people. 
His instructions were to: ‘To reinstate France as a belligerent, to 
prevent her subversion … .’44 
The first step was to gain control. Moulin’s orders were to 
bring the numerous groups of resisters under ‘a single central 
authority’,45 without which they might ‘slip into the anarchy of 
the “great companies” or … Communist ascendancy’.46 He first 
amalgamated southern non-communist groups into the United 
Resistance Movement (MUR). In May 1943 he formed the National 
Resistance Council (CNR), which included the communists.
Moulin’s second task was to secure de Gaulle’s political authority 
in the military sphere, by excluding ideological debate and 
discussion: ‘the separation of the movement’s political and military 
activities must result in an autonomous military organisation linked 
to London from whence it would receive and execute orders.’47 This 
would be the hierarchical ‘Secret Army’ with which de Gaulle hoped 
to neutralise the effectiveness of radical elements.
The resistance accepted a more unified structure in the interests of 
co-ordinated action, but bitterly opposed the separation of military 
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and political functions. Frenay of the MUR insisted that: ‘The Secret 
Army is an integral part of the United Movement because the latter 
created all its parts, determined its structure, its orientation, shaped 
its cadres and recruited its troops.’48 Frenay’s vision of warfare was 
sharply different to de Gaulle’s:
With us, discipline is achieved through trust and friendship. There 
is no sense of subordination in the military sense of the term. 
It is not possible – and we have ample experience of this – to 
impose officers at any level of our hierarchy. What can be done 
in a regiment or government office cannot be achieved here.49
Different armies use different techniques, as another resistance 
leader explained:
On the one hand there were those, usually former officers, who 
saw it as a point of honour to turn out ‘their boys’ … in a classic 
conventional army … Others were conscious of participating in a 
revolutionary war, and for some of them, a veritable international 
civil war … and in the area of tactics employed exclusively 
guerrilla methods.50
Neither side won the debate outright and separate militias 
persisted, ranging from the de Gaulle’s Secret Army, to the 
PCF-led ‘Franc-Tireurs et Partisans’ (FTP). Others like the MUR 
sat in between. Each adopted a different strategy. The Secret Army 
was to serve as de Gaulle’s tool and adopted a classic attentist 
approach. It waited for the brigadier-general to cross the Channel 
on D-Day (‘Jour J’ in French).51 This ran so counter to the spirit of 
the resistance that Moulin was forced to deny rumours ‘that the 
intention was to forbid any action by Secret Army militants while 
they waited for Jour J … which is something that is practically 
impossible anyway’.52 
The communist-led movements ignored this wait-and-see attitude 
and launched high profile actions, often at extremely high cost to 
themselves.53 They might well have achieved the ‘ascendancy’ that 
de Gaulle feared (and which was obtained in places like Yugoslavia 
and Greece) had not the US-led invasion of North Africa (Operation 
Torch) supervened in November 1943.
Torch went smoothly because in Algiers pro-Gaullist officers, in 
combination with a resistance movement led by the Jewish Aboulker 
brothers, arrested the top Vichy officials as well as seizing barracks 
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and command posts.54 No sooner had the Americans landed than 
they began talks with one of the prisoners, Admiral Darlan. This was 
an extraordinarily insensitive decision. Even Funk, a semi-apologist 
for the US’s action, has to admit: 
As the chief architect of Pétain’s policy, Darlan [had] exerted 
his utmost skill to convince the Axis of France’s willingness 
to cooperate with the Nazi New Order… he pursued exactly 
the same policies for which Laval, Pétain and other Vichyites 
were later indicted and for which Laval was hanged. To the 
French resister Darlan became the epitome of collaboration and 
surrender.55
Furthermore, Darlan was the anointed heir of Pétain, yet the 
US freed him and returned the government of North Africa to 
his hands! Privately Morgenthau, US Secretary of the Treasury, 
grumbled, if ‘we are going to sit back and favor these Fascists … 
what’s the use of fighting just to put that kind of people back in 
power?’56 
The resistance movement was stunned, though this outcome 
could have been predicted. Roosevelt had maintained close 
relations with Vichy from the start by signing a trade agreement 
in 1941.57 The US enthronement of Darlan infuriated the French 
resistance: ‘In no case will we agree to consider the about-face of 
those responsible for our political and military betrayal an excuse 
for their past crimes … .’58 Revenge came when the Admiral was 
assassinated by a resistance fighter.59 The US now turned to General 
Giraud, who at least had not courted Nazis and was respected 
for a spectacular escape from their prison. However, according to 
Funk, ‘Giraud’s attitude – toward Pétain, toward Vichy, toward 
democracy, toward anti-Semitism – did not differ distinguishably 
from Darlan’s’.60 A charitable interpretation of Roosevelt’s actions 
would be that he hoped to prise Vichy away from Germany. More 
likely, the US wanted its own clients in place as an alternative to the 
British protégé de Gaulle. Certainly, Roosevelt refused any dealings 
with ‘dissident groups which set themselves up as Governments’,61 
which was code for de Gaulle. Clearly, the US would take anyone 
who would do their bidding, rather than see a restored a rival 
imperialism in France.
Operation Torch did not bring about the Atlantic Charter’s 
promise of ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live’. Under Giraud seven million Algerians 
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continued under the yoke of US-backed French colonialism and its 
600,000 French settlers.62 Vichy’s anti-Semitic laws remained intact, 
as did concentration camps containing elected communist deputies. 
They were now joined by Gaullists, and the very resistance fighters 
who had assisted the Allied landing.63 
In mainland France the Nazis responded to Operation Torch 
by brushing aside the Vichy fig leaf and took control of the entire 
country.64 As the same time the shock of the Darlan incident rallied 
all the resistance groups to de Gaulle. This gave him a powerful 
enough base to marginalise Giraud and establish a provisional 
French government in North Africa. The legitimacy conferred by the 
newly-formed CNR proved crucial in making de Gaulle the national 
figurehead. But once his hegemony was secure he completely ignored 
his followers. Moulin was killed by the Gestapo and his replacement, 
Bidault, recounts that he wrote ‘hundreds of coded telegrams to the 
French government in exile … I did get one answer and only one: 
the only reply that ever reached me was “Reduce traffic”.’65 
De Gaulle eventually deigned to communicate with ‘his’ 
resistance movement at the time of the Normandy landings in 
summer 1944. General Eisenhower wanted maximum disruption 
of the Wehrmacht from within France. At great personal cost all 
the resistance movements threw themselves into battle. In unequal 
combat thousands died at places like Vercors. Yet still more joined 
the fray so that the ‘interior forces’ rose from 140,000 to 400,000 
between June and September.66 The insurrection was heavily reliant 
on Allied arms deliveries, but weapons were distributed on a highly 
selective basis. Even Frenay, a man much closer to Gaullism than 
communism, complained that until shortly before D-Day only de 
Gaulle’s direct representatives, who were committed to attentism 
rather than action, received vital radios, money and arms.67 
Furthermore, although parachute drops accelerated68 supplies were 
still inadequate, something ascribed to the ‘visceral distrust’ the US 
had of the resistance.69 
Corsica offered a glimpse of liberation by people’s war (as opposed 
to Operation Torch). The island was jointly occupied by German 
and Italian troops. When Mussolini fell, and the Italian government 
switched sides, the broad communist-initiated resistance movement 
moved into action. Partisan bands, in alliance with Italian troops, 
confronted the Wehrmacht and between 9 September and 4 October 
1943, killed a thousand Germans (for a loss of 170 maquis).70 An 
uprising in the capital, Ajaccio, saw the election by mass meeting 
of leaders who refused to deal with any Corsican equivalent of 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   94 04/05/2012   09:47
france 95
Darlan: ‘We can’t mount an effective defence of the island unless 
proven patriots take command of the levers of power. We can’t trust 
a local government that did nothing to resist in 1940 … Let’s kick 
out the Vichyists!’71
De Gaulle was dismayed, not because of the rejection of Vichy, 
but because he was not in control. He announced that he did not 
wish to ‘see this precedent followed tomorrow in metropolitan 
France’.72 This difference between his war and that of the Corsicans, 
was played out on a grander scale during the liberation of Paris.
By August 1944 Nazi authority was disintegrating in the French 
capital in the face of a restless population.73 De Gaulle feared the 
resistance would free Paris before imperialist forces could reach 
it. When mass strikes of police, postal and metro workers erupted 
in mid-August74 de Gaulle ordered them to: ‘Return to work 
immediately and maintain order until the Allies arrive.’75 This 
command was ignored, and on 19 August a general insurrection 
began. Headed by Rol-Tanguy, a communist veteran of the Spanish 
civil war, 20,000 fighters (of whom only one tenth were armed76) 
freed the capital over an eight-day period. 
The German commander, von Choltitz, was under orders to 
demolish Paris rather than lose it. Despite being a veteran of 
Stalingrad, and a man who had wreaked horrific carnage upon 
Warsaw,77 he realised this policy could not be implemented and that 
a more likely outcome would be that his forces would be trapped by 
the resistance and destroyed. At the critical moment Gaullist repre-
sentatives threw von Choltitz a lifeline. Despite the Allied policy of 
unconditional surrender, they offered him a truce. He could evacuate 
in good order if he promised not to sack the town. Accordingly, the 
resistance was ordered to ‘cease fire against the occupier’. Its leaders 
were outraged, one writing that: ‘It was impossible to imagine a 
greater divorce between the action sustained by the masses and the 
coterie which had positioned itself between them and the enemy.’78 
In the confusion, the Germans regained the upper hand for the first 
time. On the night of 20/21 August, 99 resistance fighters lost their 
lives as against five Germans.79 So the next day the uprising resumed 
and completed the job that had been so dangerously interrupted. It 
was only on the evening of 24 August that regular French troops 
(General Leclerc’s Second Armoured Division) reached the heart of 
the city. The final tally for the liberation of Paris was 1,483 French 
lives compared to 2,788 Germans.80 
Now that the hated enemy had been disposed of, would former 
differences disappear in the glow of national unity? Not at all! 
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While the triumphant resistance waited for de Gaulle at the 
Hotel de Ville, the symbol of Parisian revolt for three centuries, 
the brigadier-general was elsewhere. First he met von Choltitz’s 
aide-de-camp, then leading financiers, and then the Director of the 
Bank of Indochina, before heading to the War Ministry.81 Only after 
greeting the Parisian police, who had helped the Nazis maintain 
order, did he deign to visit the Hotel de Ville.82 De Gaulle did not 
use the occasion to congratulate the fighters, but to complain that 
Rol-Tanguy had had the temerity to receive the German surrender 
as an equal alongside the ‘legitimate’,‘regular’ soldier, Leclerc.83 
This was a foretaste of things to come. Three days later, de Gaulle 
met the resistance again. According to his own account he told 
the meeting: ‘The militias had no further object. The existing ones 
would be dissolved [and] after having made note of the accordant 
or protesting observations of the members of the [CNR] I put 
an end to the audience.’84 It was not long before the resistance 
was disarmed. Although this was less violent than in Greece, the 
process was essentially the same. With the PCF, the main party of 
the resistance, accepting Stalin’s view that France lay in the Western 
capitalist camp, its fighters simply accepted de Gaulle’s demands.85 
The different conceptions of the Second World War found further 
expression on the very last day of the war in the West. Amidst the 
celebrations on 8 May 1945 French troops opened fire on jubilant 
crowds in Sétif, Algeria, killing thousands.
It might seem that French imperialism had vanquished the people’s 
war completely, yet the impact of the latter was long-lasting. In the 
words of a resister, Stéphane Hessel, the CNR programme of 1944 
‘set the principles and values that formed the basis of our modern 
democracy’ with its wide-ranging reforms in the economy, welfare 
and education. In 2010 Hessel suggested that despite the passage 
of 65 years it required the current economic crisis to threaten the 
final vestiges of that heritage.86 This statement is true for most of 
Western Europe, where a post-war ‘social democratic consensus’ 
prevailed after 1945, and is today being fought over once more.
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Britain – The myth of unity
Unlike France, Britain was not occupied by the Nazis. Therefore no 
radical resistance movement developed independently of an official 
government-in-exile. Hints of class tension were smoothed over. 
Thus, on the eve of war, when Labour’s Arthur Greenwood rose 
to denounce the arch-appeaser and Tory PM, Neville Chamberlain, 
dissident Tory MPs shouted ‘Speak for England’, while Labour MPs 
shouted ‘Speak for the workers’.1 In 1940 both combined to back a 
coalition with Churchill, as new Prime Minister. He affirmed: ‘This 
is not a war of chieftains or of princes, of dynasties or national 
ambition; it is a war of peoples and of causes,’2 and from Labour’s 
ranks the former union leader Bevin promised that ‘British Labour 
would not fight an imperialist war’.3 National harmony was also the 
theme of Britain Under Fire, a pictorial record of the blitz. It was 
fronted by a photo captioned ‘their Majesties outside Buckingham 
Palace … subject to identical trials and chances’.4 
This heart-warming picture seemed to be confirmed when their 
Majesties visited the wreckage of Southampton. Journalists reported: 
‘excited multitudes [who] lined the wintry streets which re-echoed 
to volley after volley of cheers and repeated cries of “God save the 
King”.’5 However, Southampton’s indefatigable Mass Observation 
volunteers, who looked past the media hype to gauge the popular 
mood, considered this comment more typical: ‘If they gave new 
furniture, good food and no fuss, we’d be truly grateful.’6 
The nature of modern warfare meant that even without occupation 
British people experienced the disjuncture between imperialism and 
their own needs in a way not entirely dissimilar to France. As one 
writer put it: ‘The Front is not a distant battle field [but] part of 
our daily lives; its dug-outs and First Aid posts are in every street; 
its trenches and encampments occupy sections of every city park 
and every village green … .’7 
In London the Blitz threatened to dispel the mirage of unity. 
A senior diplomat noted privately that in government circles: 
‘Everybody is worried about the feeling in the East End, where 
there is much bitterness. It is said that even the King and Queen 
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were booed the other day when they visited the destroyed areas.’ 
He was therefore mightily relieved when the Luftwaffe targeted 
the much wealthier West End: ‘if only the Germans had had the 
sense not to bomb west of London Bridge there might have been a 
revolution in this country. As it is, they have smashed about Bond 
St and Park Lane and readjusted the balance.’8
To make the myth that everyone, ‘however rich or privileged, 
was in it together’9 plausible required the cultivation of amnesia. 
On becoming PM Churchill warned his colleagues: ‘If we open a 
quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have 
lost the future’.10 He was right to be cautious. He had selected a 
Cabinet that included notorious appeasers, such as Chamberlain 
and Halifax, while 21 of the 36 ministerial posts went to people 
who had served under the previous PM. 
Churchill’s cupboard had its own skeletons, too. After visiting 
Mussolini in 1927 he wrote he ‘could not help being charmed, like 
so many other people have been, by his gentle and simple bearing 
and by his calm, detached poise’. He told the inventor of fascism 
that, ‘[i]f I had been an Italian, I am sure that I should have been 
whole-heartedly with you from start to finish in your triumphant 
struggle against…Leninism’.11 Nine years later, during the Italian 
aggression against Abyssinia, Churchill opposed sanctions against 
Italy and described the Hoare-Laval pact (an attempt to appease the 
fascists by handing much of the country over), as ‘a very shrewd, 
far-seeing agreement …’.12 Nothing Mussolini did could dissuade 
Churchill from his admiration. Despite the bitter fighting in North 
Africa that culminated in the Battle of El Alamein, when the Duce 
fell in 1943 the British PM swore that: ‘Even when the issue of the 
war became certain, Mussolini would have been welcomed by the 
Allies’.13 Evidently, determined action against fascism was not his 
primary motivation during the Second World War.
Neither were the rights of small nations a factor. We shall consider 
his contemptuous dismissal of Indian nationalism later, but what 
he had said about the demand for Irish independence in 1921 was 
also revealing: ‘What an idiotic and what a hideous prospect is 
unfolded to our eyes. What a crime we should commit if, for the 
sake of a brief interval of relief from worry and strife, we condemned 
ourselves and our children after us to such misfortunes. We should 
be ripping up the British Empire.’14 Therefore, Eire ‘must be closely 
laced with cordons of blockhouses and barbed wire; a systematic 
rummaging and question of every individual must be put in force’.15
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Yet Churchill was strongly against appeasing Hitler and his 
‘rule of terrorism and concentration camps’.16 His opposition to 
the Führer was unwavering, but only because Germany directly 
threatened Britain’s power.17 Churchill’s wartime speeches are 
justifiably famous, yet the familiar ringing phrases are lifted out 
of context and key sentences left incomplete. After every stirring 
appeal there was a reference to Empire. Here are a few examples:
I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat … for 
without victory there can be no survival – let that be realized – no 
survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British 
Empire has stood for.18
The Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends 
the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own 
British life and the long continuity of our institutions and our 
Empire.19
Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty and so bear ourselves 
that if the British Commonwealth and Empire lasts for a thousand 
years, men will say, ‘This was their finest hour’.20
Churchill was not as openly blunt as Amery who declared, once 
the defensive Battle of Britain had been won, that ‘The Battle of 
Empire comes next’.21 He did insist, however: ‘We mean to hold 
our own. I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to 
preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.’22
The imperialist character of the British government’s war was 
not simply a matter of personal predilection but was structured 
by grand strategy past and present. For centuries overseas colonies 
had required a strong Royal Navy, and the military budget was 
apportioned accordingly.23 Next in line came the RAF; while the 
army, the key element in any war with a continental power like 
Germany, came a poor third. Thus in the decade 1923–1933 the 
fleet took 58 per cent of spending, the airforce 33 per cent and the 
army just 8 per cent.24 When the Second World War began only 
107,000 of Britain’s 387,000 troops were stationed at home.25 So the 
Expeditionary Force sent to the Continent could provide no more 
than auxiliary support to sit out the phoney war with the French. 
When this ‘Sitzkrieg’ ended in 1940, it had to scramble from the 
beaches of Dunkirk.
After this there was little choice but to try and wear down the 
German war machine from afar. One historian suggests it was 
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essential ‘to avoid the risk of any confrontation with the German 
Army anywhere’.26 Skirmishes with the Wehrmacht were therefore 
by accident rather than design. One example was Norway, which 
Britain had intended to seize before the Nazis, but found on arrival 
to be already occupied. London’s chief land operation was far away 
from Europe, in the Libyan desert defending the route to India 
from Italians. And only when the latter called in Rommel’s Panzer 
divisions did engagement with the German army occur there.
A new opportunity to confront Germany on more advantageous 
terms arose after 1941 when Hitler attacked Russia and the USA 
joined the war. With 240 Nazi divisions fighting in the East (as 
compared to just 50 guarding the West), Stalin begged for soldiers 
to be sent across the Channel to open a second front. When Britain 
prevaricated some said it was happy ‘to fight to the last drop of 
Russian blood’. Churchill’s petulant, though technically accurate, 
reply was that the Russians ‘certainly have no right to reproach 
us. They brought their own fate upon themselves when by their 
pact with Ribbentrop they let Hitler loose on Poland and so started 
the war… .’27
Further, he accused the Soviets of following ‘lines of ruthless 
self-interest in disregard of the rights of small States for which Great 
Britain and France were fighting as well as for themselves …’.28 
This was rich coming from a government which postponed the 
second front on the ground that British troops were ‘spread across 
a distance of some 6,300 miles from Gibraltar to Calcutta’,29 and:
We have to maintain our armies in the Middle East and hold a line 
from the Caspian to the Western Desert … Great efforts will be 
needed to maintain the existing strength at home while supplying 
the drafts for the Middle East, India, and other garrisons abroad, 
e.g. Iceland, Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Singapore, Hong Kong … .30
No-one was convinced when Churchill tried to pass off Operation 
Torch, the landing in French North Africa, as a ‘full discharge of 
our obligations as Allies to Russia.’31 
Britain’s chief strategy bore a feature typical of imperialist war 
– contempt for human life, and civilians in particular. It involved 
‘area bombing’ – the use of the RAF to flatten German cities rather 
than hit specific military targets. This tactic was predicted in 1932 
by the then PM, Baldwin. He declared laconically that because ‘the 
bomber always gets through’: ‘The only defence is in offence, which 
means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly 
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than the enemy if you want to save yourselves. I just mention that 
… so that people may realize what is waiting for them when the 
next war comes.’32
Despite initial doubts, Churchill turned to this method in 1940 
because: ‘We have no Continental Army which can defeat the 
German military power [but] there is one thing that will bring him 
back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, 
exterminating attack by very heavy bombers.’33 Bomber Command 
translated this into practice: ‘the aiming-points are to be the built-up 
areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories … This 
must be made quite clear … .’34 Three-quarters of bombs fell on 
civilian targets,35 the ultimate intention being to render 25 million 
homeless, kill 900,000, and injure one million more.36 
It has been alleged, in mitigation, that practical factors made area 
bombing unavoidable. German anti-aircraft defences made daylight 
raids on military installations too costly, but night-time attacks 
could not hit precise military targets. Big cities were therefore a more 
realistic goal.37 Nonetheless, the technical capabilities of the British 
military were shaped by Empire and were inseparable from it. 
Even if area bombing had been tenable as the only viable tactic, 
it lost all credence after the Normandy landings in the summer of 
1944. Yet it carried on relentlessly under Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris 
of Bomber Command. He boasted that his boys had ‘virtually 
destroyed 45 out of the leading 60 German cities. In spite of 
invasion diversions we have so far managed to keep up and even 
exceed our average of two and a half cities devastated a month… .’38 
On 13 February 1945 British and US bombers generated a firestorm 
that destroyed Dresden’s cultural centre, the Altstadt, along with 
19 hospitals, 39 schools and residential areas. Key military and 
transport installations remained intact. Between 35,000 and 70,000 
people died, of whom just 100 were soldiers.39 
The bombing campaign only ceased when Churchill realised 
nothing would be left to plunder after victory: 40 ‘… we shall come 
into control of an utterly ruined land. We shall not, for instance, 
be able to get housing materials out of Germany for our own 
needs because some temporary provision would have to be made 
for the Germans themselves.’41 Belatedly he argued for ‘more 
precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and 
communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on 
mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive’.42
Could it at least be argued that all this suffering speeded the 
end of Nazism? It was claimed that area bombing would break 
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morale and slow armaments production. But Germany’s output 
actually rose under the hail of bombs: from an index of 100 in 
January 1942, to 153 in July 1943, and 332 in July 1944.43 Far from 
morale being broken, Germany’s population was steeled. Hitler’s 
Armaments Minister wrote that, ‘the estimated loss of 9 per cent 
of our production capacity was amply balanced out by increased 
effort.’44 Max Hastings concludes that: ‘Bomber Command’s 
principal task and principal achievement had been to impress the 
British people and their Allies, rather than to damage the enemy’.45
When it came, German defeat was largely due to the Red Army, 
which fought the most crucial battles, at Stalingrad and Kursk 
(1942–43). Soviet military deaths amounted to 13.6 million out 
of 20 million under arms (an attrition rate of 68 per cent). British 
military strength was 4.7 million and its forces endured 271,000 
deaths (an attrition rate of 6 per cent).46 Refusing to open a second 
front until Russia was winning on its own (and marching towards 
Western Europe), plus the deliberate slaughter of civilians to minimal 
military effect, were chilling evidence of the nature of the war being 
fought by Churchill. His government was driven, above all, by the 
need to impress friend and foe of Britain’s great power status. 
The motives of most British people were not the same as their 
government’s. A variety of writers expressed the notion that: ‘The 
world is confronted by a clash between two irreconcilable ideals: 
humanism and anti-humanism.’47 The war was about ‘accepting a 
way of life determined by love rather than power’.48 Mass Observers 
found people largely free of the jingoism of the First World War: 
‘There is no gushing, sweeping-away dynamo of “patriotism”, no 
satisfied gush of the primitive, the hidden violent, the anti-hun and 
“destroy the swines”.’49 This should not be taken as cool detachment 
– quite the contrary. In 1938, 75 per cent of those asked about 
foreign affairs were either bewildered or could make no comment. In 
1944 85 per cent had definite views and ‘an overwhelming majority 
are in favour of international cooperation …’.50
Ordinary people remembered that during the 1930s appeasement 
abroad walked hand in hand with attacks on living standards at 
home. Therefore, when appeasement was discredited they wanted 
to confront the home-grown ‘little Hitlers’ who had conducted a 
blitzkrieg against labour.51 In Glasgow a Mass Observation study 
of 1941 reported:
The workers do not believe that the employers care a fig for 
the men, or for anything else than saving their skins now by at 
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last producing the vessels, metals, cargo discharges; and … a 
surprising number of men do not even believe that the employers 
really care about saving their skins, because ‘they would be just as 
happy under Hitler’ – here left wing propaganda has certainly had 
an effect in equating the employer with the friend of Fascism.52
Based on experience after the 1914–18 war many feared what 
the Second World War might bring. Ritzkrieg, a satirical book of 
1940, warned that if the establishment had its way once more: ‘The 
People’s War was to have become the Best People’s War, and the 
peace to follow it… a return to Olde England and the aristocratic 
regime, without the alteration of one jot or title.’53 Mass Observation 
found it was not that ‘workers are against the war or for peace. 
They want it as much as anyone… [but they] are also having a war 
of their own … .’54 And this was the crux of the matter. Most were 
not fighting to defend the Britain of the 1930s or colonial rule. In 
1944, a Mass Observer noted, ‘[t]he things that people want put 
right first are the things that went wrong last time … Chief among 
these is certainty of a job, and then certainty of a decent house to 
live in.’55 
So in place of area bombing and Empire, ordinary people focused 
on a fight for justice and decency. Remarkably, the inhabitants of 
cities most damaged by the Blitz were least favourable to reprisals. 
In London where 1.4 million (one in six) were rendered homeless, 
only a minority wanted to fight back in kind.56 Individual comments 
recorded by Mass Observers showed how ordinary people’s views 
clashed with the government’s approach:
PEACE AIMS: an armed League of Nations to precede Socialism. 
RECONSTRUCTION AT HOME: every man who has been a 
worker should be allowed enough to live in comfort for the rest 
of his life. 
THE END OF THE WAR: financiers… are running the war, 
and when they have made as much money as they want, the war 
will stop.57
The Labour Party sought to bridge the widening gap between 
imperial war and the people’s war, as this rather confusing 
contribution by Bevin shows: ‘England’s experience in the realm 
of giving liberty is probably the greatest. We have built up a great 
empire over the last three or four hundred years … .’58 However 
nonsensical, such statements do show an awareness of the two wars. 
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British communism’s position was even more complicated. At the 
outbreak of war Harry Pollitt was its leader and an enthusiastic 
advocate of people’s war:
Whatever the motive of the present rulers of Britain and France… 
[T]o stand aside from this conflict, to contribute only revolutionary 
sounding phrases while the fascist beast rides roughshod over 
Europe, would be the betrayal of everything our forbears have 
fought to achieve in the course of long years of struggle against 
capitalism.59
Since this contradicted the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Pollitt was replaced. 
The October 1939 CP manifesto called for: ‘a united movement of 
the people to compel the immediate ending of the war … to bring 
down the Chamberlain government, to compel new elections and to 
prepare the establishment of a new government which shall make 
immediate peace’.60
In June 1941 Moscow’s line changed again and the Party reverted 
to supporting anti-fascist struggle, but with all references to ‘struggle 
against capitalism’ deleted. Pollitt returned to promote unity with 
‘all who are for Hitler’s defeat. Our fight is not against the Churchill 
Government…Now it is a people’s war.’61 His definition does not 
accord with the one used in this book, but these alternating CP 
interpretations shows how difficult it was to reconcile people’s war 
and imperialist war. 
The bosses were divided too. This emerged in a debate over 
Joint Production Committees, bodies set up to encourage worker-
employer collaboration. The director of the Engineering Employers’ 
Federation insisted he ‘was not going to be a party to handing 
over the production of the factory and the problems concerning 
production to shop stewards or anyone else’.62 Another managing 
director took the contrary view: ‘If industry doesn’t plan for 
revolution, there’ll be revolution … And we can only avoid it by 
anticipating it, by meeting the needs of the people and the times, by 
taking the great changes that are going to be forced on us anyway 
if we don’t do it ourselves.’63
On the workers’ side the Manchester District Committee of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) warned perceptively that:
we are working under a capitalist system, more highly organised 
for exploitation, even than in peace time. Every advantage that 
the employers can secure from collaboration and relaxation [of 
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trade union vigilance] will be, and is being, ruthlessly acquired, 
throughout the industry … For the workers it is truly a war on 
two fronts, or, if you like, back and front.
Despite these misgivings the conclusion drawn was that Joint 
Production Committees should be supported to increase production 
and prevent a Nazi victory.64 The conundrum is perhaps explained 
by this opinion picked up by a Mass Observation volunteer in 1944: 
‘Away from selfishness. In the factories of Britain men and women 
worked long hours, not for a boss, not for any one person’s private 
advantage, but for everyone … .’65 
The strong belief that the people’s will could be impressed upon 
the Second World War did not depend on ideas alone. With 30 
per cent of the male workforce called up,66 and an unquenchable 
demand for industrial output, ordinary people had a new-found 
economic clout and confidence. The signs of this were everywhere. 
When homeless Londoners invaded the underground stations to 
use them as shelters the government objected, but eventually gave 
in.67 Calder recounts how:
Father John Groser, one of the historic figures of the ‘blitz’ took 
the law into his own hands. He smashed open a local depot. He 
lit a bonfire outside his church and fed the hungry. There wasn’t 
a cabinet minister or an official who would have dared to stand 
in his war or to challenge this ‘illicit’ act. Similarly, in another 
London borough a local official of the Ministry of Food found a 
crowd of homeless uncared for. He broke open a block of flats. 
He put them in. He got hold of furniture by hook or by crook, 
he got the electricity, gas and water supply turned on, and he 
brought them food.68
It was in industry that the clash between the two wars was most 
strongly expressed. The CP’s drive for maximum production led it 
to strive ‘might and main to avoid stoppages’69 and industrialists 
gratefully rewarded it with positive testimonials.70 There was an 
alternative analysis expressed. At one shop stewards’ meeting a 
speaker referred to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938: 
‘There were Municheers still in the Government and there were 
Municheers still running business … .’71 This distrust was clearly 
a common view, and the public often took the side of the workers 
during industrial disputes.72 
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While the CP’s links with Russia gave it a rising prestige that 
more than compensated for losses sustained by opposing strikes, 
its stance opened the way for other political forces to channel 
workers’ discontent. The Trotskyist movement was miniscule but its 
position on the war enabled it to lead a series of strikes far beyond 
its numbers.73 According to the movement’s historians, British 
Trotskyists ‘differentiated between the defencism of the capitalists 
and that of the workers, which “stems largely from entirely 
progressive motives of preserving their own class organisations 
and democratic rights from destruction at the hands of fascism”.’74
There were 900 strikes in the first months of war. By 1944 the 
figure had risen to 2,000 (with 3.7 million days of lost production). 
This was in spite of the combined efforts of Labour, the CP, and 
Regulation 1AA which, by virtually outlawing stoppages has been 
described as ‘… the most powerful anti-strike weapon possessed 
by any government since the 1799 Combination Acts’.75 One 
historian writes that: ‘the tempo of activity and discussion increased 
dramatically, sometimes giving a toehold to some extreme left 
political agitators [though] it was at this point too early to speak, 
as some of these agitators did, of a “second front at home”.’76
Radicalism never matched that seen in the First World War 
because of the ‘contradictory duality’ of the Second World War.77 
Nevertheless, the very idea of a ‘second front at home’ spoke volumes.
Britain’s Middle East Army also experienced war in parallel. The 
mission was to protect Egypt and the sea route to India, the ‘jewel 
in the Crown’ of the Empire. Its commanders have been described 
in these terms:
Almost to a man the officers were tall, upper-class Englishmen 
who came to a formal dinner wearing the same skin-tight 
crimson trews that had seen service in the Crimea. They had 
almost all attended the same top six English public schools … 
The Nottingham-based Sherwood Rangers under the Earl of 
Yarborough had even tried to take with them to Palestine a pack 
of foxhounds belonging to the Brocklesby Hunt.78
The playing fields of Eton proved a poor preparation for total 
war. The fall of Tobruk was, after Singapore, the largest British 
capitulation in the Second World War,79 and German panzers came 
within 10km of Cairo. The morale of Britain’s ‘desert rats’ had to 
be rapidly reconstituted, so Field Marshal Montgomery motivated 
his troops by giving them a purpose for risking their lives. This 
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was explained to them by the newly founded Army Bureau of 
Current Affairs (ABCA), a body largely run by radically-minded 
tutors committed to making the Second World War a people’s war.80 
The King’s Regulations forbad political activity by soldiers, but in 
the highly charged atmosphere of the time the borderline between 
current affairs and politics was easily blurred. 
A rank and file soldier’s movement developed and found its 
voice in a profusion of information sheets and wall newspapers. 
They were for a people’s war as opposed to an imperialist one. 
For example, the founding statement of the Soldiers’ Anti-Fascist 
Movement said:
We shall campaign for a maximum war effort, expose slackness 
and reactionary influences in the fighting services. Our news on 
international affairs will be from the anti-fascist viewpoint… We 
shall do all we can to speed victory over fascism, victory that 
must be followed by a People’s Peace.81
The very fact of soldiers openly discussing military policy was 
insubordination, as was the widespread demand for a second front 
in opposition to Churchill’s foot-dragging.82
However, it did not stop there. Allied rhetoric asserted this was 
a fight for democracy. If so, some soldiers concluded, democracy 
could and should be practiced by those doing the fighting. A mock 
soldiers’ parliament was set up in Cairo in late 1943. Although 
others appeared elsewhere, what made the Egyptian experiment 
unique was the lack of officer influence. It was a ‘parliament of 
Other Ranks in the tradition of the English Revolution’.83 
The tenor of the proceedings can be gauged from the Bills it 
‘passed’. The first called for public ownership of businesses. On 1 
December the distributive trades were nationalised. An Inheritance 
Restriction Bill followed.84 There were also plans to grant 
independence to India, abolish private schools and nationalise coal, 
steel, transport and the banks.85 An ‘election’ by mass meeting was 
held. The joint Labour/CP ticket won 119 seats, Commonwealth 
(a new party opposing the Churchill-led coalition from the left) 
55, Liberals 38 and Conservatives just 17.86 Simultaneously, in the 
‘real’ parliament at Westminster, a move to permit off-duty soldiers 
to engage in politics was proposed by no less than a Tory MP. He 
argued it ‘could do no harm and might do a great deal of good, 
and which ought to be his by right – that is to say if we are indeed 
fighting for democracy’.87 
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Unsurprisingly this ‘real’ proposal was defeated. An imperial 
war requires a tame army that unquestioningly follows ruling 
class orders. The advocates of people’s war had to be silenced. In 
February 1944 the Commander in Chief of Middle East Forces 
ordered: ‘that the name of parliament must not be used; that there 
must be no publicity of any kind, even war correspondents being 
excluded, and that the proceedings must be supervised and directed 
by an Army education officer.’88
When this was read out to the Cairo Parliament the soldiers 
protested 600 to one. That one vote was the brigadier who had 
presented the order. Members of the organising committee were 
immediately transferred, as was the new ‘Prime Minister’. The man 
who moved bank nationalisation, Leo Abse, was spirited away 
under ‘open arrest’, and deported back to Britain.89
This Forces Parliament was broken up and the old order restored. 
However, discontent bubbled up again. When news of Labour’s 
election victory in Britain reached Egypt in 1945, soldiers stopped 
saluting officers for about ten days.90 Real fury erupted after Victory 
over Japan Day, August 1945, when soldiers realised that defeating 
the Axis had not ended the war. If the government had considered 
the Second World War an anti-fascist war, demobilisation should 
have begun the day the enemy capitulated. However, Labour 
refused to bring its weary troops home. Bevin told the Commons 
in November 1945 that: ‘It is the intention of his Majesty’s 
Government to safeguard British interests in whatever part of the 
world they may be found.’91 British troops must continue to fight 
for the British Empire, and for the empires of those yet unable 
to fight for themselves – France and Holland. Their Vietnamese 
and Indonesian colonies would have to be violently restored to the 
‘rightful’ owners.92
Some servicemen had other ideas. They struck rather than sail 
Dutch soldiers to Indonesia.93 700 RAF briefly mutinied at Jodhpur, 
India.94 By the end of 1945 protests had occurred in Malta95 followed 
by Ceylon, Egypt and again India96 where a new Forces Parliament 
had been reconstituted.97 In March 1946 a radar operator was 
sentenced to ten years in connection with RAF strikes in Singapore, 
and in May there was a full-scale mutiny in Malaya which resulted 
in a string of court martials.98
Britain’s industrial strikes and military mutinies, while revealing 
the existence of parallel wars, were limited affairs. More often the 
conflict between those giving orders and those carrying them out was 
masked, existing as divergent ideas held in people’s heads. Indeed, 
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many ordinary citizens just wanted to muddle through without 
choosing between either of the two wars. Rather than politics or 
strategy, the driving force for the ‘poor bloody infantry’ has been 
described as frequently a combination of ‘coercion, inducement 
and narcosis’.99 And the sentiment of this Yorkshirewoman was 
doubtless commonplace among civilians:
We used to watch our bombers going out, hundreds at a time at 
regular intervals … I would say, ‘They’ve gone over the edge of 
England and many won’t ever come back. They are just going 
out there to die.’ And then we thought of all the innocent people 
over there who were going to be destroyed by us. When was it 
going to end? It was all so hopeless – and for what? You felt the 
futility of it all and the sorrow for all the human beings involved 
in this hellish war, and wished with all your heart it was over.100
Nonetheless, there were clear proofs that large numbers, probably 
the majority, saw the war very differently to the establishment. One 
example was the reception accorded to the 1942 Beveridge Report 
that laid the basis for the post-war welfare state and National Health 
Service. Calder is correct to argue that ‘the scheme was nothing 
like so revolutionary as Beveridge, and some of his admirers, liked 
to present’.101 For example, contributions to the scheme were flat 
rated so the poor paid as much as the rich, and it provided no more 
than a safety net. Nonetheless, ‘after the first glare of limelight, 
the Government went to extraordinary lengths to stifle all official 
publicity for the report’.102 A summary written by Beveridge for 
servicemen was withdrawn two days after being issued103 on the 
grounds that the Report had become ‘controversial and therefore 
contrary to King’s Regulations’,104 while Churchill regarded the 
report as a distraction from the fighting. 
The fascinating thing is that in spite of all this, as Mass Observation 
discovered, ordinary people took it to be ‘a symbol of Britain’s war 
aims’.105 No other official government publication has sold 635,000 
copies or had the approval of 90 per cent of those polled.106 Even 
The Times pointed out that the public ‘refuses to accept the false 
distinction between these aims and the aim of victory’.107 
The ultimate purpose of the war – a better, more equal, fairer world 
as embodied in a welfare state, or a return to pre-war structures – 
was the main issue of the 1945 general election. Churchill plainly 
hoped for a ‘khaki election’ such as the one that returned the First 
World War’s Prime Minister, Lloyd George. Churchill called on 
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the public to ‘Vote National’. The brunt of his keynote speech was 
directed in veiled terms against welfare: ‘Here in old England … 
in this glorious island, the cradle and citadel of free democracy 
throughout the world, we do not like to be regimented and ordered 
about and have every action of our lives prescribed for us.’ Labour’s 
welfare state, he predicted, ‘would have to fall back on some form 
of Gestapo’.108
In his reply Attlee appealed to the concept of a ‘people’s war’.
I state again the fundamental question which you have to decide. 
Is this country in peace as in war to be governed on the principle 
that public welfare comes before private interest?… Or is the 
nation to go back to the old conditions…? I ask you, the electors 
of Britain, the men and women who have shown the world such 
a shining example of how a great people in the face of mortal 
danger saved itself, to give Labour power to lead the way to a 
peaceful world and a just social order.109
Even if Labour failed to deliver on many of its promises, the 
significant point is that it claimed the mantle of a people’s war. 
And the results were eloquent. Churchill’s Conservatives dropped 
to 213 MPs, while the Labour Party romped home with 393 MPs, 
to form its first majority administration. The coalition government 
(including Labour) had fought an imperialist war, but in the minds 
of millions of voters the goal of the conflict had been quite different.
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democracy
The USA made a major contribution to the outcome of the Second 
World War. 405,000 Americans lost their lives and a staggering 
$330 billion was spent.1 If the death toll pales in comparison with 
that of the Soviet Union, the USA’s role as a source of arms was 
outstanding. Through lend-lease it supplied mountains of military 
equipment and food. The Soviet Union gained about one tenth of 
its hardware from the US,2 and Britain twice as much.3 
In some respects the position of the USA did appear different to 
its Allies. It lacked extensive colonies4 and more readily spoke the 
language of people’s war. In 1940 President Roosevelt made a famous 
speech claiming the USA was the ‘great arsenal of democracy’. He 
castigated the Nazis for having ‘proclaimed, time and again, that all 
other races are their inferiors and therefore subject to their orders’.5 
A week later he declared ‘national policy’ was ‘without regard to 
partisanship’ and involved ‘the preservation of civil liberties for all’.6
However, the differences between the USA and its Allies should 
not be exaggerated. Washington’s involvement in the Second World 
War was part of what Ambrose has called its ‘rise to globalism’:
In 1939 … the United States had an Army of 185,000 men with an 
annual budget of less than $500 million. America had no military 
alliances and no American troops were stationed in any foreign 
country … Thirty years later the United States had [a defence 
budget of] over $100 billion. The United States had military 
alliances with forty-eight nations, 1.5 million soldiers, airmen, 
and sailors stationed in 119 countries.7
If, prior to the Second World War, America had followed a 
different path to the European powers, it was one of internal rather 
than external colonisation, not just through the drive West and 
obliteration of Native Americans, but through the exploitation of 
enslaved Africans shipped to its soil. Therefore, on the question 
of whether the US war effort took on an imperialist or people’s 
111
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character, a crucial test was the domestic issue of race, which has 
been called ‘the American obssession’.8
The JaPaneSe
This first arose in relation to the Japanese. Although the December 
1941 attack on Pearl Harbor was the brainchild of Tokyo, Federal 
authorities turned on the Japanese in America. Roosevelt’s Executive 
Order 9066 (March 1942) interned ‘all persons of Japanese 
ancestry’ in the Western Defense Command area (California, 
Oregon, Washington and Arizona).9 This affected 120,000 people 
of whom 70,000 were American citizens.10
Asians had been exploited on America’s western seaboard since 
the mid-nineteenth century, and racism was encouraged to both 
keep their wages down and divide all workers, white and non-white, 
amongst themselves. The Japanese were a common target. When 
running for President in 1912 Woodrow Wilson declared that the 
Japanese could ‘not blend with the Caucasian race,’ and a few years 
later the Californian governor insisted on ‘the principle of race 
self-preservation’. In a notorious court case one man was refused 
naturalisation simply because he was ‘clearly of a race which is 
not Caucasian’,11 and by 1924 that precedent had solidified into 
national law. To maintain ‘racial preponderance’ only ‘free white 
persons’ were now eligible.12
The architect of Order 9066, Western Defense Commander 
DeWitt, was clear his motivation was genetic: 
The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and 
third generation Japanese born in the United States soil, possessed 
of United States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized’, the 
racial strains are undiluted. To conclude otherwise is to expect 
that children born of white parents on Japanese soil to sever all 
racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects.13
Administrators of Order 9066 thought it an over-reaction, but 
they accepted the view that: ‘the normal Caucasian countenances of 
such persons enable the average American to recognize particular 
individuals by distinguishing minor facial characteristics [but] 
the Occidental eye cannot readily distinguish one Japanese 
resident from another.’ This made the ‘effective surveillance of the 
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movements of particular Japanese residents suspected of disloyalty’ 
virtually impossible.14 
The public justification for Order 9066 was military necessity. 
DeWitt loudly claimed that the US Japanese were broadcasting 
sensitive US intelligence, though he knew it to be untrue,15 and the 
notoriously reactionary FBI boss, Hoover was aware the claim was 
pure fiction.16 To get round the lack of evidence an amazing proof, 
worthy of Donald Rumsfeld, was advanced: ‘The very fact that no 
sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming 
indication that such action will be taken.’17 Although the authorities 
suggested internment was popular, secret polling in the areas affected 
showed only 14 per cent favoured the strategy.18 People could see 
through the scare-mongering of politicians and press.
Order 9066 was implemented using methods reminiscent of Nazi 
‘aryanisation’. Japanese were herded into former stables, cattle stalls 
and pigpens before transfer to longer term ‘relocation centers’ like 
the bleak camp at Minidoka, Idaho.19 The term ‘concentration 
camp’ had been quietly dropped. Taking little more than they could 
carry, they lost homes and property worth $400 million.20 A riot 
in one camp was quelled by soldiers who killed two and wounded 
many more. When a doctor revealed protesters had been shot in 
the back he was sacked.21 
Internment found critics in unexpected quarters. The director of 
the War Relocation Authority was dismayed by the policy he had to 
implement. He believed that it ‘added weight to the contention of 
the enemy that we are fighting a race war; that this nation preaches 
democracy and practices racial discrimination’.22 The victims of 
Order 9066 also pointed out the hypocrisy of the government’s 
stance: ‘Although we have yellow skins, we too are Americans. [So] 
how can we say to the white American buddies in the armed forces 
that we are fighting for the perpetuation of democracy, especially 
when our fathers, mothers and families are in concentration camps, 
even though they are not charged with any crime?’23
The difference between the way the USA fought its war in Europe 
and Asia also showed the influence of race. One veteran remembered 
how his drill instructor declared: ‘You’re not going to Europe, you’re 
going to the Pacific. Don’t hesitate to fight the Japs dirty’.24 A war 
correspondent recalled: ‘We shot prisoners in cold blood, wiped out 
hospitals, strafed lifeboats … finished off the enemy wounded.’25 
Sometimes the purpose was merely to extract their gold teeth.26 
When the same veteran asked about a shooting he heard, he was 
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told: ‘It was just an old gook woman. She wanted to be put out of 
her misery and join her ancestors, I guess. So I obliged her.’27
When Britain’s Bomber Command asked the Eighth US Air 
Force to participate in ‘Operation Thunderclap’ which aimed to 
kill some 275,000 Berliners, America’s General Cabell protested 
that such: ‘baby killing schemes [would] be a blot on the history 
of the Air Forces and of the US’.28 This did not prevent the USA 
from participating in the bombing of Dresden but the reasons were 
strategic. Like the British, Senior US commanders were aware that 
their air forces ‘are the blue chips with which we will approach the 
post-war treaty table’ and that it was important to ensure ‘Russian 
knowledge of their strength’.29
In war with Japan the racial overtones were more prominent. 
‘Baby killing schemes’ were routine US policy in the Asian theatre, 
and those who said these were ‘un-American’ were denounced 
because, as the Weekly Intelligence Review suggested in tones 
reminiscent of Stanley Baldwin: ‘We intend to seek out and destroy 
the enemy wherever he or she is, in the greatest possible numbers, 
in the shortest possible time. For us, THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS 
IN JAPAN.’30
An example of what this meant in practice was the raid on Tokyo, 
10 March 1945. It killed 100,000. Air Chief Curtis LeMay called it 
‘the greatest single disaster incurred by any enemy in military history 
… There were more casualties than in any other military action in 
the history of the world’.31 US Atomic energy Commission chair, 
David Lilienthal summed up how the war developed against Japan:
Then we burned Tokyo, not just military targets, but set out to 
wipe out the place, indiscriminately. The atomic bomb is the last 
word in this direction. All ethical limitations of warfare are gone, 
not because the means of destruction are more cruel or painful or 
otherwise hideous in their effect upon combatants, but because 
there are no individual combatants. The fences are gone. And it 
was we, the civilized, who have pushed standardless conduct to 
its ultimate.32
This is a valid judgement on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although 
the US was fully aware that Japan was suing for peace,33 the 
Secretary of State – Stimson – wanted the atom bomb deployed 
and ‘the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing 
a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ 
houses’. One historian adds: ‘Stripped of polite euphemisms, that 
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meant massively killing workers and their families, the residents 
of those houses.’34
Harry Truman, Roosevelt’s successor, realised the atomic bomb 
was ‘far worse than gas or biological warfare because it affects the 
civilian population and murders them by the wholesale’.35 Nuclear 
bombs killed around 200,000 in the short term, and wiped out the 
very medical services which might have helped civilian casualties. 
In Hiroshima:
Of a hundred and fifty doctors in the city, sixty-five were already 
dead and most of the rest were wounded. Of 1,780 nurses, 1,654 
were dead or too badly hurt to work. In the biggest hospital, 
that of the Red Cross, only six doctors out of thirty were able to 
function, and only ten nurses out of more than two hundred.36 
And the effect of the bomb on people virtually defies description:
The sight of them was almost unbearable. Their faces and hands 
were burnt and swollen; and great sheets of skin had peeled away 
from their tissues to hang down like rags on a scarecrow … And 
they had no faces! Their eyes, noses and mouths had been burned 
away, and it looked like their ears had melted off.37
The JeWS
The ending of the Holocaust is perhaps the most potent argument 
for the Second World War being a ‘good war’. So what was Allied 
attitude to the plight of the Jews? When Hitler annexed Austria 
in 1938 London slapped on visa restrictions to make it difficult 
for Jews to escape.38 By the outbreak of war only 70,000 of the 
600,000 Jews who sought asylum had been accepted.39 After 1939 
the door snapped shut, because anyone coming from Axis territory 
was now branded an enemy alien. Britain’s Foreign Secretary vetoed 
the rescue of 70,000 Romanian Jews (fully funded by the American 
Jewish community) because: ‘If we do that, then the Jews of the 
world will be wanting us to make similar offers in Poland and 
Germany. Hitler might well take us up … .’40 
‘Amazing, most amazing position’, exclaimed one American 
official,41 and this shows that the USA had a better approach. In 
January 1944 it set up a War Refugee Board which saved up to 
250,000 Jewish lives.42 However, before getting carried away it is 
important to note that the Government provided a mere 9 per cent 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   115 04/05/2012   09:47
116 a PeoPle’S hISTory of The Second World War
of its funding. The rest came from private sources.43 Moreover, as 
Wyman makes clear in his excellent book The Abandonment of the 
Jews, 1944 was very late, and the road to the establishment of the 
Board had been a rocky one. As early as 1941 the US authorities 
knew about the extermination taking place in Europe. Indeed, in 
July 1942 a 20,000 strong assembly in New York protesting at the 
Holocaust received messages of sympathy from both Roosevelt 
and Churchill.44 
Yet Roosevelt appointed Breckinridge Long, who Eleanor 
Roosevelt described as ‘a fascist’,45 to oversee immigration rules. 
His policy was to ‘postpone and postpone and postpone the granting 
of visas’ and thus ‘delay and effectively stop [immigration] for a 
temporary period of indefinite length …’46 To assist in this process 
the USA visa application form was four feet long and:
had to be filled out on both sides by one of the refugee’s sponsors 
(or a refugee-aid agency), sworn under penalty of perjury, and 
submitted in six copies. It required detailed information not only 
about the refugee but also about the two American sponsors 
who were needed to testify that he would present no danger to 
the United States. Each sponsor had to list his own residences 
and employers for the preceding two years and submit character 
references from two reputable American citizens whose own past 
activities could be readily checked.47
Then a cruel Catch-22 was introduced. There were no consuls to 
issue visas in Axis-controlled Europe, but those who escaped from 
there to places such as Spain and Portugal were deemed to be ‘not 
in acute danger’ and therefore refused visas. 
Such actions led a prominent Jewish Socialist member of the Polish 
National Council to commit suicide. He explained his decision thus:
The responsibility for this crime of murdering the entire Jewish 
population of Poland falls in the first instance on the perpetrators, 
but … by the passive observation of the murder of defenseless 
millions and of the maltreatment of children, women and old 
men, [the Allied states] have become the criminals’ accomplices 
… As I was unable to do anything during my life, perhaps by 
my death I shall contribute to breaking down that indifference.48 
The welcome establishment of the War Refugee Board close to 
the end of the war pales in significance when set against the USA’s 
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refusal to stop Auschwitz operating. Detailed information about 
this death camp came from two escapees, Vrba and Wetzler, in early 
1944. Wyman shows that up to 437,000 lives could have been saved 
if Auschwitz’s railways lines and crematoria had been bombed,49 but 
the War Department declared this ‘impracticable.’50 In fact, between 
July and October 1944, ‘a total of 2,700 bombers travelled along 
or within easy reach of both rail lines on the way to targets in the 
Blechammer-Auschwitz region’,51 and on several occasions the camp 
actually shook from attacks at nearby installations. 
Wyman’s verdict has been hotly debated.52 The counter-argument, 
that the Western Allies did not wish to be distracted from an 
exclusive focus on defeating Germany, falls when set against their 
costly efforts to evacuate Spanish children during the civil war 
or supply the Warsaw Rising. ‘Humanitarian acts’ seem to have 
been carried out only when politically expedient. One convinced 
‘Rooseveltian’ defends his hero by emphasising the President’s 
‘sincere belief that it was essential to put all of America’s resources 
and his own influence into winning the war’.53 The question is: 
which war was he trying to win?
The people’s war did not focus on gaining political advantage 
but common decency and protection of human life. Arguments that 
nothing could be done to save Jews, or that this was a diversion, 
are disproved by the case of Denmark. Though under German 
occupation, only 474 of its population of 7,000 Jews fell into Nazi 
hands54 because large numbers of citizens hid them when the round 
ups began.55 The resistance then organised a flotilla of small ships to 
smuggle them across the Oresund to neutral Sweden.56 In Bulgaria 
significant sections of society ‘united in the singular determination 
to protect Bulgarian Jewry from the pro-Hitler Fascist majority in 
parliament’. As a result ‘the cattle cars … remained empty. Bulgarian 
Jews fought alongside their non-Jewish compatriots in a mighty 
partisan movement.’57
This rescue of Jews was not pointless. As one participant argues, 
many historians ‘make a mistake [when] they try to disconnect 
the rescue of the Jews from the rest of the resistance. It all belongs 
together.’58 Many who escaped would return later to fight.59 An 
estimated 1.5 million Jewish women and men were involved 
in combat against the Axis, the US and Russian armed forces 
having half a million each.60 In Eastern Europe there were Jewish 
underground organisations in seven major ghettos and 45 minor 
ghettos. Uprisings occurred in five concentration camps and eighteen 
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forced-labour camps.61 Against incredible odds there were armed 
rebellions in Auschwitz, Treblinka and Sobibor death camps. 
Even Jewish resistance had a two-war aspect to it. In many 
instances established Jewish organisations tried to limit the inroads 
of Nazism through collaboration. Tzur shows that the Jewish 
population was divided like others: ‘[Resistance] could develop only 
from an active ideology which presented its holders in opposition to 
the existing circumstances and believed in the possibility of changing 
the cultural and political ecology. Therefore the resisters usually 
had a previous history as members of anti-establishment groups.’62 
An opposite example occurred at the Vilna ghetto, in ‘one of the 
most tragic chapters in the annals of the Holocaust’.63 The head of 
the Jewish organisation betrayed the leader of the ghetto’s armed 
resistance group to the Gestapo, just after 33,500 of its 57,000 
inhabitants had been buried in pits nearby.64 
‘douBle vIcTory’ – Black amerIcanS and The War
In the USA the black population were conscious of the two wars 
and said so. When Roosevelt announced the USA was defending 
‘freedom and democracy’ Afro-Americans, who made up one-eighth 
of its population, could not but be aware that in 12 southern states, 
only 2 per cent of voting-age blacks were entitled to vote, or that 
the median income of blacks was just 40 per cent that of whites.65 
They may well have remembered the President’s response to dozens 
of lynchings in 1933. When asked by the leader of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
to back an anti-lynching Bill he said that racist white southern 
Democrats ‘occupy strategic places on most of the Senate and 
House committees’, and so, ‘I just can’t take that risk’.66 His future 
successor, Truman, said in 1940: ‘I wish to make it clear that I am 
not appealing for social equality for the Negro. The Negro himself 
knows better than that …’.67 
Cracks in the edifice of racism appeared when the US armed 
services expanded from a few hundred thousand to over 14 million. 
The state now had no choice but to appeal to the country’s nine 
million blacks. In 1940 the Selective Service and Training Act 
opened the forces to ‘any person, regardless of race or color’ and 
promised ‘there shall be no discrimination …’.68 Yet the Services 
remained thoroughly segregated. As Roosevelt put it: ‘The policy of 
the War Department is not to intermingle colored and white enlisted 
personnel in the same regimental organization.’69 Presumably ‘no 
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discrimination’ only applied within separate black and white 
sections, not between them.
The justification given by the Secretary for War was that blacks 
were ‘basically agriculturalists’.70 Consequently, ‘Negro units have 
… been unable to master the techniques of modern weapons.’71 
In the Navy blacks could aspire only to be messmen and cooks 
because, according to the Secretary of the Navy: ‘it would be a 
waste of time and effort [to train those who] by reason of their race 
and color could not properly and efficiently fill the higher ratings.’ 
Admiral Nimitz warned desegregation was ‘the Soviet way, not the 
American way’.72 In the army 95 per cent of black soldiers were 
restricted to service roles,73 because, as General Marshall put it, 
integration would have meant ‘settlement of vexing racial problems 
[that] cannot be permitted to complicate the tremendous task of the 
War Department and thereby jeopardize discipline and morale’.74 As 
the morale of racists took priority whites could command blacks, 
blacks could never command whites. So in 1940 there were only 
two black army officers.75 
Segregation even applied to blood donations. Protesters called this 
‘abhorrent to the principles for which this war is being fought’ and 
a ‘Hitler-like policy’.76 But there were many other outrages. This 
was the experience of one black soldier: ‘I saw German prisoners 
free to move around the camp, unlike black soldiers, who were 
restricted. The Germans walked right into the doggone places like 
any white American. We were wearin’ the same uniform, but we 
were excluded.’77 In town German POWs sat at the front of buses 
while blacks were relegated to the back.78 He concluded the USA 
was fielding ‘two armies, one black, one white’.79 When proposals 
emerged for segregated bomb shelters in Washington DC, one paper 
wryly commented: ‘Wouldn’t it be just like Hitler to make American 
whites choose a “fate worse than death” – running into a Negro 
bomb shelter?’80
Some radical blacks responded to the situation by rejecting 
participation in the war altogether:
Why should I shed my blood for Roosevelt’s America … for the 
whole Jim Crow Negro-hating South, for the low-paid, dirty 
jobs for which Negroes have to fight, for the few dollars of relief 
and the insults, discrimination, police brutality and perpetual 
poverty to which Negroes are condemned even in the more 
liberal North?81
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Answering talk of ‘saving democracy’, one black newspaper 
wrote, ‘We cannot save what DOES NOT EXIST’.82 The Second 
World War was a ‘white man’s war’ to a significant minority.83 
Thirty-eight per cent of black people believed it was more important 
to ‘make democracy work at home’ than beat the Germans and 
Japanese.84 An apocryphal epitaph summed up the bitterness felt: 
‘Here lies a black man killed fighting a yellow man for the protection 
of a white man.’85
For the majority, however, the Second World War embodied two 
separate wars. This was made explicit by The Pittsburgh Courier, 
the largest black circulation weekly, in its popular ‘Double V’ 
campaign: ‘The “Double V” stands for victory against the enemies 
abroad and for victory against the forces at home who would deny 
the Negro full and free participation in every phase of national life. 
Therefore the Negro is fighting on two fronts.’
There were contradictions and differences within the campaign, 
however. One Courier article claimed that ‘Double V is a victory 
slogan adopted by Negro America as an expression of its traditional 
patriotism to the ideals … expressed by President Roosevelt …’.86 
However, other articles pointed out that under his Presidency 
‘lynchings, “Jim Crow” laws, discrimination in employment and 
training, denial of suffrage’ continued. With an ‘army and navy 
steeped in prejudice … [O]ur country still insists on making itself 
vulnerable to Axis propagandists and their slimy effective methods 
… If we can’t exercise democracy at home, how can we carry the 
torch effectively to those who need our assistance and who in turn 
must aid us?’87 A black soldier put it still more succinctly. It was a 
matter of ‘Lynching versus Morale’.88
The clash between the two wars emerged in several areas of 
society. On one side corporate America profited as never before. 
There was burgeoning growth in defence industries which saw 
profits rise 250 per cent and prices by 45 per cent above pre-war 
levels. However, wages were frozen at 15 per cent above the 1941 
level.89 Discrimination against African American employment in 
defence was staggering. Despite labour shortages, in 1941 over half 
of new defence jobs were formally closed to blacks, while 90 per cent 
of those who did find work were in low paid service or unskilled 
employment. For whites the equivalent figure was just 5 per cent.90 
In January of that year A. Philip Randolph, the socialist leader 
of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Union, declared blacks 
would ‘exact their rights in National Defense employment and 
the armed forces of the country’.91 His ‘March On Washington 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   120 04/05/2012   09:47
uSa 121
Movement’ (MOWM) has been described as ‘African America’s 
first large-scale demonstration aimed at federal officials’;92 ‘one of 
the most promising [black movements] in all American history’; and 
the ‘first large black organization in which trade unionists played 
the leading role’.93 
Randolph himself argued that: ‘The whole National Defense set-up 
reeks and stinks with race prejudice, hatred and discrimination …’ 
Promises had been made but: ‘it all ends there. Nothing is actually 
done to stop discrimination …’ So blacks should not politely beg, but 
act: ‘Power and pressure do not reside in the few, the intelligentsia, 
they lie in and flow from the masses. …. On to Washington … Let 
them swarm from every hamlet, village and town … Let them come 
in automobiles, buses, trains, trucks and on foot. Let them come 
though the winds blow… .’94 Soon the original prediction of 10,000 
marchers grew to 100,000.
In reply Roosevelt accused the organisers of aiding the Axis:
Today’s threat to our national security is not a matter of military 
weapons alone … The method is simple. It is first, a dissemination 
of discord. A group – not too large – a group that may be sectional 
or racial or political – is encouraged to exploit its prejudices 
through false slogans and emotional appeals … As a result of 
these techniques, armament programs may be dangerously 
delayed. Singleness of national purpose may be undermined … .95
Nevertheless, Roosevelt shifted. He set up a Fair Employment 
Practice Committee (FEPC) to ‘investigate complaints’ of 
discrimination and ‘redress grievances,’ and the march was cancelled. 
The FEPC was lauded as ‘the most important effort in the history of 
this country to eliminate discrimination in employment,’96 but the 
omens were worrying. Mark Ethridge, appointed the Committee’s 
chair, found there was no power, ‘not even in all the mechanized 
armies of the earth, Allied and Axis – which could now force the 
Southern white people to the abandonment of the principle of social 
segregation … .’97 A disillusioned Randolph realised the FEPC was 
facing a situation that was ‘of the same cloth as Hitler’s Nazism, 
Mussolini’s fascism and Hirohito’s militaryism’.98 Once the threat 
of a march had disappeared Roosevelt moved to emasculate the 
FEPC, and Ethridge resigned in disgust.
The clash between people’s war and imperialist war in the USA 
could also take the form of bullets, knives and stones. There was an 
enormous expansion of non-white employment, due less to the FEPC 
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than sheer necessity. For example, in 1941 there were virtually no 
Mexican Americans in the Los Angeles shipyards. Three years later 
there were 17,000.99 Nationally during the same period a million 
people moved home.100 In San Francisco the black population rose 
at 20 times the rate of the whites.101 All this put pressure on housing, 
and the tension that caused generated 242 racial battles in 47 cities 
during 1943 alone.102 
The most dramatic episode was in the engineering metropolis 
of Detroit. By the middle of the war blacks and southern whites 
were arriving at a rate of 1,400 a week.103 Whites rioted when a 
black housing project named after Sojourner Truth, the ex-slave 
Civil War heroine, was opened. Local police stood back because, 
as their chief commented: ‘My men are naturally in sympathy with 
the white mob.’104 As a result 33 of the 38 people hospitalised were 
black. Yet of the 104 arrests 101 were blacks.105 This was but a 
prelude to an even bigger clash in 1943. There were attempts to 
overcome divisions and in April 10,000 black and white workers 
marched together against discrimination.106 Alas, racism was not 
so easily overcome. Two months later fighting between black and 
white youths spread to three quarters of the city. Once more, the 
state was not a neutral bystander to ethnic conflict. 34 people died, 
25 of them black. Eighty-five per cent of the 1,500 arrests made 
were of blacks, and 17 blacks were shot dead by the police.107 
Can it be argued that these events owed more to a split among the 
masses than a division between an imperialist-minded Government 
and the majority of people? It is true that racism infected the white 
working class. There were numerous strikes to exclude black labour, 
for example.108 However, even these strikes showed some social 
differentiation. There was a clear difference between the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) with its origins in the more privileged 
craft elite of workers, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO) which was more broadly based. While several AFL unions 
officially banned blacks, the CIO welcomed them,109 and set up over 
85 anti-discrimination committees to actively oppose racism.110 In 
1943 a delegate at the Michigan state CIO convention pinpointed 
the origins of the problem: ‘Divide the common people and rule 
has been the economic keystone of those who control the economic 
destiny of America.’111
The rot came from the top. The attitudes expressed by politicians, 
businessmen, and chiefs of the armed services found their way into 
civil society. In housing, for example, the National Association of 
Real Estate Boards bracketed blacks with bootleggers, madams 
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and gangsters, and advised its estate agents to avoid selling to 
African Americans ‘no matter what the motive or character of 
the would-be purchaser, if the deal would instigate a form of 
blight …’.112 Randolph summarised the way the administration 
fuelled ethnic conflict: ‘the official jim crow of the Negro by the 
Federal Government itself in the armed forces, the Government 
departments and defense industries, is a major cause of the wave 
of race riots sweeping the country’.113 On occasion the Government 
might quell the rioting in the interests of war production, but this 
did not undo the way its policies generated the conditions for such 
conflicts to erupt. 
The scale and location of the Detroit confrontation, and that of 
Harlem New York which followed,114 showed the continuing racism 
of the state, but also the readiness of blacks to fight back. These 
events had occurred in the North. Yet the ‘other war’ erupted in the 
South, too. Against the background of an increase in lynchings115 
came the resistance of black soldiers. They were predominantly 
transfers from northern cities and were unaccustomed to, and refused 
to accept, Jim Crow. In total there were over 200 confrontations 
between black soldiers and the military and civilian authorities, 
of which two thirds occurred in the South.116 This followed the 
mushrooming of black community groups such as the NAACP117 
(which in the 1960s came to be seen as moderate in comparison 
with the black power movement, but often represented the leading 
edge of agitation in the Second World War). 
In addition there was self-organisation. A black Soldier’s Council 
was formed in the biggest army camp, Fort Bragg,118 following a 
fight during which a black soldier and a white military policeman 
died.119 A detailed study of a black GI ‘insurrection’ at Camp 
Stewart, Georgia, shows how a new militancy was arising.120 The 
conditions in Camp Stewart were described in this letter to the head 
of the NAACP: ‘Please for God Sake help us. These old southern 
officers over us have us quarantined like slaves come down and see 
… They really hate colored. Please appeal to the war dept about 
our treatment at once. We are no slaves.’121
Numerous letters from this Camp referred to physical isolation, 
‘unspeakable’ sanitary conditions, white officers kicking black 
soldiers, and lack of medical care. It was claimed ‘at least 3 men 
die every month as a result of race riots … [and] at least 2 men die 
every month as a result of over-exertion.’122 
After reports of violence against a black woman by white soldiers 
a column of a hundred blacks in ‘military formation’ armed with 
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rifles, bayonets and clubs formed up and called others to join them.123 
Military police then began shooting and the camp was ‘engulfed by 
the tumult of battle’.124 Eventually, after some six thousand rounds 
of .30 calibre ammunition had been fired, one military policeman 
lay dead.125 The battle at Camp Stewart was just one example of a 
mass of racial conflicts both in the US and abroad.
The outcome of the Second World War for the USA was 
double-edged. The state emerged as a super-power. If it was not 
possible to talk about a victory for the peoples at home, at least the 
front for justice and democracy had advanced. From 1943 white 
and blacks in the military were allowed to use the same recreational 
facilities, though at different times.126 In 1944 some black platoons 
were assigned to white companies,127 and by 1948 the armed forces 
were officially desegregated.128 Despite all the obstacles, the people’s 
war had unleashed forces that could not be stopped. Led by figures 
such as Martin Luther King the campaign for black equality would 
soon rekindle, and it was not long before new forces round Malcolm 
X and the Black Panthers would take up arms to advance it further.
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Part III
germany, austria and Italy –  
under the axis
In Axis countries the people’s war was fought in darkness behind 
the doors of the torture chamber. As well as facing the wrath of 
their own governments, these anti-fascist movements had the added 
political obstacle of defying their own nation’s war effort, and the 
lack of a sympathetic response from the Allies.
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germany – conservatives and antifa
Three million Germans became political prisoners during Hitler’s 
reign, and many tens of thousands died. As one writer puts it, ‘These 
numbers reveal the potential for popular resistance in German 
society – and what happened to it.’1 
Some establishment figures, who shared a common class and 
political position to Allied governments, took the road of resistance, 
but the sort of problems they faced were revealed during the 
Czechoslovak crisis of 1938. Fearing the Führer would start an 
unwinnable global war, influential conservative conspirators 
including the Army’s Commander-in-Chief plotted to arrest him. 
They were confident there could be ‘no possibility of a hitch’ to their 
plan just so long as Britain and France were willing to stand up to 
Hitler.2 These two countries were duly informed of the conspiracy.
Alas, neither was in a mood to have the German Chancellor 
deposed. Sir Neville Henderson, Britain’s ambassador in Berlin, 
wrote that Hitler had ‘achieved gigantic progress in the military, 
industrial, and moral reorganisation of Germany’.3 He regarded 
Czech objections to Hitler’s aggression as being on ‘uncertain moral 
ground’4 because the Nazis were merely ‘consummating at long last 
the unity of Greater Germany’.5 Above all, Henderson wanted a 
strong Germany to hold back communism: ‘Moscow’s chief aim 
was to embroil Germany and the Western Powers in a common 
ruin and to emerge as the tertius gaudens [the third one wins] of the 
conflict between them.’6 So the pleas of the plotters were ignored 
and Czechoslovakia was sacrificed.
Once the war began, the Allies adopted the opposite policy: 
‘unconditional surrender’. This was equally fatal to the conservative 
resistance. Any attempt by them to encourage German peace feelers 
would, in Churchill’s words, be met with ‘absolute silence’.7 This 
stance paralysed the conservative opposition because, without a 
prior agreement with the West, toppling Hitler might result in a 
Soviet takeover, something they abhorred even more than Nazism. 
Allied tactics undermined opposition amongst ordinary Germans 
too. Instead of engaging with the German people in a joint 
127
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struggle against Nazism, Britain and the USA gave them firestorms 
accompanied with leaflets saying: ‘Our bombs fall on your homes 
and on you … You can’t stop us, and you know it. You have no 
hope.’8 The Red Army reinforced that message. Russian soldiers 
fighting the ‘Great Patriotic War’ were encouraged into intense 
hatred of enemy civilians. Reports reached Stalin that ‘all German 
women in East Prussia who stayed behind were raped by Red Army 
soldiers’.9 The bitter choice for German women was expressed in 
this joke: ‘Better a Russki on the belly, than a Yank [bombing you] 
on the head!’10 In sum, Allied methods produced sullen co-operation 
with Hitler’s regime. He thus avoided the revolution that befell the 
Kaiser in 1918. Nevertheless Nazism was resisted – through both 
imperialist and people’s war forms.
The german reSISTance
Most histories give pride of place to Conservatives. Gördeler, Mayor 
of Leipzig and Reich Price Commissioner, led an elite grouping 
which hoped to replace Hitler with himself as Chancellor. Gördeler’s 
supporters had the best opportunity to assassinate the Führer 
because they mixed with top Nazis. Stauffenberg’s bomb of 20 
July 1944 came within inches of success. Tragically, Hitler survived, 
Operation Valkyrie failed, and the plotters paid with their lives.
Their rejection of Nazism was not based on opposition to 
German imperialism, but a disagreement over how best to maintain 
it. Like Ambassador Henderson, Hassell (Gördeler’s ‘shadow’ 
Foreign Minister), argued for ‘a healthy, vigorous Germany as an 
indispensable factor … in face of Bolshevist Russia’.11 Gördeler 
himself intended to retain Austria and part of Czechoslovakia for 
Germany after the war.12 
Allied capitulation at Munich may have stymied their 1938 plot, 
but the Conservatives were galvanised into a new conspiracy by the 
Hitler–Stalin Pact which, they feared, gave too much influence to 
Moscow.13 But once the Second World War began, action against it 
was again delayed, because the Wehrmacht looked like succeeding. 
They acted in the summer of 1944 because, as Mommsen puts it, 
‘the generals of the Opposition, with but few exceptions, only made 
up their minds to unconditional action when the Bolshevist danger 
threatened to become a military reality’.14
On the domestic front the conservative resistance preferred 
authoritarian rule or a monarchy to democracy.15 They judged it 
expedient to ‘carry over, for permanent retention in the reconstructed 
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state, an appreciable amount of what had been achieved by National 
Socialism’.16 Indeed, Mommsen believes ‘leading generals in the 
military opposition were also deeply involved in the war crimes of 
the Third Reich’.17 Gördeler rejected ‘uncontrolled overdemocratic 
parliamentarianism’,18 concluding an elected chamber should have 
only advisory functions, and no independent legislative rights. 
Only the tiny Kreisau circle, whose members included aristocrats, 
trade union leaders and socialists, went beyond such reactionary 
politics; but it was a discussion group. When it was caught up in the 
repression of the July 1944 bomb plot, its key figure, von Moltke, 
protested that: ‘We only thought … We are on the outside of each 
practical action; we get hanged because we have thought together.’19
If the conservative resistance was galvanised by fear of defeat and 
a concern to salvage German imperialism from the disaster Hitler 
was leading it to, workers’ opposition was rooted in fundamental 
opposition to Nazi dictatorship, war and racism. The communist 
youth wing warned that young workers were ‘being trained to be 
cannon fodder’ and to avert war it was necessary to ‘bring fascism 
to ruin’.20 The Party called for ‘solidarity through sympathy and 
help for our Jewish comrades’,21 while the socialists demanded 
the ‘overthrow [of] all supporters of despotism and all violent 
organisations that oppose freedom …’.22 
Whereas many of the conservative opposition had been Nazis but 
broke away over the best policy for German capitalism, the working 
class resisted the pull of Hitler from the start. This was shown by 
the Nazi Party’s social composition. Labour was under-represented 
in membership (relative to the overall population) by almost half; 
the lower middle class was over-represented by one-third; while 
there was a fourfold over-representation of the elite.23 
Before Hitler’s accession as Chancellor, the Communist Party 
(KPD) fought Nazis valiantly on the streets. In Prussia alone, during 
June/July 1932, 82 died in political clashes, the majority being 
Nazis (38) or communists (30).24 Alas, Moscow’s insistence that 
the German socialists (SPD) were ‘social fascists’ and worse than 
Nazis, produced disastrous divisions in the working class.25 These 
were compounded by the SPD’s equally false belief that Hitler would 
be constrained by the democratic constitution of Weimar Germany 
– ‘Our foes will perish through our legality’.26 These follies fatally 
undermined the left and made it possible for the German elite, 
centred on President Hindenburg, to appoint Hitler as Chancellor.
Even after Hitler’s accession to power, and wave upon wave 
of murderous repression, working-class opposition continued. 
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Although Göbbels’ government-controlled media could successfully 
peddle lies concerning issues of which the population had no 
direct knowledge, the Nazis fared badly in 1934’s government 
sponsored shop stewards’ elections, because the candidates were 
known personally to voters. The one-party state barred alternative 
platforms, but ‘no’ votes and abstentions combined comprised three 
quarters of the final result.27 No further elections were held. 
Workers tried various methods to withstand the Nazi onslaught. 
Lacking direct access to Hitler’s circle, workers’ resistance could 
not easily mount assassination plots, though heroic individuals 
attempted this. The SPD hoped to ride out the storm by remaining 
passive. Although extremely reckless, to its credit the KPD called for 
‘an unbroken chain of mass resistance and mass struggle …’.28 In June 
1935 the Berlin KPD alone distributed 62,000 copies of its literature. 
The SPD’s illegal newspaper had a national circulation of 250,000.29 
Sometimes more could be done. Despite the dangers, occasional 
strikes and acts of sabotage of military production also occurred.30 
Even in concentration camps the left mounted struggles for physical 
and moral survival. At Berlin’s Sachsenhausen camp a group of 
communists, socialists and non-party prisoners, organised equitable 
distribution of food and clothes, political education, morale-building 
cultural work, and even a demonstration of defiance.31
But by 1939 mass popular resistance had been smashed. This did 
not mean working class acceptance of Hitlerism. A report smuggled 
out and published by the Socialists estimated that: ‘Ninety percent 
of the workers beyond all doubt are convinced anti-Nazis [but 
there is] no active attitude against the ruling conditions.’32 Small 
groups composed of activists from a variety of backgrounds, such 
as the Red Orchestra (a network spying for Russia), the White Rose 
(students), and Edelweiss Pirates (youth) continued to splutter into 
life only to be snuffed out. The ‘other war’ had been reduced to an 
occasional skirmish. Nevertheless, as Peukert has argued:
Given the twofold trauma of 1933 – defeat without struggle, and 
the terror-induced split between the activists and the politically 
passive proletarian community – the sheer quantity of political 
opposition, the commitment and self-sacrifice of those involved, 
and the stubborn determination with which they persisted in 
secret operations, despite setbacks at the hands of the Gestapo, 
are certainly remarkable accomplishments. They constitute an 
immense and historic achievement, quite irrespective of the total 
impact of the working-class resistance on the Third Reich.33
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A comparison in size of the conservative and communist resistance 
is instructive. The former numbered around 200 activists (though 
in the repression following the July 1944 plot the regime executed 
some 5,000 opponents).34 By the end of the Second World War, of 
the KPD alone, 300,000 members had been incarcerated, and at 
least 20,000 killed.35
As Peukert suggests above, it cannot be said mass resistance was 
decisive, but it was significant. The war which ultimately destroyed 
Nazism partly came about because it ‘sought to resolve its social 
antagonisms through dynamic territorial expansion. So Germany 
was inevitably drawn into a conflict with other Great Powers’.36 
Equally, as Aly has shown, fearing a repeat of the revolution that 
ended the First World War the Nazis avoided antagonising German 
workers through lower living standards, and this significantly 
reduced the Nazi war machine’s effectiveness.37 Churchill and 
Roosevelt demanded levels of self-sacrifice from their populations 
that Hitler dared not request.
afTer The War
Victory in Europe day was 8 May 1945 and the fatal blow was 
delivered by Allied imperialism. But the motive was not to free 
the German population. A US spokesperson explained: ‘Our aim 
in occupying Germany is not to liberate it, but to treat it as a 
defeated enemy state.’38 Russia agreed and carried out the violent 
‘ethnic cleansing’ of eleven million Germans from Eastern Europe.39 
Furthermore, Stalin saw no reason to object ‘if a soldier who has 
crossed thousands of kilometres through blood and fire and death 
has fun with a women or takes some trifle’.40 Though notorious 
for mass rape, the Red Army was not the only occupying army to 
do this.41 
Rather than the welfare of the German population, many of 
whom were victims of Nazism, the victors were interested in 
who would gain the greatest share of the spoils. Morgenthau, US 
Treasury Secretary, wanted to de-industrialise Germany and break it 
into several small states,42 but the State Department, mindful of the 
way the First World War ended in a wave of European revolutions, 
regarded this as ‘a plan of blind vengeance’ that would open the 
door to communism, and close it to American plans for economic 
reconstruction.43 
Churchill agreed that ‘inflicting severities upon Germany [might 
allow] the Russians in a very short time to advance, if they chose, 
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to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic’.44 For this reason 
Admiral Dönitz, Hitler’s designated successor, was allowed to 
continue running government and to issue orders. Churchill even 
retained Luftwaffe planes and a force of some 700,000 soldiers as 
insurance against ‘Russian armies should they decide to advance 
farther than is agreed’.45 It was only the bizarre alliance of Russian 
and Daily Mail protests that put a stop to this outrage, Dönitz 
finally being arrested two weeks after VE Day.46
Imperialist considerations also shaped the treatment of Hitler’s 
henchmen. In West Germany the USA wanted Nazis to be brought 
to justice without destroying Germany’s social structure, lest Russia 
take advantage of the disarray.47 This was not easy because, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, Nazism was not some alien contagion, 
the result of a charismatic leader or collective madness. Although 
the Nazi Party started as a collection of counter-revolutionary 
cranks outside the mainstream, almost from the very beginning 
it garnered support from significant figures, such as the First 
World War commander Ludendorff. When the standing of the 
conventional middle class parties was destroyed first by the hyper-
inflation of 1923 and then the 1929 Wall Street Crash millions 
voted for the Nazis. Now, with the economy spiralling downwards, 
the establishment realised that however unsavoury rabble-rousing 
individuals like Hitler might appear, the alternative to Nazism was 
social breakdown and civil war. So they backed his appointment as 
Chancellor in 1933. Hitler showed his appreciation a year later in 
the ‘Night of the Long Knives’, during which he massacred those 
of his own supporters gullible enough to believe that Nazism was 
some radical alternative to capitalism.
By the Second World War the leading Nazis were thoroughly 
integrated into the social structure and its elite. This posed a problem 
for the Western Allies. Cutting away much of the summit of society 
in their sector might release radical forces from below and weaken 
authority. In East Germany the Russians had no such qualms and 
took a different approach. They would expunge Nazism, not in 
order to hand control to ordinary Germans, but to Moscow.
Despite their different approaches, the Allied military authorities 
in both sectors were therefore hostile to the spontaneous mass 
movement of anti-fascist committees (Antifas) that emerged as the 
Third Reich disintegrated. These committees represented the long 
repressed people’s war against fascism. One of their first aims was 
to forestall Hitler’s ‘Nero Order’, the suicidal self-destruction of 
Germany’s infrastructure. In Leipzig Antifa leaflets urged soldiers 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   132 04/05/2012   09:47
germany 133
to desert, while in Stuttgart pro-war officers were challenged. 
Such actions were still dangerous. In Dachau the SS repulsed 
the committee when it stormed the Town Hall. The same thing 
happened in an assault on Dusseldorf’s police HQ. But in places 
such as Mulheim and Solingen Antifas were in control when Allied 
soldiers arrived, so they marched in unopposed.48 
The scale of the movement was impressive, with over 120 
committees established nationwide. The Leipzig Antifa claimed 
150,000 adherents.49 Many of these organisations broke through 
entrenched social barriers to include foreign slave labourers and 
establish working class unity across political parties and trade 
unions. Their functions ranged from creating local democracy, to 
restoring basic services like food supply.50 An official US report 
shows the Allies had a clear understanding of what the Antifas 
stood for:
Denunciation of Nazis, efforts to prevent an illegal Nazi 
underground movement, denazification of civil authorities and 
private industry, improvement of housing and food supply 
provision – these are the central questions which preoccupy the 
newly created organizations … .’51
The fact that so many committees adopted similar names and 
policies poses the question of whether there was a centralised 
organisation at work.52 
Communists were prominent in nearly every Antifa53 despite the 
opposition of Moscow.54 Walter Ulbricht, the KPD leader, criticised 
the ‘spontaneous creation of KPD bureaus, people’s committees, 
and Free Germany committees’,55 but he could do little as the KPD 
central apparatus had no communication link with the rank and 
file.56 Once communications were restored he could report: ‘We have 
shut these [Antifas] down and told the comrades that all activities 
must be channelled through the state apparatus.’57
The Western Allies were equally disconcerted by the Antifas self-
proclaimed ‘ruthless struggle against all remnants of Hitler’s party 
in the state apparatus, the local authorities and public life’.58 The US 
authorities expelled the Leipzig committee from its offices, ordered 
the removal of all leaflets and posters from the streets, and then 
banned it. Any further use of the name ‘Free Germany National 
Committee’ would be punished severely.59 The military government 
stopped Solingen’s workplace councils purging Nazi activists and 
then abolished them.60 Brunswick’s Nazis had been arrested by the 
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Antifa, but were liberated by Allied command.61 When Frankfurt 
Antifa housed people made homeless by bombing in apartments 
abandoned by fleeing Nazis, the authorities evicted them.62 A GI 
described his experience of the parallel wars in Germany:
The crime of it all is that we would take a little town, arrest the 
mayor and the other big shots, and put the anti-fascist in charge 
of the town. We’d double back to that town three days later, the 
Americans had freed all the officials and put ‘em back in power. 
And they threw this other guy aside. Invariably it happened.63
It is important to realise that the Allied Military Government did 
not oppose the Antifas out of tenderness towards Nazism. But 
there was a greater enemy, as this German industrialist explained: 
‘Frankly, we are expecting a revolution … Not without reason has 
the Military Government imposed curfews and banned assemblies. 
It has prevented a growing threat coming from that direction’.64 
Hitler’s supporters were to be punished as rival imperialists, rather 
than for their role in German society. There could be no people’s 
war against Nazism in conquered Germany.
So denazification would be on imperialist terms, and not shaped 
by the people. In Soviet-controlled East Germany half a million 
cases (or 3 per cent of the population) were investigated.65 Moscow 
was keen to replace the former German establishment with its 
own placemen, and therefore the process was thorough. During 
the 1945–65 period over 16,000 people were tried, almost 13,000 
found guilty, and 118 sentenced to death.66 
In the Western zone there were also mass arrests, with 100,000 
Nazis interned in the US sector alone.67 However, when the Cold 
War began, Britain, France and the USA focused on the new enemy 
and forgave the old one. Suddenly the brakes were applied to 
denazification. That meant:
almost every case of even major offenders [was] downgraded to 
the category of followership, which in turn, rendered the offender 
eligible for amnesty. This meant that even a majority of those 
who had belonged to groups defined as criminal organizations 
(SS, Gestapo, and others) by the Nuernberg Tribunal were 
exonerated … .68
The impact of this at local level was illustrated when Sinti 
witnesses (Gypsies known by their German name of ‘Zigeuner’) 
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described the crimes of a brutal Nazi guard called Himmelheber 
to a German court. Despite hundreds of thousands of Sinti and 
Roma perishing during the Holocaust, Himmelheber was acquitted 
on appeal because it was ‘commonly known that accounts of 
“Zigeuner” are not reliable’. Racist attitudes continued and in 1951 
a senior policemen still described Sinti and Roma as ‘genetically 
criminals and anti-social persons’.69
In the British zone 90 per cent of Nazi internees were cleared.70 
In West Germany, with a population three times that of the East, 
just 12,500 were tried, 5,000 convicted and 9 faced death.71 Such 
leniency contrasted with Nazi military courts which had executed 
26,000; but no judge or prosecutor from that time was even tried.72 
As one historian has put it:
The tribunals soon came to be likened to laundries: one entered 
wearing a brown shirt and left with a clean starched white shirt 
instead. Denazification had finally become, not the cleansing of 
Germany’s economy, administration and society of Nazis, but 
rather the cleansing and rehabilitation of individuals.73
Conforming to the political needs of the imperialist powers, the 
‘small fry’ were punished while the chief culprits, who belonged 
to the capitalist establishment, escaped.74 Thus in West Germany 
giant businesses such as IG Farben (producers of the gas used at 
Auschwitz) and the big banks emerged virtually unscathed from 
decartelisation proceedings, which were scaled down in 1947.75 
Before and during the Second World War ordinary Germans 
suffered the vicious repression of Nazism. Then the Allies imposed 
collective punishment in the form of area bombing and condoning 
of mass rape. When the opportunity finally came to distinguish 
between those who had been part of the Third Reich, and those 
who had been its victims, the Allies showed no interest. Gestapo 
repression had given little space for the development of people’s 
war. As a consequence, when 1945 saw a welcome end to the 
abomination of Nazism, on both sides of a divided Germany the 
popular resistance that finally emerged in the form of an Antifa 
movement stood little chance against the combined weight of the 
Allied conquerors. 
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austria – resistance and ruling-class 
capitulation
Even before Spain, Austria witnessed the first skirmishes of the 
people’s war when in 1934 the working class in Vienna rebelled 
against fascist dictatorship. The background to this event was the 
collapse of the Austrian Empire after the First World War and the 
Wall Street crash. The ruling class was bitterly divided over how to 
cope. One wing favoured Anschluss – caving into Hitler’s demands 
for a merger. Another believed independence could still be viable 
if it leaned on Mussolini’s Italy as a counter-weight to German 
influence.1 The latter faction, the Austrofascists, adopted Italian 
methods, suspended Parliament and outlawed strikes. 
So sharp was the conflict between the two wings that pro-Nazis 
murdered the Austrofascist Chancellor, Dolfuss, and attempted to 
seize power. Though they failed, Dolfuss’ successor, Schuschnigg, 
was in a precarious position. Despite their differences, however, 
both sides agreed that the weakness of Austrian capitalism required 
an intensified exploitation of labour through dictatorship. 
Resistance began on 12 February 1934, when Vienna’s workers 
took to the barricades. Their slogan was: ‘Strike fascism down, 
before it crushes you …Workers, arm yourselves.’2 Four days of 
fighting followed during which the army bombed council housing 
estates and eventually quelled the opposition. A participant drew 
up the balance sheet: ‘Despite its defeat, the February struggle had 
great historical significance well beyond the borders of Austria. The 
German working class had capitulated to Hitler without a struggle. 
Now, for the first time, workers were mounting resistance to fascism 
weapons in hand. They lit a beacon!’3
And in spite of the repression it burned on. For example, 
the August–September 1937 edition of the illegal union paper 
Gewerkschaft (Union) reported strikes at Austro-Fiat, a wagon 
works, a steel plant, glass factory, textile mill and 12 other 
establishments.4
Austrofascism was fatally undermined when Italy joined the 
Rome–Berlin Axis and gave Hitler carte blanche to take over. In 
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1938 Hitler made his move. He summoned Schuschnigg to his 
mountain retreat in Berchtesgaden and demanded annexation. 
The stakes were high. As a conservative historian has suggested, 
even ‘24 hours of resistance, the launching of a general strike, and 
spontaneous mass demonstrations could have generated a common 
defensive struggle …’.5 Workers’ representatives were calling for 
exactly that. Ten days before the Anschluss they took a considerable 
risk and emerged from the underground to beg Schuschnigg to 
mobilise popular resistance to Nazism.6 All they asked was that 
left-wing political prisoners be freed and anti-union laws lifted. 
Schuschnigg, however, recalled a fateful point Hitler made at their 
meeting in Berchtesgaden. Referring to the Spanish revolution, 
the Führer asked him: ‘Do you want to make another Spain of 
Austria?’7 Schuschnigg did not, and refused to co-operate with the 
workers’ leaders, saying this would be equivalent to ‘conspiring with 
Bolsheviks’.8 This left his regime isolated and unable to defend itself.
On 12 March 1938 Hitler’s forces flooded across the border. One 
left activist saw workers with ‘weapons in hand’ ready to fight ‘to 
the death’ for Austrian independence. They were met by police who 
taunted them: ‘Why are you still demonstrating? Schuschnigg has 
already abdicated.’9 This finally destroyed any hope of a united 
resistance. The depth of capitulation was illustrated by the fact that 
unlike every other country occupied by Germany, Austria had no 
government in exile.10 Even Karl Renner, the Socialist Party leader, 
advocated a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum Hitler held on annexation, 
to the disgust of many of his comrades. 
A ‘people’s war’ against Nazism developed nonetheless, though 
it was conducted by a small minority for the benefit of the masses, 
rather than by the people themselves. Following Renner’s treachery 
the once solid and influential Socialist Party split.11 The breakaway 
Revolutionary Socialists grouped around the veteran Otto Bauer 
attracted some members, but most went to the Austrian Communist 
Party (KPÖ). Indeed six out of seven communist resisters were 
former socialists and they constituted 75 per cent of those tried 
for political opposition.12 As one historian puts it: ‘on the basis 
of a large sample of active members of all types of underground 
resistance groups … almost every Austrian actively resisting the 
Nazis was affiliated to the KPÖ.’13 What was left of the remaining 
opposition was generally Catholic orientated.14 Indeed, the only 
large demonstration against Nazism after Anschluss was in October 
1938 under the slogan ‘Our Führer is Christ’ (rather than Hitler).15 
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In spite of great heroism, Austrian resistance remained splintered 
and weak. An example of this was the O5 organisation which 
made contact with the Allies towards the end of the war. Like 
the conservative opposition in Germany, its track record was not 
promising. There were many Austrofascists and monarchists in 
its ranks who outmanoeuvred those members who were on the 
left. Only partisans in Carinthia Province (who consisted mainly of 
Slovenians aided by Tito’s forces in Yugoslavia), and the working 
class resistance, gave the Nazis any real problems.
The opponents of Nazism had to deal with the additional 
handicap of Allied policy. In 1943 the Foreign Ministers of the 
USA, Russia and Britain issued this joint declaration: ‘Austria was 
the first free land to fall victim to Hitler’s aggression.’16 Perhaps they 
hoped to encourage an Austrian breakaway from Germany, but their 
position had dire long-term consequences. As one commentator has 
put it: ‘You gave us a historical out, and we grabbed it.’17 Granting 
all Austrians victim status meant, when the war ended, that former 
Austrofascists or Nazis were accorded equal status to anti-fascist 
resisters, in a situation where the former greatly outnumbered the 
latter. Post-war denazification investigators calculated that there 
were 100,000 Nazi members in Austria before the Anschluss, and 
700,000 by 1945.18 Over the same period 5,000 Austrian resistance 
fighters had been killed and 100,000 arrested.19
Even before 1949, when ex-Nazi Party members were permitted to 
vote and became an important electoral factor, prominent politicians 
were using the Allies’ ‘victim theory’ to whitewash fascist crimes. 
In 1945 the country’s Foreign Minister exonerated local Nazis by 
insisting: ‘The persecution [of Jews] was ordered by the German 
Reich authorities and carried out by them.’20 Renner, now elevated 
to Chancellor by the Russians, described Austrian anti-semitism as 
‘never very aggressive’.21 Those who, in 1938, had been forced to 
clean Vienna’s pavements with toothbrushes under a hail of abuse 
from passers-by might have disagreed; but the 70,000 Austrian 
Jews who perished in gas chambers could not object. With such 
politicians in charge, it was small wonder that in 1946 an opinion 
poll recorded 46 per cent of Austrians opposed to the return of the 
tiny remnant of the Jewish population that had survived.22 There 
was a certain cold logic to this. Many pro-Nazi Austrians had 
profited from ‘Aryanisation’ of Jewish homes and property.
The disbanding of the Wehrmacht saw many thousands of Hitler’s 
soldiers being welcomed home to Austria as tragic victims, while 
resisters received little recognition, and often found it extremely 
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difficult even to return. An oral history of Austrian resisters records 
numerous examples of the US, for example, delaying travel home 
(because they were so frequently communists).23 Once back they had 
pariah status. A telling example of this was during the dedication 
of a ‘monument to the fallen’, an event addressed by the highest 
officer in the Army. He refused to allow the memory of resistance 
fighters to be associated with the ceremony, because ‘such people 
died as oath breakers and do not belong at this monument’.24
Denazification was less than thorough in Austria. In the amnesty of 
1948 90 per cent of those under investigation escaped punishment.25 
Post-war Austria never underwent the re-education process that 
occurred in Germany, and the outcome has been shocking. In 1983 a 
man implicated in the killing of some 10,000 civilians in the Ukraine 
was only blocked from becoming President of the Parliament by 
a petition campaign. Worse still, Kurt Waldheim, known to have 
been charged of war crimes by the Yugoslavs, and on the US list of 
suspected war criminals, was elected President in 1986.26
Testimonies by two Austrian resisters show how anti-fascists 
viewed the ‘victory’ of the Second World War. The first is from Josef 
Hindels, a prominent trade union leader who found exile in Sweden:
Despite the great, great joy I felt at the defeat of Hitler and 
liberation, I had many grounds to be depressed … I had hoped 
to return home immediately. But right through 1945 I failed, 
despite great efforts to get the necessary permission to return 
the Austria. It was only in 1946, and even then required the 
strenuous intervention of Kreisky [a future Chancellor] to obtain 
permission for me. That was the first disappointment. The second 
was that a provisional government was created in Austria with 
Karl Renner at its head. I had considered that utterly impossible 
… To me Renner was the man who, in 1938, had welcomed the 
annexation of Austria by Hitler’s Germany. Ever since then I had 
considered him to be politically dead.27
The second comes from Bruno Furch who was released from a 
concentration camp in 1945:
A damned, truly vile game began to be played by the two main 
parties in Austria [the Socialist and People’s Parties]. I say it 
quite bluntly. They used the legacy of Nazi rule and fascism 
in their heads and their hearts for the purposes of fighting the 
Cold War in the West. The game was to use the fundamental 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   139 04/05/2012   09:47
140 a PeoPle’S hISTory of The Second World War
legacy of anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism for their own 
anti-Communist ends, by keeping it alive, if not in power. It was 
not merely to court the votes of 600,000 Nazi Party members – 
because that only happened in 1949 during the next election. No, 
it had already begun in 1945. So it was not only about votes but 
about harnessing this force from the very beginning. 
In one of the housing estates we had a young Jewish comrade 
who in 1946 returned from exile in England to his home. But 
he committed suicide. What happened was he had fallen in love 
with the daughter of a high up socialist official... Her parents 
were against the relationship and against any marriage because he 
was Jewish. The young man simply could not cope with the idea 
that after the victory over Hitler, that anti-Semitism of this sort 
could still exist in the higher ranks of the re-born Socialist Party.28
It is difficult to imagine a wider gulf between the goals of imperialism 
and of anti-fascism. The readiness of the Allies to collaborate with 
both the pre-Anschluss Austrofascists, and former Nazis in the Cold 
War era, would poison post-war Austrian politics for decades.
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Italy – The Working class and the  
Two Wars
A feature distinguishing people’s war from conventional war was the 
way it combined social aspirations for equality and emancipation 
with political goals, such as national independence and democracy. 
These former aspects were marked in Italy where overt working 
class struggle was more prominent than elsewhere.1 One reason was 
that fascism originated here, so rather than resistance developing in 
sharp reaction to foreign invasion, it matured over decades under 
a hated social system that was closely associated with capitalism 
from its inception in 1922.2 Business and finance supplied 74 per 
cent of fascist party funding3 and in return Mussolini smashed the 
unions, and imposed draconian wage cuts in 1927, 1930 and 1934.4 
His regime was less repressive than Hitler’s, but it still condemned 
17,000 political opponents to internal exile, 60,000 to special 
surveillance and control, and imposed 28,000 years of penal 
servitude between 1926 and 1943.5 Workers made up 85 per cent 
of those convicted.6 The Socialist leader Matteotti was murdered, 
while Gramsci, the founder of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), 
languished in jail, only being released to die. It has been argued 
that an ‘indefatigable subversiveness’ survived within popular 
culture, but before the Second World War this did not translate 
into active resistance.7 
The war changed everything. Italy’s entry was not smooth. Spriano 
tells us that Mussolini’s doubts about the ability of his country to 
withstand a major conflict were pushed aside by the establishment. 
After witnessing the success of Blitzkrieg it was anxious to ‘arrive in 
time to seize an easy and crushing victory’.8 War brought the ruling 
class tangible benefits. By 1942 engineers hours had risen to 60 per 
week9 and Fiat’s share price had soared by 62 per cent. Its director 
revelled in ‘the formidable Japanese conquests in the Pacific and 
the absorption of the rich territories of Russia into the European 
Axis economy’, as they promised ‘expanded production and vaster 
markets’.10 Italy’s rapacious plans were ultimately frustrated by the 
Allies, as was the case with Germany and Japan. However, it took 
141
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   141 04/05/2012   09:47
142 a PeoPle’S hISTory of The Second World War
till 1945 and required overwhelming force to obliterate the latter. 
Mussolini’s rule crumbled two years earlier. Why was it so fragile? 
It was partly due to Italy’s GNP which was a third of Germany’s. 
This made the army more vulnerable to defeat in an inter-imperialist 
conflict. Even more significant was the fact that the regime was 
destroyed from within by people’s war. Between 1938 and 1945 
the cost of living increased 20 times over. With grossly inadequate 
rationing on the one side, and astronomical black market prices11 on 
the other, it was no surprise that many of Turin’s 150,000 thousand 
strong labour force lost 10 to15 kilograms in weight.12 Gradually 
the gulf between the repression-hardened minority of politically-
motivated resisters and the masses began narrowing.13 
This became clear when strikes swept across the northern 
industrial belt in the spring of 1943. Their epicentre was Turin 
where flourishing war production in vast factories generated a 
sense of collective power. At the same time Allied bombing had 
flattened 25,000 homes but the state provided no air-raid shelters.14 
Confidence combined with desperation to generate strike action 
even though this was a perilous step to take under fascism, especially 
during wartime.15 A leaflet of January 1943 illustrates the mood:
For food and liberty!
Down with the 12-hour day and the damned war!
We demand that Mussolini be chased from power!
We are struggling for peace and our country’s independence!
For a pay rise that is actually paid out!
Action, strike, struggle – these are the only weapons we have to 
save ourselves
Strike, strike, strike!16 
Such appeals fell on fertile ground. During winter 1942/3 
stoppages increased from two to five per month.17 Then, on 5 
March, 21,000 workers at Fiat Mirafiori responded to the call of the 
80-strong communist cell and struck, despite the signal for action 
– the factory siren – being silenced by management.18 Walkouts 
spread through Turin and beyond. By 15 March the movement 
encompassed 100,000 women and men19 and at the end of the 
month every factory in Piedmont had shut.20
Mussolini was shocked that ‘the population was so hostile and 
averse to fascism’ and offered major concessions.21 He realised 
that: ‘This decidedly nasty and extremely deplorable episode has 
suddenly thrown us back 20 years.’22 Hitler, who just a month before 
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had lost the key battle of Stalingrad, understood the implications 
too. He found it ‘unthinkable that so many people can strike, and 
no-one dares intervene … I am convinced that in the circumstances 
anyone who shows the minimum weakness is doomed.’23 His words 
were prophetic. 
The Turin strike was the first successful mass walkout in two 
decades, and arguably the most important of the global war. 
The shock it administered fascism was supplemented by an 
Anglo-American landing in Sicily (on 10 July 1943). Then the 
establishment panicked. It had wallowed in the benefits of fascism 
for 20 years, but now that association was a liability provoking 
revolution and/or the wrath of the advancing Allies. To gain some 
room for manoeuvre Italy’s government asked the Germans to 
accept its withdrawal from war in return for ceding its Balkan 
conquests, but they refused.24 Grasping for another way out the 
government decided to publicly ditch Mussolini and secretly 
conclude an armistice with the Allies. The Fascist Grand Council 
itself voted 19 to 7 to depose and arrest the Duce. 
The ruling class hoped the change would be no more than 
cosmetic. Pirelli, the industrial magnate, began discussions with 
the Allies25 on the basis that ‘the monarchy, the crown, the church, 
the army and the leaders of the economy’ would remain at the 
helm.26 There was a slight presentational difficulty. It was this 
very monarch King Vittorio Emanuele III who made Mussolini 
dictator in 1922. The Duce had touted the myth that he came to 
power in a daring seizure of power during which 3,000 martyrs 
had died – the March on Rome.27 But the claim was fake. As one 
writer put it: ‘Only when all was over did there begin the spectacle 
which has been called the March on Rome.’28 Some advisors had 
begged the King to invoke state power to counter Mussolini’s antics 
but he openly boasted about his refusal: ‘I desire that all Italians 
know that I signed no decree for a state of siege.’29 This decision 
paid off. With Mussolini as his PM, Vittorio Emanuele would add 
Emperor of Ethiopia and King of Albania to his list of titles. So now, 
even after Mussolini was formally deposed, the King insisted that 
‘fascism cannot be dismantled in one go. It needs to be gradually 
modified in order to remove those aspects which are shown to be 
harmful to the country’.30 His new PM was Marshal Badoglio. His 
anti-fascist credentials were no better. He too had energetically 
supported Mussolini and earned promotion and the title of Duke 
of Addis Ababa in the process. 
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If the Second World War had been an unambiguous battle against 
fascism, then this supposed metamorphosis of the Italian government 
would have been recognised for the fraud it was. However, the 
Allied powers embraced the King and Badoglio with open arms. 
They had no qualms because, as one writer puts it, ‘there was no 
ideological prejudice against personalities of the Fascist regime’.31 
The Anglo-Americans shared the Italian establishment’s fear of 
revolution and willingly forgave past misdemeanours, just so long 
as Italy quit the rival imperialist coalition. Indeed, the US had made 
overtures to the King before and after Italy’s entry into the Second 
World War.32 Churchill’s admiration of the Duce dated from 1927 
and was undimmed when, in 1943, he contemptuously dismissed 
‘the usual arguments against having anything to do with those 
who had worked with or helped Mussolini’.33 The King had other 
surprising friends. When the US expressed doubts about his ability 
to keep control, Russia granted him full diplomatic recognition. It 
was the first Allied power to do so.34
Demonstrators who ecstatically welcomed the Duce’s downfall 
on 25 July 1943 were unaware of these sordid games. Tearing down 
the symbols of dictatorship they celebrated the end of fascism and 
war. Their joy was premature. The government ordered newspapers 
to ‘avoid criticising the men and events of the previous regime [or] 
the war. Exercise maximum care towards our German ally. Do not 
call for the freeing of political prisoners … .’35 Badoglio, as military 
governor of Italy, declared: ‘it is necessary to act with maximum 
energy to prevent the current excitement degenerating into a 
Communist or subversive movement.’36 Using language reminiscent 
of Athens, the army and police were instructed to confront the 
jubilant crowds ‘in combat formation, opening fire from a distance, 
but also using mortars and artillery as though proceeding against 
enemy troops’.37 In Reggio Emilia, 11 were machine-gunned at a 
demonstration for peace and the expulsion of the Wehrmacht. In 
Bari there were 19 victims.38 Italy’s ruling class was still equivocating 
over which imperialist camp would best suit its purposes, but it had 
no doubt who the real enemy was.
In March 1943 Hitler had berated the Italian government for 
weakness. Five months later Churchill applauded the murderous 
actions of a supposedly post-fascist regime:
In Turin and Milan there were Communist demonstrations which 
had to be put down by armed force. Twenty years of Fascism has 
obliterated the middle class. There is nothing between the King, 
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with the Patriots who have rallied round him, who have complete 
control, and rampant Bolshevism.39 
The Allied media could not help noticing the hypocrisy of such 
talk. The BBC scorned the Italian government’s ‘failure’ to remove 
fascism40 and America’s Life magazine warned that:
The clear tendency within the fascist regime is to free itself from 
Mussolini and the Germanophiles, but to preserve the system. 
This is the idea of the big industrialists today … In other words, 
a change from pro-German fascism to pro-Ally fascism. The 
fascist hierarchy are very impressed by the successful volte face 
of Darlan … .41
Government repression was met with strikes demanding peace, 
pay rises, the removal of fascists, and release of political prisoners.42 
Some soldiers mutinied and refused to shoot. Nazi Germany watched 
the unfolding situation with alarm, and the eight Wehrmacht 
divisions stationed in the North got ready to take charge. The PCI 
understood the danger and in August 1943 called on Italians to: 
‘Prepare to repel any German intervention with force [and] organise 
the armed collaboration of the people and army … .’43 This ran 
directly counter to the government’s aim of salvaging what remained 
of fascism.44 
Badoglio could only have repulsed the German threat by rousing 
the populace, but instead treated them ‘as though proceeding against 
enemy troops’. Denying a people’s war meant Badoglio could only 
tack ineffectually between the imperialist blocs, hoping one would 
cancel out the other. Even as he concluded a secret peace treaty 
with the Anglo-Americans advancing from the South he sought 
continued German backing in the North, telling Ribbentrop: ‘If 
this government collapses, it will be replaced by one of Bolshevik 
hue.’ The Nazi foreign minister also feared that ‘power would go 
to those with left radical ideas’.45
Without a peace deal, and caught in a pincer movement between 
imperialist armies, the suffering of the Italian people continued. 
Allied bombs rained down on them, with 220,000 Milanese losing 
their homes in just five days during August 1943. Meanwhile, 
the Germans were left free to entrench their positions.46 The 
government’s double-dealing eventually ran out of time. On 8 
September General Eisenhower, weary of Badoglio’s procrastina-
tion, broadcast news of the armistice the Italian government had 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   145 04/05/2012   09:47
146 a PeoPle’S hISTory of The Second World War
negotiated with the Allies.47 Amazingly, even now Badoglio still 
tried to sit on the fence. ‘We will fight whoever attacks us’, he said, 
without specifying who that might be.48 Another military order 
was clearer: ‘In no case are you to take the initiative in hostilities 
against German troops.’49
Such hesitancy left Italy’s armed forces totally unprepared for 
the Nazi backlash. The German army attacked, while the King, 
Badoglio, and all three armed services ministers fled south to safety 
in the arms of the Allies. Left with no instructions except not to 
fight50 the Italian army of one million was eliminated overnight: 
615,000 soldiers were deported to concentration camps and 30,000 
died.51 Although the King had finally thrown his lot in with the 
Allies, his prior actions symbolised the treachery of an entire 
governing class, and sealed the post-war fate of the monarchy.52
Northern Italy was now subject to the full force of German 
wartime economic policy which consisted of shifting ‘responsibility 
for funding the Nazi war machine to the citizens of conquered 
lands’.53 From Italy the Nazis extracted 84 billion lira, out of an 
annual national income of 130 billion lira.54 They used Mussolini 
as an alibi in this enterprise. He was freed in a daring commando 
raid and installed as head of a puppet regime – the Republic of Salò. 
Henceforth resisters applied a single term to the enemy: Nazi-Fascist. 
After looting the country, the Nazis required: a) its factory 
production; b) no distractions from the fight against Allied advance 
in the South; c) manpower for the German war machine. The 
resistance of the northern workers and peasants deprived them of 
all three. 
The difference between this people’s war and imperialist war was 
eloquently described by Ginzburg of the Action Party, a radical 
republic grouping:
The formal declaration of hostilities against Germany by the King 
and Badoglio was a meaningless gesture which did nothing to 
change the real situation of the time.
The real war against Nazi Germany was declared on 9 
September, after the soldiers were officially ordered to abandon 
their guns. The Italian people seized hold of them and boldly 
confronted the armour of the German tanks. Thousands of 
soldiers and civilians headed into the mountains rather than 
serve the Germans, and equipped themselves for guerrilla struggle 
following the heroic example of the Russian and Balkan partisans 
… The Italian war against Nazi Germany was the war of a people 
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who aspired to full political and social liberty … This war was 
not declared in an exchange of diplomatic notes but written in the 
blood of heroes who sacrificed themselves each day, who had an 
impact on the future, who weighed in the balance of history … .55
A female partisan witnessed the birth of people’s war in Turin. 
At the very moment that the King and Badoglio were scuttling for 
cover, ‘the youth launched an assault on the barracks … and we held 
a grand demonstration in front of the Chamber of Labour where the 
workers demanded arms and waved placards saying “Turn Turin 
into Stalingrad” … This was the real army of the working class on 
the move.’56
Fighting both Salò and the Wehrmacht gave mass struggle a dual 
character. It was a battle for national liberation, and ‘a true civil 
war’57 for ‘class emancipation’.58 Italian conditions favoured such 
a development. In France the Nazis had collapsed so suddenly at 
the end that there was no need for the resistance to consolidate its 
hold before the Allies arrived. By contrast, it took Anglo-American 
forces from September 1943 to April 1945 to reach Italy’s northern 
frontier. As one British diplomat wrote ruefully: ‘The pace of Allied 
advance has undoubtedly contributed to the birth of an independent 
government in the North.’59
Italy’s people’s war, which fused workers’ action in industry with 
armed operations, was far more audacious than anything witnessed 
in Germany or Austria. Valiani, of the Action Party, explains why:
If the movement took the Germans by surprise they gave in and 
made concessions … But if the movement did not spread and 
remained isolated in a single city the Gestapo could focus its 
attack, raiding and deporting people to Germany. This included 
members of the improvised committees with whom they had 
previously negotiated, as well as political suspects. Paradoxically 
the degree of daring, the spreading of strikes to the largest number 
of localities, represented a precautionary approach.60
Milan became the headquarters of the Committee for National 
Liberation (CLN), and emulated Turin by staging a classic strike, this 
time under a German regime. The demand was for a dramatic pay 
rise, doubling of rations, provision of oil and sugar, no to sackings, 
an end to curfew, and exclusion of Nazis from workplaces.61 The 
stoppage began on 10 December 1943 and within days the Lombard 
capital ground to a halt.
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While employers like Pirelli conceded 30 per cent pay rises, others 
proclaimed their willingness to meet demands only if the German 
commander, General Zimmermann, approved.62 He ordered a return 
to work. With the workers unbending the SS began rounding them 
up. So a new demand was added to the list – freedom for those 
arrested! Now General Zimmermann promised vague concessions, 
but the strikers were unimpressed: ‘On to complete victory. Your 
threats do not frighten us. Just give us what we demand and we 
will return to work!’63
Events at the Breda Funk works show the local dimension. After 
the boss assembled the 6,000-strong workforce to report he would 
meet their demands in full, and have those arrested released, he 
asked: ‘Will you return tomorrow?’ The resounding response was 
still ‘No!’ Perplexed the management suggested the workforce 
might like to elect representatives to meet General Zimmermann. 
No-one responded.64 Eventually a delegation did step forward, but 
on condition that it would only talk to the management, not the 
Nazis. This was not honoured. When the delegation arrived at the 
Breda plant the bosses melted away, the Germans appeared, barred 
the exits and attempted to begin negotiations.
Eventually, to try and end the strike city-wide, the Nazis offered 
pay rises of 40–50 per cent, along with improved rations. Still the 
workers held out! Armoured cars toured Milan’s factories, and 
soldiers attempted to compel people to return – to little avail.65 The 
strike ended after a week, but those involved made it plain they did 
this because they chose to, not because of Nazi pressure.
Workplace resistance was but one form of the people’s war. 
Communist-led Patriotic Action Groups (GAP) and Patriotic Action 
Squads (SAP) operated in the urban setting.66 In the countryside there 
were partisan squads. These were headed by seasoned anti-fascists 
(many of them veterans of the Spanish Civil War), or occasionally 
soldiers who had reached the mountains under arms before the 
Germans could capture them.67 As with the French maquis, mass 
recruitment was stimulated by Nazi-Fascist round-ups and the death 
penalty for draft dodgers. One young man’s diary described the 
dilemma facing many: ‘What am I to do? Present myself? Never! 
… So here I am, 22, on the run and wondering – will I be shot? 
Or should I take refuge in the woods?’ Despite his mother being 
taken hostage he chose a life of ‘seizing arms, munitions, anything 
that serves the struggle … .’68 In Pavia alone 50 per cent of those 
summoned failed to appear.69
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The effectiveness of the partisans is attested to by numerous 
sources. The Allied commander, General Alexander, estimated that 
six of the Wehrmacht’s 25 divisions were diverted to dealing with 
them.70 From the opposing side, Kesselring, Germany’s plenipoten-
tiary for Italy, complained that once ‘unlimited guerrilla warfare’ 
commenced in June 1944 the 200,000 to 300,00071 partisans 
‘constituted a real menace to Germany’s armed forces and played 
a vital role in the campaign. Eliminating this threat was of decisive 
importance to us.’ He judged that ‘the battle against the regular 
enemy forces and against the partisan bands had equal importance 
[so] the very best troops had to be used ...’.72 The guerrillas’ claimed 
5,449 surprise actions, 218 pitched battles, 458 locomotives 
destroyed, 356 bridges blown up and 5,573 operations to sabotage 
power lines and communications, as well as tens of thousands of 
enemy soldiers killed.73
The guerrilla method of the people’s war was quite different 
from imperialist combat. When Giovanni Pesce, a partisan, went to 
collect weapons from the royal army, an officer demanded to know 
his grade. Pesce was scandalised: ‘Neither the utter collapse of 8 
September, nor the partisan insurrection, had shaken this man’s rigid 
view that there must be a fixed and immutable hierarchy.’ Another 
partisan resented the ‘social disparity between officers and troops’ 
that he found and contrasted that with ‘our formations that are 
based on absolute democracy’. Guerrillas found ‘the institution of 
the officers’ mess incomprehensible. An officer in the Garibaldini 
[the communist-led grouping] shares bread, board and heating 
with the other soldiers.’74 Incomprehension was mutual. General 
Cadorna, sent north to command the partisans in the name of the 
King, was shocked by their political engagement and the ‘election 
of officers by consensus of the base’ that occurred in some units.75
Money was another bone of contention. To the GAP leader, 
Cichetti, the very idea of receiving a salary was offensive: ‘I detested 
the idea of being paid to be a partisan. I had not seen a lira for six 
months, but had always been able to make do, without turning 
to the laws of the market to survive.’76 Higher pay for partisan 
commanders was usually rejected because ‘we are in a people’s war 
which is fought by volunteers motivated by high patriotic spirit’.77
Unlike professional or conscript armies, where political debate 
is frowned upon, the partisans were simultaneously a prototype 
alternative state and militia. In August 1944 a typical agreement 
between various partisan groups declared:
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Far from being a miniature replica of the old military structure, 
the partisan army is the symbol of an independent movement 
that owes its being to the will of the people, which is in itself 
an unequivocal political affirmation. The war against the 
Nazi-Fascists is only the preliminary step on the road towards 
our ultimate objective; the radical reconstruction of the political, 
moral and social life of our country… we are fighting for 
democracy, freedom in the fullest sense of the word, justice, and 
the dignity and respect that are due to man.78
These principles could be put into practice when Axis forces were 
expelled from entire districts. Fifteen partisan republics appeared,79 
in places like Carnia (150,000 inhabitants), Montefiorino (50,000) 
and Ossola (70,000).80 Their administrations were quite unlike those 
of Salò, or Badoglio’s for that matter.81 In Varzi, for example, mass 
assemblies elected a local government purged of fascists using 
direct democracy. Observers saw ‘people of every race … coming 
and going on the steps of the town hall. There were peasants who 
wanted permits, who came to collect their share of requisitioned 
goods, or to protest against an abuse – bourgeois, partisans working 
class women, many new faces.’82 Requisitions were paid for in kind, 
or with partisan ‘money’, that could be redeemed after the country 
was liberated.83 
This financial arrangement also operated in the Republic of the 
Val d’Ossola84 where crime was eliminated, a ‘Popular University’ 
frequented by all classes was established, Italy’s first female Minister 
appointed, and trade unions restored.85 It has been claimed that this 
area ‘was the only substantial part of Hitler’s occupied Europe to 
achieve independence, and obtain recognition from Switzerland’.86 
The partisans expected the republic to receive substantial outside aid 
because its ‘capital’, Domodossola, was close to Milan and would 
be a useful launching pad for any Anglo-American offensive there. 
But the Allied representative on hand was dismissive: ‘You must not 
pretend to be in charge of military operations, like Alexander and 
Eisenhower … .’87 Another explained that the republic’s continued 
existence made it ‘not only a rival to the Italian government in Rome, 
but also a rival to the Italian Army …’.88 A partisan leader lamented 
that ‘the indifference shown by the Allies in regard to the efforts at 
Domodossola, provoked a wave of bitterness’.89 Without assistance 
the republic was finally crushed in six days of savage fighting.
Further evidence of tension between the parallel wars emerged in 
debate over attentism. Opponents stood for an immediate people’s 
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war of liberation, supporters wanted to wait for salvation by 
imperialist armies. Battaglia has paraphrased the arguments. The 
attentists said: ‘It is useless for us to attack the Germans; there 
aren’t enough of us to do any good, and what’s more, any attempt 
we make will simply provoke reprisals: apart from ourselves, the 
civil population will suffer, and suffer hideously.’
He then lays out the flaws in this logic: ‘How could the Resistance 
increase in strength or extend its scope if it remained completely 
passive, completely static? Furthermore, what the Attentistes had 
signally failed to recognize was that, for local, national, sentimental 
and strictly common-sense reasons, it had become absolutely 
necessary to fight the Germans.’90
A factor impelling independent action was that the Allies denied 
Italy all rights because it had been an Axis power. Thus Churchill’s 
Foreign Minister was outraged when the Italians replaced Marshal 
Badoglio: ‘A nation which has unconditionally surrendered has 
no right to present the Allies with a Government chosen by 
themselves.’91 Britain was simply not there to free Italy, as Radio 
London admitted: ‘The liberation of the peninsula is not, and 
cannot be, the ultimate aim of the Allies. It is just a means of 
defeating Germany … .’92 
This attitude led some commentators to quip that Italy was now 
under two occupations. In the South were the Allies supported 
by a fascist King; in the North were the Germans supported by 
Mussolini’s Salò Republic.93 Put like this, attentism amounted to 
either accepting Nazi-Fascism or Allied imperialist domination 
through the AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied 
Territory). 
The only alternative was a liberation struggle. One form this 
took was further mass strikes. In the spring of 1944 half a million 
downed tools in the largest stoppage of the World War. It was 
directed almost as much at convincing the Allies that heavy aerial 
bombing was unnecessary.94
Another related issue was ‘terrorism’. Should partisans target 
individual Nazis behind the lines, even if it provoked the Germans 
to murder hostages or civilians, or wait for the Anglo-Americans? 
A notorious example of the risks involved in terror actions followed 
the killing of 32 SS guards in Rome. In revenge the Nazis executed 
335 Italian hostages at the Ardeatine caves.95 For the attentists this 
horrific collective punishment proved the need to hold back, and 
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some peasants did indeed turn against the partisans for fear their 
actions could attract reprisals.96
The guerrillas were acutely aware of the problem, but had a 
solution. Valiani, whose Action Party was linked to the Justice and 
Liberty partisans, explains that urban terrorism aimed to avoid 
collective punishment and to inspire youth to join the struggle.97 
Whereas Axis troops were under attack at the front, in cities 
‘terrorism was not directly against enemy soldiers, but against the 
machinery of police, repression and reprisal. It was adopted, despite 
the risks, as a method of self-defence.’98 Successful actions showed 
the enemy was not invincible. Pavone offers an illustration: when 
fascist police began an anti-guerrilla operation in one area, the GAP 
killed 17 of them. As a result 100 out of the remaining 150 deserted 
their posts, some even joining the partisans.99 
Demonstrative action was effective as long as it did not substitute 
for, or become an alternative to, mass actions such as strikes. 
Partisans dared not become cut off from the wider population 
on whom they depended for shelter, food, and general support. 
Awareness of these reciprocal relations helped avoid the pitfalls 
of terror operations that might have demobilised the masses and 
left them as passive bystanders. An example of how the link-up 
could work was given by Our Struggle in February 1944. The 
Germans wished to ship labour and machinery from Italy to assist 
its war efforts, but the resistance responded: ‘Not a machine, not 
a worker must go to Germany! To achieve this the actions of the 
mass of workers [will be backed by] armed defence squads (GAP) 
and partisan formations, [and] will systematically interrupt and 
destroy communication links with Germany.’100
Perhaps the most powerful argument was given by a hostage 
of the Nazis: ‘Don’t give up the struggle. Don’t let my situation 
hold you back. If I survive, I survive, but if I must die I will be 
fulfilling my fate. The important thing is that you never give in!’101 
Whatever doubt there might be about using terrorism as a weapon 
in the people’s war arsenal, this pales against the barbarity of 
indiscriminate bombing so beloved of the Allies. 
Regardless of the merits of the debate, attentism suited the Allied 
imperialist cause. On 10 November 1944 General Alexander, 
Commander of Allied Forces in Italy, announced that his forces 
would not advance that winter and that the partisans should 
stand down, cease offensive operations, return to their homes and 
await further orders.102 This declaration had a devastating impact 
on morale. The guerrillas were battling in deteriorating weather 
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conditions against enormous Nazi-fascist armies who now had carte 
blanche to attack. Longo, the most prominent communist in the 
resistance, saw Alexander’s move ‘as an attempt on the part of the 
Allied command to eliminate the Italian liberation movement’.103 In 
the General’s favour it has been argued that the Germans’ Gothic 
Line defences were impregnable and that Allied commanders had 
‘no political considerations in their minds; they thought solely of 
the interests of the partisans’.104 However, Behan finds it strange 
that Alexander’s statement ‘was not broadcast in code, as was 
the norm. Even worse, Resistance leaders were not consulted or 
informed beforehand…’105 
To suggest, in a North Italy infested with German and fascist 
troops, that the partisans cease operations, showed no appreciation 
of the on-going deportations of labour to Germany, the daily acts of 
repression against the population, etc. The guerrillas’ reply was that 
‘the partisan war is not, on the part of the Italian people and the 
patriots who have taken up arms, a mere whim, an idle caprice to be 
refrained from at will. It arose from the vital necessity of defending 
our material, moral and social heritage; this is the supreme cause for 
which we have been fighting and must continue to fight day after 
day … The war must go on.’106 Whether Alexander was motivated 
by the politicians’ distaste for Italian self-liberation or military 
considerations alone,107 this episode is a graphic example of the 
two wars in practice.
Although workers played such a prominent role in Italy, even 
here the people’s war was never a pure class phenomenon. Thus 
the more astute northern employers realised that bitter disputes 
with labour invited Nazi intervention, which could lead to their 
workers (and factories) being shipped to Germany.108 To forestall 
this they made concessions and protected ‘their’ employees.109 Behan 
describes the ‘ducking and weaving’ of Fiat. Even as it produced 
tanks and V2 rocket parts for Germany it maintained links with US 
intelligence services, and provided massive funds to the CLN. The 
resistance leader at Fiat Mirafiori understood how his employers 
‘had no scruples about facing in several directions at the same time 
to safeguard their primary interest: profit’.110 
Similarly, in the interests of national unity, the Italian resistance 
brought together a multitude of parties representing a constellation 
of class forces. Thus the day after the 8 September 1943 armistice 
the five main political parties – Communists, Socialists, Action 
Party, Christian Democrats and Liberals – formed the Comitato di 
Liberazione Nazionale Alta Italia (North Italy National Liberation 
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Committee – CLNAI). Local committees spread quickly. In turn 
a centralised military structure – the CVL (Corpo Volontari della 
Libertà (Volunteers for Liberty Corps) – was set up to oversee 
partisan activity.
The relationship between the summit and the base of this 
people’s war was complex, and the most important and interesting 
interaction took place within the PCI’s sphere of influence. Although 
the statistics differ, it is clear the PCI was the dominant force. 
Spriano suggests that between 80 and 90 per cent of political 
detainees were communist in the early stages.111 When the mass 
anti-fascist movement took off, PCI influence persisted. By October 
1944 perhaps five-eighths of the partisans were in the communist-
controlled Garibaldi Brigades,112 and 60 per cent of partisans who 
died were linked to communist formations.113 Even political rivals 
admitted to communist numerical preponderance, with Valiani of 
the Action Party, the second most important grouping, estimating 
41 per cent of partisans were in the Garibaldini as opposed to 
29 per cent in his Justice and Liberty bands.114 The pre-war PCI 
membership of 6,000 had become 1.8 million by its end.115
Working class politics therefore set the tone even for political or 
ideological rivals. Thus Olivelli, leader of the Catholic Green Flame 
partisans, took it for granted that: 
the age of capitalism that has produced astronomical wealth 
and led to unspeakable misery, is in its death throes. A soulless 
regime encouraged the spread of a poverty that was beyond belief, 
sabotaged the productive efforts of the people, and deliberately 
provoked man’s inhumanity to man; it exalted the cult of might 
and violence, manifested itself in tyranny and oppression, and 
burnt itself out in the flames of war. From the final convulsions 
of this age a new era is being born, the era of the working classes, 
infinitely more just, more fraternal, more Christian.116
The PCI’s working-class base encouraged it to reflect the need of 
the people’s war, but its leadership felt other pressures. Since 1926 
fascist repression had driven this group into exile (in France and 
Russia). It was so cut off from its membership that, according to one 
scholar: ‘In most of the towns and villages none of [the rank and 
file] had any contact with the party apparatus for years… .’117 The 
top leadership, headed by Palmiro Togliatti, was shaped instead by 
Stalinism. Togliatti sought to control and channel the spontaneous 
aspects of struggle into ever more centralised structures – the CLNs, 
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the CLNAI and the CVL. Such a development was partly driven by 
the exigencies of war, which required increasing co-ordination as 
the scale of the fighting grew. It also reflected the PCI leadership’s 
programme. The democratic base and the centralist needs of armed 
struggle were not inherently antagonistic. Each could strengthen 
the other. However, the people’s war did come into conflict with 
centralism, because that was driven by Togliatti’s pursuit of Russian 
foreign policy aims.
The most dramatic expression of this occurred in March 1944 
when Togliatti joined Badoglio’s cabinet. This so-called ‘Salerno 
turn’ was totally unexpected. Two months before, a PCI conference 
in Bari had strongly criticised Badoglio,118 and the PCI newspaper, 
Unità, ridiculed the idea that the southern regime could fight 
Nazism: ‘How could this government that is terrified of the people, 
lead a people’s war.’119 During fascism the PCI had suffered terribly 
from the likes of Badoglio and the King, yet now Togliatti wrote: 
‘The working class must abandon the position of opposition and 
criticism which it occupied in the past … .’120 Not without reason 
has Broué suggested that the Salerno turn represented ‘a Stalinist 
apparatus brought into Italy from outside, struggling to impose itself 
from above upon the real party, the true party … .’121
Togliatti’s policy conformed to the decisions made at the Yalta 
conference of February 1945122 when Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt 
divided Europe into spheres of influence. Since Italy fell into the 
Anglo-American sphere, the resistance must be sacrificed to honour 
a deal giving Russia dominance in Eastern Europe. The Salerno turn 
transformed the PCI’s role in the resistance. Class struggle was now 
to be replaced by ‘national unity’ with the bosses, the monarchy, 
ex-fascists, and anyone not overtly in the Nazi camp. The May 1944 
edition of the PCI’s guerrilla newspaper, Il Combattente, insisted 
that ‘every disagreement about the regime we want in our country, 
every legitimate reform, if it is not urgent, must take second place, 
be set aside, be delayed until after the victory’123 What a contrast to 
its words six months before: ‘The struggle of peasants and workers 
for their immediate demands is sacrosanct, unavoidable [and] must 
be linked to the armed struggle without which both would sooner 
or later suffocate.’124
Some rank and file activists saw Togliatti’s move as ‘an act of 
betrayal’.125 It ‘caused perplexity, especially among those who were 
in jail for years’.126 Even prominent individuals such as Amendola 
admitted: ‘as the Central Committee carried out its political activity 
along the lines of national unity, nearly all the groups with which 
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it was in contact … tended not to understand or approve.’127 
Scoccimarro, found Togliatti’s views ‘absolutely inopportunune, 
and it is to be hoped they are not repeated’.128
The staunchly republican Action Party, which had been more 
middle class, white collar, and moderate than the PCI,129 was now 
to its left. Valiani initially thought news reports of the Salerno 
turn were a forgery, and noted the glee with which Mussolini’s 
Republic of Salò described the PCI as selling out to royalty.130 
The Action Party warned Togliatti that he threatened to split the 
anti-fascist movement.
One consequence of the Salerno turn was the growth of 
revolutionary movements outside the PCI advocating ‘the class 
struggle transposed on to an international plane’.131 By June 
1944 the Stella Rossa (Red Star) group, which accused the PCI 
of betraying the working class and joining the bourgeoisie, had 
as many members as the PCI in the key industrial city of Turin.132 
Bandiera Rossa (Red Flag) had more fighters in Rome than the 
PCI. This movement thought the PCI had forfeited its right to call 
itself communist.133 
However, Togliatti held a trump card: his association with the 
USSR and its Red Army, which at that very moment was hurling 
back the Nazis on the Eastern Front. As Russian forces approached 
Flossenburg concentration camp a captured Garibaldini inmate 
described how he ‘heard a roar … Those cannons were the voice 
of Stalin’.134 Another prisoner, though an Action Party member, 
expressed disappointment at being liberated by US soldiers rather 
than the Red Army. Togliatti’s Salerno turn drew legitimacy from 
the myth that Russia represented ‘actually existing socialism’, or 
as street graffiti expressed it, the USSR ‘truly relied on the poor, 
the humble, the proletarians and workers …’.135 Before Togliatti’s 
somersault ‘the bosses’ were described as ‘vampires who feed on 
labour, these profiteers from war and German occupation …’.136 
Now, wielding Soviet authority, the PCI leadership demanded its 
Italian followers unite with ‘industrialists, intellectuals, priests, 
ex-fascists … no-one is excluded’.137 Therefore, those who raised 
clenched fists or wore symbols like the hammer and sickle must be 
dealt with ‘severely and made to tow the party line’.138
In return for financial support the resistance also accepted the 
‘Rome Protocols’ which stated: ‘As the enemy withdraws, all 
components [of the partisans] will come under direct command of 
the [Allied] Commander-in-Chief … and will obey any order issued 
by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   156 04/05/2012   09:47
ITaly 157
such orders to disband and surrender their arms, when required 
to do so.’139
There were limits to how far the PCI leadership could move 
rightwards, because it still had to placate its membership, compete 
with rival political groupings, and retain bargaining strength in 
the post-war era. Card-carrying Communist Party members were a 
minority and partisans were not automatons. Lines of communication 
and command were tenuous; and formal hierarchical structures 
rarely corresponded to the anarchic conditions of combat on the 
ground. So the PCI did not entirely abandon radical language. 
Squaring the circle, Togliatti still called for an ‘insurrection’, but 
it would not be ‘socialist or communist but for national liberation 
to destroy fascism’.140 Equally, the PCI rejected attentism and 
Allied efforts to marginalise the partisans’. It encouraged the 
establishment of CLNs in every village, district and factory.141 This 
institutionalisation of the movement was simultaneously a means 
of defying the AMGOT and royal government, a means of exerting 
control from above, and a method of organising a more efficient 
struggle from below. Nevertheless, a tense relationship between 
people’s war and the imperialist war currents within the resistance 
movement persisted. 
By April 1945 the Allied offensive seemed poised to finally break 
into the North. At that moment the CLNAI issued Directive No. 
16, its call to ‘national insurrection’. Sounding a note of realism it 
cautioned that ‘the Allies may decide, for one reason or another, 
to withhold their support, instead of making the contribution for 
which we have asked’. Nevertheless, ‘Partisan formations will attack 
and eliminate Nazi-Fascist headquarters and effect the liberation 
of cities, towns and villages … [We] will proclaim a general strike 
… the culmination of the people’s long campaign for freedom and 
the expression of their unshakable determination.’142
During the month that the final liberation of Italy took to 
complete, the two types of war complemented each other, with the 
Allied armies attacking at the front while partisans struck from 
the rear. Immense general strikes shook the northern industrial 
cities and thwarted German plans for a ‘scorched earth’ policy of 
destroying the North’s infrastructure. Yet the distinction between the 
parallel wars did not disappear. A good example was the liberation 
of Genoa, whose story has been told by Basil Davidson, a British 
Liaison Officer working with the partisans.
Genoa was a port city that, along with Milan and Turin, formed 
the ‘industrial triangle’ powering Italian economic development. 
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In April 1945 there were over 15,000 strongly armed Germans in 
occupation.143 In a move similar to von Choltitz’s in Paris, General 
Meinhold offered to declare Genoa an open city if the partisans 
allowed the Wehrmacht to retreat unhindered. On 23 April the 
CLN decided to prevent Meinhold’s forces fighting elsewhere, by 
making an immediate stand. At this time the partisans numbered 
some 6,000. Lacking adequate supplies from the Allies, most 
were minimally armed.144 Nevertheless they fought the Nazis to a 
standstill and on 25 April 9,000 Germans surrendered uncondition-
ally. Two days later, a 7,000-strong section tried to break out, but 
eventually surrendered to a force of just 300 SAP fighters.145
The CLN had liberated Genoa. At that very moment the US Army 
appeared in the shape of General Almond. Not speaking Italian 
he could only address the CLN leadership via the intermediary 
of Davidson: 
‘Tell them,’ General Almond said, ‘that my troops have liberated 
their city, and they are free men.’
A silence followed: which continued.
The general looked at me with some surprise: couldn’t I speak 
the language?146
Davidson, who had fought alongside the partisans and knew 
what they had achieved, dared not translate Almond’s words. He 
continues:
Then Providence intervened … There came, from outside that 
room, the sudden din of shouts and uproar. We rushed through 
the floor-to-ceiling windows to a balcony giving on that street 
of arcades.
Looking down, we saw far up that street the dense fore-ranks 
of a crowd of advancing men, and then we saw it was a column, 
a column of German prisoners a dozen or more abreast, hundreds 
of them, thousands of them, marching down that street unarmed 
but with armed partisans on either side. Then we went back into 
the salon and General Almond gave me a measuring glance and 
said, ‘All right’.147
The example of Genoa was repeated in various ways across the 
whole of northern Italy. Despite General Alexander’s unfortunate 
statement and the withholding of substantial supplies of weapons 
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to all but the attentists, the resistance had played a significant part 
in the liberation. 
The irony was that it would be disarmed, not by the Germans, 
but from within. The working class had often been the spearhead 
of the movement, but the party to which it was loyal accepted 
a return to capitalist normality. General Almond had no option 
but to acknowledge the work of the CLN on the day Genoa was 
freed, but immediately afterwards Davidson received new words 
to translate from a British brigadier: ‘Tell them, will you please, 
that the committee, this committee, is dissolved as from tomorrow. 
All their functions cease. All their responsibilities are assumed by 
AMGOT.’148 But the Anglo-Americans lacked the ability to enforce 
their demands, as Davidson explains:
Those severe Ligurians listened in silence. … they had reckoned 
with its coming. That was one large reason why they had launched 
an insurrection and carried it through. And they were right. What 
the CLN had foreseen, this CLN as well as other CLNs held 
good. AMGOT officers might have all the force of the Allied 
armies at their call, but it proved beyond all practical powers 
of AMGOT to remove the democratic nominees now placed in 
positions of responsibility.149
The Anglo-Americans could not do it, but as Davidson explains, 
the political leaders could. They had made commitments and 
these ‘had to be carried through. The democratic nominees were 
not eliminated; but they had to assist in the elimination of their 
movement. The CLNs were set aside and left to vanish in futility.’150 
If imperialism robbed Italy’s resistance of the opportunity to 
transform the fundamental structure of society, its achievement 
was still undeniable, and utterly different to the work of both Axis 
and Allied rulers. Despite the efforts of the AMGOT, the Italian 
capitalists, and the ex-fascists, the people’s war left an indelible 
mark on subsequent Italian politics, even if this was mainly reflected 
through the strengthened position of the PCI that had betrayed it.
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Part Iv
India, Indonesia and vietnam – 
different enemies
Anti-colonial movements in Asia are rarely treated as part of the 
Second World War resistance. However, uncritically accepting the 
subordinate status accorded by European imperialists, or seeing 
the struggle for freedom as uniquely Western, is conceited if not 
downright racist. Although they directed fire as much against their 
European masters as against Japan, the Axis power in the region, 
these movements differed from their equivalents in Europe in form, 
but not in substance. 
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India – from famine to Independence
On 3 September 1939 Indians woke to discover they were at war. 
London did not bother to ask them for approval, unlike Dominions 
such as Canada or Australia.1 When Churchill told the Commons 
that ‘India has a great part to play in the world’s struggle for 
freedom’,2 that did not include independence for India’s 400 million, 
a population that exceeded the maximum number conquered by 
the Third Reich.3 
One consequence of the ‘struggle for freedom’ was the Bengal 
famine of 1943. The Viceroy called it ‘one of the greatest disasters 
that has befallen any people under British rule’.4 It consumed 
between 1.5 and 3.5 million lives5 despite civil servants describing 
the preceding harvest as ‘a good one’.6 Government intelligence 
reports recounted:
the daily removal of corpses from streets and houses. In Dacca, 
the poor are living on what rice water then can get, since even the 
rich are unable to obtain rice. Cholera, smallpox and starvation 
are causing hundreds of deaths daily in the surrounding villages 
… Suicides and child-selling have been reported.7
This continued an appalling record – 12 major famines since 
colonisation began.8 In the 1860s an Indian economist had 
discovered the basic cause: a sum greater than the sub-continent’s 
land value was drained off annually to support British occupation 
and profits.9 Another contributory factor was the custom of making 
impoverished India pay for Britain’s Asian adventures, as in the case 
of the two Afghan conflicts in the late nineteenth century.10
The 1943 famine was directly connected to India’s involvement 
in the Second World War, because after it began eleven times the 
usual number of soldiers were maintained at the country’s expense.11 
A full year before the tragedy struck, officials had warned London 
of the likely consequences. To pay for the troops the money supply 
would have to expand exponentially12 and ‘an inflationary position 
would result. There would be the danger of a flight from currency 
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into goods, which would result in hoarding. This in turn might give 
rise to famines and riots’.13 That prediction was borne out when 
the cost of rice increased tenfold between May and October 1943.14 
London’s resistance to rationing, and its shameful response to the 
Japanese conquest of neighbouring Malaya and Burma worsened 
the situation. In the words of the Indian National Congress:
Officials whose business it was to protect lives of people in their 
areas utterly failed to discharge responsibility and, running away 
from post of duty, sought safety for themselves leaving vast majority 
of people wholly unprovided for. Such arrangements for evacuees 
as were made were principally for the European populations and 
at every step racial discrimination was in evidence.15
Loss of Burma severed an important source of rice, but instead 
of locating alternative providers, a scorched earth policy was 
instituted in Bengal, the border region. Bridges and local boats 
were destroyed even though, as Congress warned, ‘life is impossible 
without them  …’.16 Now it was difficult to transport the local 
harvest to market. 
The Secretary for India was Leo Amery, who has been described 
as a ‘passionate advocate of British imperialism [and] right-wing 
politics’.17 His reaction to the first reports of starvation was expressed 
in a letter to the retiring Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow. Amery welcomed 
this distraction from the movement for independence. The public 
were ‘now absorbed in questions of food and cost-of-living’ which 
might ‘infuse a tinge of realism into politics  …’.18
However, when the seriousness of the crisis became clear Amery 
also backed urgent food imports. The minimum necessary was 
calculated as the equivalent of one million tons of grain over the 
year.19 Was it pure coincidence that this was exactly the same amount 
as the army’s annual consumption in India?20 Amery’s appeals fell 
on deaf ears. London insisted that ‘Defence Services demand must 
be first charge on indigenous or imported grain’.21 
The wording of the War Cabinet’s response to Amery’s frantic 
appeals was shocking:
After the requirements of Ceylon and the Middle East had been 
met, it would be extremely difficult to find further ships which 
could be sent to Australia to fetch grain [for India]. If however 
the War Cabinet decided that some action should be taken … 
arrangements should now be made to import not more than 
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50,000 tons as a token shipment. This should, however, not be 
earmarked for India but should be ordered to Colombo to await 
instructions there.22
Those who dared accuse the Government of wishing ‘deliberately to 
starve the people by acquiring the whole crop for the Army’ would 
be pursued and prosecuted.23
Field Marshall Wavell, who replaced Linlithgow as Viceroy, was 
also exasperated: ‘It is scandalous that we are making no progress 
about food imports after about six months’ discussion … .’24 He 
pointed out the ‘very different attitude towards feeding a starving 
population when there is starvation in Europe’.25
Churchill was unabashed. British rule would be seen as a ‘Golden 
Age as time passes’26 and sending food amounted to ‘appeasement’ 
of the Congress Party.27 The official record notes that the Canadian 
PM had 100,000 tons of grain loaded on a ship bound for India, 
but was ‘dissuaded by a strong personal appeal from Winston’ from 
sending it.28 When the British military commander in the South East 
Asia offered to use 10 per cent of his shipping capacity to assist 
Bengal, Churchill cut his allocation by 10 per cent.29 Finally, no help 
would come from Britain itself because, said Churchill, to divert 
ships to India might affect ‘imports of food into this country’.30
Underlying this was deep-seated racism. Amery, for example, 
thought the country needed ‘an increasing infusion of stronger 
nordic blood, whether by settlement or intermarriage or otherwise 
… and so breed a more virile type of native ruler.’31 Yet the Secretary 
for India’s prejudice was nothing compared to the PM’s. The latter 
complained Indians were ‘breeding like rabbits’ and said: ‘I hate 
Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.’ Amery 
told him to his face that he took a ‘Hitler-like attitude’.32
Imperialist war was disastrous for India, and clearly had nothing 
to do with publicly stated humanitarian aims. In the words of 
Jawaharlal Nehru, a leading member of the Indian National 
Congress, London was simply ‘defending the British Empire’.33 
Churchill would not have disagreed, saying: ‘I have not become the 
King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the 
British Empire’.34 That approach was not exclusive to Tories. The 
Labour Party’s attitude was set out during its first administration in 
1924. On arriving at his office, the Colonial Minister uttered words 
bearing an uncanny resemblance to Churchill’s: ‘I’m here to see that 
there is no mucking about with the British Empire.’35 During the 
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Second World War Labour’s line on India remained indistinguish-
able from the Conservatives.36
The irony of Britain’s declaration of war on India’s behalf was 
that, if help had been asked for it would have been forthcoming. 
Politicians such as Nehru had a record of anti-fascism that far 
surpassed that of the British government. While London appeased 
in the 1930s, he had visited and expressed support for Spain’s 
International Brigades, Czechoslovakia, and China under Japanese 
attack.37 Despite Britain’s high-handed action he continued to 
champion the anti-fascist cause within the Indian National Congress. 
As a consequence it resolved to avoid ‘taking advantage of Britain’s 
difficulties … In a conflict between democracy and freedom on the 
one side and Fascism and aggression on the other, our sympathies 
must inevitably lie on the side of democracy.’38
Alas, the willing co-operation of an independence movement was 
the last thing London wanted. Instead, using the cloak of the Second 
World War, it instituted the Defence of India Ordinance restricting 
civil liberties, and attacking the Congress.39 
Not everyone shared Nehru’s approach, however. There were 
collaborators like Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar who prided himself on 
‘having laboured hard … to produce a sense of loyalty’ to Britain.40 
He was rewarded with attendance at the British war cabinet (though 
excluded from discussions on India, of course).41 Surprisingly, the 
Indian CP (CPI) was in the same camp. Illegal until 1939, it was 
the only party which argued the Popular Front line that British 
‘victory is an end in which every citizen should be interested …’.42 
At the opposite end of the spectrum was Subhas Bose whose Indian 
National Army, as we shall see, fought alongside Japanese forces.
Between these extremes sat the Congress and Muslim League, 
whose rivalry was the product of a classic imperialist manoeuvre of 
divide and rule: the British Raj had deliberately stoked up communal 
tensions between the Hindu majority and the 90 million-strong 
Muslim minority. Nevertheless both organisations saw the war as 
an opportunity to extract concessions from the colonial masters, 
although they profoundly differed as to goals. The Muslim League 
hoped to win British approval for the post-war creation of Pakistan. 
It therefore stood aloof from Congress campaigns for a unified, 
independent India. 
As the largest anti-colonial organisation, India’s Congress Party 
combined many different social layers behind its nationalist, 
cross-class programme. It was less communalist than the Muslim 
League (its wartime President was a Muslim) and wanted freedom 
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in the short-term. Congress understood the duality of the Second 
World War and in 1941 passed a resolution that expressed solidarity 
‘with the peoples who are the subject of aggression and who are 
fighting for their freedom’ against the Axis, but affirmed equally 
that a ‘subject India cannot offer voluntary or willing help to 
an arrogant imperialism which is indistinguishable from fascist 
authoritarianism’.43 
In 1942 Churchill despatched Sir Stafford Cripps to solve a public 
relations problem. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
wanted India to have autonomy, ‘otherwise the United States would 
be just fighting to preserve the British Empire’, and Indians would die 
so as ‘to prolong England’s mastery over them’.44 Accordingly, on 10 
March, Roosevelt telegrammed Churchill proposing representative 
Indian self-government in line ‘with the democratic processes of 
all who are fighting Nazism’. (Incidentally, the President added 
a revealing secret rider: ‘For the love of Heaven don’t bring me 
into this …’45) To appease the US, Cripps was sent off to India the 
very next day. The PM regarded talks on autonomy as a necessary 
evil: ‘the Cripps mission is indispensable to prove our honesty of 
purpose … If it is rejected by the Indian parties for whose benefit it 
has been devised, our sincerity will be proved to the world.’46 But 
when it looked like Cripps’s proposals for Dominion status would 
not be rejected Churchill made him set new terms guaranteed to fail. 
Congress was divided about what to do next. Its leader, Mahatma 
Gandhi, proposed a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience 
in favour of immediate independence. A debate in Congress’s 
leading body, the Working Committee, shows the complexity of 
the situation:
Nehru: Japan is an imperialist country. Conquest of India is in 
their plan. If [Gandhi]’s approach is accepted we become 
passive partners of the Axis powers. 
Achut Patwardhan: The British Government is behaving in a 
suicidal manner. [Nehru]’s attitude will lead to abject and 
unconditional co-operation with British machinery ...
Vallabhbhai Patel: ... it was made clear that the door was still 
open and our sympathies were with allies. It is time the door 
is finally closed after the repeated insults heaped upon us. I 
agree with [Gandhi’s] draft before us.47
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Gandhi won the day, and his ‘Quit India’ resolution was passed 
on 8 August. It still offered Britain support in a genuine war for 
democracy and human rights:
A free India will [throw] all her great resources in the struggle 
for freedom and against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism and 
Imperialism … On the declaration of India’s independence, a 
provisional Government will be formed and free India will become 
an ally of the United Nations [i.e. the Allies], sharing with them 
in the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle 
for freedom … The freedom of India must be the symbol of and 
prelude to this freedom of all other Asiatic nations under foreign 
domination. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran 
and Iraq must also attain their complete freedom.48
The movement to attain the Quit India resolution was not designed 
to be provocative. It would be ‘on non-violent lines on the widest 
possible scale, so that the country might utilize all the non-violent 
strength it has gathered during the last 22 years of peaceful struggle 
… non-violence is the basis of this movement’.49 ‘Gandhiji’, the 
prophet of ahimsa (non-violence) was officially entrusted with 
its leadership. 
An understanding of the fragile figure of ‘the Mahatma’ (great 
soul) is essential here. Gandhi’s progressive nationalism marshalled 
very diverse social classes behind the shared goal of independence. 
He was the fulcrum upon which balanced peasants and the middle 
class, rich industrialists, and workers. To exert pressure on Britain 
vast numbers of poor Indians had to be mobilised; but this risked 
unleashing a social radicalism that could threaten their rich 
compatriots, undermining Congress unity. Gandhi found a way 
out of this conundrum through a policy centred on his own self-
sacrifice, and mass satyagraha – non-violent civil disobedience (like 
fasting as a form of protest). 
With his individual persona at the centre of affairs he could 
open the tap of popular action, but close it as soon as militancy 
became predominant. An example was the campaign against the 
repressive Rowlatt Act in 1919. When the mass demonstrations he 
had encouraged were attacked and fought back, Gandhi ‘persuaded 
the mob to disperse, rebuking them severely and threatening to 
undertake a personal satyagraha against them if they did not behave 
properly’.50 Although emphasis on a leader’s spiritual and moral 
integrity was unusual, Gandhism was actually a typical example of 
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reformist nationalism that deployed mass activism but feared class 
struggle and revolution. Opposed to imperialist war, he stopped 
short of people’s war.
Such was the spirit with which Gandhi approached ‘Quit India’. 
When the policy was adopted he said: ‘The actual struggle does 
not commence this moment.’ He would now ‘wait upon the 
Viceroy and plead with him … That process is likely to take two 
or three weeks’.51 The British had other ideas, and arrested the 
entire Congress leadership the following morning. In Nehru’s case 
incarceration lasted 1,040 days.52 When violent protests erupted to 
free the leaders Gandhi distanced himself. From jail he condemned 
the ‘sad happenings’, ‘calamity’, and ‘deplorable destruction’ caused 
by ‘people wild with rage to the point of losing self-control’.53 
But it was he who was losing control. Caution was giving way to 
a people’s resistance movement for democracy and freedom. The 
initial phase occurred in urban centres. Strikes broke out in Mumbai, 
Calcutta and Delhi. By 12 August only 19 of Mumbai’s 63 mills 
were functioning.54 Workers at Tata Steel’s giant Jamshedpur plant 
declared ‘they will not resume work until a national government has 
been formed’, while the three month textile strike in Ahmedabad 
earned it the nickname of ‘the Stalingrad of India’.55 The middle 
classes and students also played a prominent role. At Patna crowds 
were machine-gunned from the air after they seized the city.56 That 
was the first of six occasions where the RAF was employed in this 
way.57 Such massive repression was supplemented by the arguments of 
the Indian CP which, like in Britain, promoted maximum production 
to aid Russia. Together they restored order in the big towns. 
A second phase began in late August with ‘a veritable peasant 
rebellion’.58 The fight was for something wider than independence, 
as local studies demonstrate. In Satara a parallel government (which 
lasted till 1946) published a fortnightly newspaper, set up schools, 
redistributed land, fined moneylenders, and ran a standing army.59 
During September 1942 2,500 people in Medinipur District 
gathered to prevent rice stocks being shipped out by millowners. 
After three demonstrators were killed by police another parallel 
government was set up, with departments for defence, finance, 
judiciary, education and so on.60 Grain exports were banned, fixed 
prices were imposed on merchants, and some supplies were seized 
and distributed to the people.61 How far Medinipur had gone beyond 
Gandhi’s non-violence was indicated by students who shouted: ‘We 
shall cut off (King) George’s head, and finish England with fire and 
the sword.’62 The aim was to ‘loot the Government banks, treasuries 
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and post offices’ while ‘Police stations and courts too will be razed to 
the ground’.63 However, the influence of Gandhism had not entirely 
disappeared. The Mahatma had issued a mantra in relation to Quit 
India – ‘Do or Die’. The first word is usually emphasised and it 
is taken as a militant challenge to British rule. However, a local 
Congress leader, Dr Shivpujan Raj, revealed its other aspect when 
he remonstrated with the crowd: ‘It is not by killing but by dying 
that we shall attain our goal. The leader of the nation has ordered 
this. We cannot violate his wishes.’ So, casting their weapons aside, 
demonstrators marched unarmed on government offices. When they 
arrived seven were shot dead, including Dr Raj. The rest chose to 
‘do’ rather than ‘die’, and the next day they returned to sack the 
building, a police station, seed store, and railway station (while still 
chanting Gandhi’s name).64
Despite appearances the struggle had effectively renounced 
Gandhian doctrine and was moving towards people’s war under 
J.P. Narayan, the ‘one prominent all-India leader to emerge from the 
Quit India movement’.65 In September 1942 British secret reports 
stated that Narayan’s Congress Socialist Party ‘holds the field …’.66 
He gave clear expression to the idea of parallel wars.
In 1939 he wrote: ‘There can be no hope that this war which 
in its origins is a war of imperialist rivalries will, as the war 
progresses, change automatically its imperialist character into one 
for democracy and world peace.’ This was confirmed to him by 
the response to the Quit India resolution. India was now under a 
‘British type of Nazi hell [and] the savage tyrannies of the British 
fascists …’.67 Therefore, a different war was needed:
India’s fight for freedom is at once anti-imperialist (and therefore 
also anti-fascist for Imperialism is the parent of Fascism) and a 
drive to end the war through the intervention of the common 
man … We work for the defeat both of Imperialism and Fascism 
by the common people of the world and by our struggle we show 
the way to the ending of wars and the liberation of the black, 
white and yellow.68
Answering British accusations that the movement aided the enemy 
he asked:
why should the liberation of one-fifth of humanity come in their 
way? If the [Allies] are truly fighting for the aims they profess, 
the Indian struggle for freedom should not hinder but help them. 
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If it hinders them, it is only proof of the fact that the basis of 
their war is false.69
Narayan criticised the official Congress approach which amounted 
to the Quit India resolution as no more than a bargaining tool with 
the authorities. There had been a deliberate lack of planning for a 
mass movement,70 and now, having ‘failed in their obvious duty’ 
they ‘turn round and disown the people’s travail and suffering …’.71 
Attempting to plug the gap in leadership Narayan offered detailed 
advice on how to organise and conduct a guerrilla war against the 
British, recognising that ‘if this does not accord with Gandhiji’s 
principles, that is not my fault’.72 One outcome was the Azad Dastas 
who were consciously modelled on ‘European guerrillas … or the 
Russian partisan’.73
Did the Quit India movement amount to a people’s war? The 
colonial authorities noted that key industrial concerns, such as 
the Tata and Birla empires, backed Quit India to the extent of 
paying workers to strike, for months in some cases. However, 
British officials believed that with Japanese invasion a distinct 
possibility, Indian capitalists were funding ‘a war risk insurance 
policy.’74 The calculation was that in the event of their victory ‘we 
can expect gratitude and the retention of our factories intact. Should 
the British win, however, we lose nothing’.75 This plan evidently 
succeeded, with one journalist remarking: ‘It is bewildering to know 
how prominent financial magnates with Congress affiliations have 
secured war contracts from the Supply Department of Delhi’.76
More important, as numerous writers have pointed out, Quit 
India was also ‘conspicuously supported by the poor and labour 
classes, who were the most hard hit by wartime inflation and food 
shortages’.77 In Patna an eye-witness described the radicalising effect 
this had. After a student procession was fired upon:
all signs of British rule disappeared from Patna. No rickshaws or 
ekkas [horse-drawn carriages] were plied. The students were no 
longer the leaders, leadership had passed to the rickshaw-pullers, 
ekka-drivers and other such people whose political knowledge 
extended only this far – that the British were their enemies.78
Quit India amounted to a real war. At the end of August 1942 
Viceroy Linlithgow wrote to Churchill:
I am engaged here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion 
since that of 1857, the gravity and extent of which we have so 
Gluckstein T01877 01 text   171 04/05/2012   09:47
172 a PeoPle’S hISTory of The Second World War
far concealed from the world for reasons of military security … 
If we bungle this business we shall damage India irretrievably as 
a base for future allied operations … .79
The statistics bore out his assertion. In the first week alone 250 
railway stations and 150 police stations were attacked, and 59 trains 
derailed.80 After a year, 945 post offices had been destroyed and 664 
bombs planted.81 The British authorities deployed a mass of armed 
police plus 30,000 troops in 112 battalions.82 They opened fire 538 
times; in Mumbai alone over 100 times.83 The methods used were 
shocking. A senior official in the Central Provinces ‘boasted at the 
club in the evening that he had jolly good fun having shot down 
twenty-four niggers himself’.84 In the village of Chimur all adult 
males were arrested, and then, ‘the soldiers out-raged the women 
to their heart’s content…No woman was safe even the pregnant or 
the girls of 12 or 13’.85
In total there were almost 100,000 arrests and between 4,000 and 
10,000 were killed.86 It was war, but a very asymmetrical one. In 
comparison to Indian casualties, just 11 soldiers and 63 policemen 
died.87 This disparity in armed power was duly noted by Subhas 
Chandra Bose.
The IndIan naTIonal army (Ina)
Bose was a prominent campaigner for independence. Twice elected 
as Congress President (1938 and 1939), he had undergone eleven 
prison terms. Bose’s first response to the Second World War was 
similar to Narayan’s: ‘There could be no question of supporting 
either side in the European war, since both were imperialists 
fighting for colonial possessions.’88 In 1940 he organised a massive 
demonstration for an immediate independence struggle, calling 
on Gandhi ‘to come forward and launch his campaign of passive 
resistance … it was high time for India to play her part in the war’.89 
His argument made an impact. Historians have plausibly argued 
that one reason Gandhi launched Quit India was to ‘ward off the 
evils he apprehended from the growing strength of the revolutionary 
ideas [and act as] a safety-valve for youthful energy’.90
After being jailed yet again, Bose grew to doubt the potential of 
his country’s internal forces on their own: ‘We do not believe that 
India can achieve freedom without use of arms … We have to fight 
the enemy with modern methods and with modern arms.’91 He 
continued: ‘it goes without saying that if you could do without any 
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help it would be the best course for India …. [But] every freedom 
movement in history has had to seek some help or other from 
abroad, before it could achieve success.’92 From whom could such 
help be obtained? 
Bose was not fussy. He escaped from custody and headed for 
Moscow. When his pleas for Soviet aid against the British were 
ignored he went to Berlin, saying the Axis powers ‘are the best 
friends we have in the world today’.93 Hitler was an unlikely partner. 
Bose himself had been infuriated by Hitler’s 1935 speech declaring 
whites were destined to rule over blacks,94 and such was the Führer’s 
racism that he lamented Japan’s victories at first: ‘It means the loss 
of a whole continent, and that is to be regretted, for it is the white 
race which is the loser.’95 It was with Tokyo, at war with the Allies 
since December 1941, that Bose eventually clinched a deal.
If pragmatic considerations led Bose to this decision, on the basis 
that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, this was not aired. In 
public he accepted Tokyo’s claim of establishing ‘a new order in East 
Asia on the right basis of freedom, justice and reciprocity’,96 despite 
knowing of the atrocities in China. Bose’s ideological statements 
showed breathtaking opportunism: ‘our political philosophy should 
be a synthesis between National Socialism and Communism … 
I see no reason why we cannot work out a synthesis of the two 
systems that will embody the good points of both.’97 Consistent in 
his inconsistency, after backing the Axis powers, in 1945 he turned 
once more to Stalin the ‘one man in Europe who holds in his hands 
the destinies of the European nations …’.98
Bose’s public stance on fascism makes problematic the inclusion 
of his Indian National Army in a book on war against the Axis. 
Nonetheless, his assertion that ‘every freedom movement in history 
has had to seek some help from abroad’ had some merit. During 
the First World War, supporters of the 1916 Easter Rising in 
Dublin sought arms from Imperial Germany. A year later Lenin 
caused great controversy when he accepted an offer (from the same 
source) of a sealed train to take him across the war fronts from 
Zurich to Petrograd (St Petersburg). However, unlike Bose, these 
revolutionaries refused to pay homage in any way to imperialism. 
The INA deserves consideration here because its story was much 
more than quisling collaboration. The Army existed before Bose’s 
arrival and its soldiers volunteered through the same sense of social 
and political injustice as resistance movements elsewhere. The INA 
recruited volunteers from the 60,000 Indian soldiers held as POWs 
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after Japan’s conquest of Singapore, an event Churchill called ‘the 
worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history’.99
To understand their readiness to sign up it is necessary to look at 
Britain’s Indian regiments. Amery described these as ‘a mercenary 
army’,100 because intense poverty drove many to enlist. Divide and 
rule was the method used to maintain control. Units were assembled 
‘from distant parts of the country, preferably speaking different 
languages, both from each other and from the local population. 
Where possible, each Indian regiment was further divided into 
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh companies.’101 An additional split was 
created between the so-called ‘martial races’, from whom recruits 
were drawn, and the rest. 
These tactics began to break down during the Second World 
War. Recruitment had to go well beyond the ‘martial races’ and 
communal differences paled before the gross racism encountered. 
The income of an ordinary Indian private (a sepoy) was one third 
of a British soldier’s; and despite the army’s enormous growth, 
British officers in the combat sections still outnumbered their Indian 
equivalents by 12 to 1 and received twice the pay.102 Only one Indian 
commanded a Brigade, and none a Division. In the famous post-war 
show trial of INA soldiers in Delhi a defendant asked, since Indians 
fought as bravely as the British ‘why then there should be so much 
difference in their pay, allowances, food and living conditions?’103
It was ordinary soldiers rather than officers who tended to sign 
up to the INA.104 Under post-war British interrogation captured 
prisoners advanced various reasons for joining. Avoidance of 
Japanese prison camps (Tokyo offered to free those who joined 
the INA) and expectation of imminent British defeat played a part. 
The INA was also ‘demonstratively non-communal’;105 the Delhi 
show trial saw a Hindu, Muslim and Sikh standing side by side in 
the dock. According to one officer, opposition to imperialism from 
any quarter was the most important motive:
the only solution that we could think of for our country’s problems 
was the formation of a strong and well-disciplined armed body 
which should fight for the liberation of India from the existing 
alien rule, should be able and ready to provide protection to their 
countrymen against any possible molestation by the Japanese, 
and to resist any attempt by the latter to establish themselves as 
rulers of the country in place of the British … .106
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This independent attitude showed itself in strained relations 
between the INA and the Japanese. For example, it took five days 
of hard bargaining to win Captain Mohan Singh, the INA’s first 
commander, to setting it up in the first place. He was suspicious of 
Japanese intentions107 and refused to allow the INA to be deployed 
in Japan’s conquest of the Dutch East Indies, insisting it could 
only fight against Britain.108 Matters came to a head when Mohan 
Singh demanded a guarantee from Japan that it had no designs 
of its own on India. When this was not forthcoming he ordered 
the dissolution of the INA and was arrested.109 A Japanese officer 
explained the root of the disagreement: ‘As a colonial people 
with long history of oppression they have developed some sort of 
prejudice, and whenever liberation has been proposed they have 
tried to assert equality with other nations which was beyond their 
power … .’110
Captain Singh lacked the political stature of Subhas Bose, 
who was in a better position to win a degree of independence for 
the INA. On his arrival in 1943 he re-launched the movement, 
mobilising support from the three million-strong Indian community 
in Southeast Asia as a counter-weight to Japanese preponderance.111 
Finally, rather than depending on Japanese conquest of India to 
reach his goal, Bose conceived of the INA acting as a catalyst for a 
revolution from within:
[We] are going to organise a fighting force which will be powerful 
enough to attack the British Army in India. When we do so, 
revolution will break out not only among the civil population at 
home, but also among the Indian Army which is now standing 
under the British flag. When the British Government is thus 
attacked from both sides, from inside India and from outside it 
will collapse … .112
Imperialists on either side of the Second World War showed the 
same contempt for the people’s war and so the INA was shabbily 
treated by Japan. Singh had wanted a force of 200,000, and although 
Bose scaled this down to 50,000, the Japanese provided only light 
arms for some 30,000.113 The Subhas Brigade, for example, had no 
artillery, mortars or communications equipment, and an inadequate 
supply of machine-guns.114 Bose demanded a leading role in the 
attack on the Raj so that ‘the first drop of blood shed on Indian soil 
should be that of a soldier of the INA’.115 But one officer described 
this ‘front line role’ at the incursion at Imphal as, ‘a) road-making 
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or preparing, b) repairing bridges, c) extinguishing jungle fires, 
d) driving bullock carts carrying rations for Japanese troops’.116 
There were only 8,000 INA soldiers deployed compared to 230,000 
Japanese, and when the Japanese offensive stalled INA soldiers were 
abandoned and left to starve. 6,000 were captured or surrendered 
to the British.117
At the end of the Second World War it appeared as if the people’s 
war had failed. However, this was deceptive. The scale of the Quit 
India campaign in 1942 convinced Britain that the colony’s freedom 
was inevitable, and the Viceroy advised Churchill to forestall 
future trouble with Congress: ‘it would in fact be wise to start 
negotiations before the end of the war brought a release of prisoners 
and unrest …’.118 Bose’s prediction that the INA could spark a revolt 
came true, just three months after his death in a plane crash. Protests 
against the INA trial overcame communal boundaries and in places 
like Calcutta Bose supporters, Congress, the Muslim League and 
communists, marched together in massive demonstrations which 
the authorities barely managed to control. As Sarkar puts it:
The INA never amounted to very much in sheer military terms 
… yet we must not underestimate the impact on the patriotic 
imagination of an actual army fighting, however, ineffectively, 
for the country’s liberation … the probable link between the INA 
experience and the wave of disaffection in the British Indian Army 
during the winter of 1945–46, which culminated in the great 
Bombay naval strike of February 1946 was quite possibly the 
single most decisive reason behind the British decision to make 
a quick withdrawal.119
In Europe and America the wars mostly ran in parallel because they 
both confronted the same enemy, even if they had very different 
motives for doing so. They came into various degrees of conflict, but 
this took time. The geometry of the parallel wars metaphor breaks 
down as far as India is concerned, because while there was both a 
people’s war and an imperialist war, the two were at loggerheads 
from the start. Yet the events that shook the sub-continent were just 
as much the product of the Second World War as those elsewhere, 
and should be treated as such.
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Indonesia – axis and allies united 
against the People
The imperialists officially settled their differences on ‘Victory over 
Japan day’, 16 August 1945, but the struggle for Indonesia and its 
main island, Java, refutes the notion that the Second World War 
ended on that day. Fighting continued, except this time it was not 
Japan versus the Allies, but a war of both against the people. 
Indonesians had ample reason to want freedom. The Netherlands 
had long exploited the abundant natural resources of coffee and 
sugar from a country 60 times more extensive and seven times more 
populous than itself. The entire Javanese economy was remodelled 
to produce cash crops at the expense of rice cultivation. During the 
nineteenth century this caused famines and epidemics, but so reliant 
was Holland on colonial revenue that the authorities’ response was 
not remorse but drastic increases in land tax.1 Despite rhetoric about 
reform, by the twentieth century Javanese villages were paying a 
quarter of their earnings to the colonial power, which contributed 
to overall income from Indonesia exceeding that of Holland by 30 
per cent.2 Few benefits of ‘civilisation’ returned east in recompense. 
For example, between the wars the 70 million population had the 
services of just 1030 medical doctors.3 Only one in seven million 
Indonesians graduated from secondary school.4 Those profits that 
did come back to Indonesia largely went to paying the Dutch army5 
to maintain a regime under which advocating a strike attracted a 
prison sentence of five years.6 
Despite this background the people’s war was slow to arrive 
in Indonesia. Elsewhere dedicated and visionary individuals or 
organisations provided the spark, but in Indonesia such leadership 
was missing. This was partly due to the legacy of colonialism. 
Nationalism originated as a European idea and was encountered 
by the miniscule number of educated Indonesians, mainly from the 
privileged elite, through whom the Dutch ruled. Geography created 
another obstacle: 
177
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[This] sprawling archipelago was divided into 200 or more 
distinct ethnic groups, ranging from fiercely Muslim Acehnese 
on the northern tip of Sumatra and the Catholic communities of 
Flores and Timor to the Hindu Balinese and the animist tribes of 
the interior of Kalimantan (Borneo) and New Guinea, as well as 
more recent immigrant communities such as Chinese in western 
Kalimantan and Europeans in the cities of Java.7
For these reasons nationalism had difficulty making headway 
and had to compete with rival ideologies. After the First World 
War Sarekat Islam drew on the Muslim sympathies of many, its 
membership rising from 800,000 in 1916 to two million in 1919. In 
the mid-1920s it was eclipsed by the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI), the first such party to be established in Asia.8 However, the 
PKI suffered rapid decline following abortive risings in Java and 
Sumatra in 1926 and 1927 during which the Dutch arrested 13,000 
communists and shot several.9 
It took that destruction of its chief competitor to give Indonesian 
nationalism some traction. Until this moment, its leader, Sukarno 
had been afraid to appeal to the common people lest their radicalism 
spill over into support for communism to which he was opposed: 
‘We nationalists put our emphasis on the national struggle.’10 
With the communists out of the way it was a lot easier to promote 
cross-class unity: ‘[Are we] hostile to every well-to-do Indonesian? 
Not at all … Do our principles mean that we emphasize the class 
struggle? By no means!’ 
Though the oratory of a Sukarno attracted large audiences, 
organised nationalism remained the affair of a tiny minority. This 
made Dutch repression relatively easy. Without gainsaying the 
courage of individual leaders, their collective weakness encouraged 
them to depend on external assistance. People like Mohammed Hatta 
and Sutan Sjahrir, who were educated in Holland, hoped national 
salvation would come through the Dutch social democratic left. 
By contrast, as early as 1928 Sukarno oriented himself eastwards. 
He foresaw ‘a great struggle in the Pacific, among the imperialist 
giants, America, Japan and England, who will engage in a struggle 
for plunder and domination’.11 This could cause ‘hostility between 
one Asian people and, for example, English imperialism. I would 
then hope that this Asian people would receive help from other 
Asian peoples.’12 
When the Second World War began Hatta and Sjahrir, in similar 
terms to India’s Congress Party, offered to support the Allies if 
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concessions towards autonomy were made. None were forthcoming. 
The Dutch were ‘practising exactly the kind of totalitarianism they 
criticize’ said one nationalist leader.13 This attitude assisted Tokyo’s 
conquest of South East Asia, which was achieved with remarkable 
speed and few forces. It took just eight days for Java to fall to the 
16th Army in March 1942. As if to confirm Sukarno’s predictions 
jubilation was widespread. One Japanese Admiral encountered ‘a 
frantic atmosphere of welcome [that] ruled the entire region of the 
East Indies’.14 Further apparent justification for Sukarno came when 
Japan proclaimed their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
whose peoples, it was claimed, would ‘enjoy prosperous coexistence 
by mutual help and accommodation and, by so doing, to promote 
the peace and prosperity of the world’.15 After meeting Japanese 
officials Sukarno announced: ‘Indonesia’s independence can only be 
achieved by cooperation with Dai Nippon [Japan] … .’16 Soon he 
was rallying supporters with the motto: ‘We will wipe out America 
and liquidate England.’17
However, ‘Co-Prosperity’ turned out to have as much practical 
value as the Allies’ much-vaunted Atlantic Charter. The new 
authorities treated their conquered territory with the familiar 
mixture of condescension and avarice seen under the Netherlands. 
On the day the Commander of the 16th Army announced ‘the 
prime objective of the military administration is to let these obedient 
people bathe in the genuine imperial graces’,18 a more candid 
spokesman opined that Indonesians had ‘been lazy coolies for the 
Dutch. From now on they must be made diligent workers for Japan 
and Asia.’19 Japan set about achieving this through what one writer 
calls ‘exploitation and persuasion’.20
 ‘Exploitation’ centred on rice, textiles and manpower. Like 
the Nazis in Europe, Japanese armies sustained occupation by 
plunder. Lacking the numbers to administer this at local level they 
employed the same indigenous social elites as the Dutch.21 In Java 
these people helped the Japanese levy up to 40 per cent of the crop 
of small farmers, and 70 per cent of the wealthier farmers’ crop.22 
As cash was given in exchange for this rice, large landowners made 
large profits and hoarding became rife. The effect on prices (and 
consequently on the landless) was devastating.23 Maladministration 
also left thousands of tons rotting in stores or eaten by rats.24 Soon 
the ratio of deaths to births reached ‘unexampled heights’.25 Cloth 
became so difficult to obtain that in some places women were unable 
to go out, and farmers worked the fields stark naked.26
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The Japanese instituted a forced labour system called ‘romusha’. 
By the end of the war Java’s entire mobilisable workforce of ten 
million had served in it at some point. Romusha were, according 
to one historian, recruited through ‘unbelievable and even 
immoral deceptions’:
The townsmen gathered, thinking there would be special 
distribution [of food or clothing]. With clever words, the military 
men loaded them on prepared trucks and took them away to 
ports where ships awaited them. The men were then shipped to 
the battlefields of New Guinea, to the Andamans and Nicobars, 
to Burma, etc. as laborers. They had no idea once they left when 
they could return home, and they received no opportunity to 
bid farewell.27
Mistreatment of romusha was so extensive that the Japanese had 
to institute a ‘Don’t Hit the Natives’ campaign amongst their own 
people.28 Labourers received just 40 to 60 per cent of a Japanese 
soldier’s food ration.29 Though most were employed locally, of the 
hundreds of thousands sent abroad a large number (perhaps 50 per 
cent) never returned.30 
Japan’s treatment of opposition was sometimes even more cruel 
than its Axis partners. Thus, 27 per cent of those in its POW camps 
died compared with 4 per cent in German or Italian camps, while 
hundreds of Javanese were executed without trial.31
In spite of these horrors ‘persuasion’ could also succeed, though 
initially the plan was that ‘native inhabitants shall be so guided 
to induce a sense of trust in the imperial forces, and premature 
encouragement of native independence movements shall be 
avoided’.32 Japan altered its stance when its military position 
deteriorated and sought an alliance with the nationalists. Most 
were more than willing to collaborate. Pliable nationalist politicians 
fronted the three successive Japanese campaigns to mobilise 
Indonesians behind the war effort – Triple A (‘Asia’s Mother – 
Japan; Asia’s Dawn – Japan; Asia’s Leadership – Japan’),33 Putera 
(Concentration of the People’s Energy), and Java Hokokai. For 
example, Sukarno addressed 100,000 people at Putera’s launch. The 
event started with a bow towards the Emperor’s Palace in Tokyo 
and ended with three cheers of ‘banzai!’34 In between Sukarno told 
his followers that the Japanese were ‘elder brothers’ and that the 
Indonesian people would ‘follow the advice of the elder brothers. 
We trust Dai Nippon’.35 
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Sukarno registered himself as romusha to encourage others.36 
After the war he confessed that he knew about the tragic fate of 
those who followed his advice: ‘In fact, it was I, Sukarno, who 
sent them to work. Yes it was I. I shipped them to their deaths 
… It was horrible, hopeless. And it was I who gave them to the 
Japanese. Sounds terrible, doesn’t it?’37 Why did Sukarno collaborate 
if, as one apologist insists, he ‘was never a lackey of Japan’ and 
‘at no time subordinated his goal, Indonesian independence, to 
Japanese interests’.38 Perhaps he was duped by the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere39 and the sort of widely circulated propaganda 
that said ‘yellow men will come out of the north to liberate the 
Indonesian people from the slavery of the Dutch. Look for the 
yellow skins’.40 
However, the real intention of the authorities in Tokyo remained 
what it had always been:
In order to enable the fifty million people of Java to further endure 
the deprivation of clothing, to deliver foodstuffs while bearing 
hardships, and to cooperate with the military administration in 
all aspects, the best policy is to clearly indicate to them that they 
shall be granted independence when their preparatory education 
for the postwar future has been completed.41
No demand for ‘preparatory education’ was made of Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines or Burma, which were granted 
nominal independence.42 In private Sukarno complained bitterly 
about the contrast: ‘It’s beyond our comprehension what evil we’ve 
done to be made to face such an insult.’43 The hurt was personal 
too. He was beaten by a drunken Japanese officer who claimed 
not to recognise the Indonesian leader.44 In truth it was the craven 
attitude of the Indonesian nationalists, in contrast to the more 
independent stance taken by nationalists in these other countries, 
which left the country lagging behind in the movement towards 
limited independence.
Experience showed that progress did not come from kowtowing 
to imperialism. When they first arrived the Japanese were uncertain 
of their reception and dropped Indonesian flags from planes. But 
as soon as they felt secure they banned such national symbols, all 
political parties, and any discussion of politics.45 It was only when 
they felt their hold on the country was at risk that permission to use 
the flag and the term ‘Indonesia’ was given once more.46 
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Sukarno’s fawning (and that of the nationalist movement in 
general) was analogous to the attentists elsewhere. Fearing mass 
mobilisation might spill over into a challenge to his all-class alliance, 
he depended on one of the belligerent imperialists in the Second 
World War bestowing independence. Hatta and Sjahrir were less 
enthusiastic than Sukarno about Japan, as they disliked its militarism 
intensely. However, the pair agreed to an ingenious division of 
labour: Hatta would work with Sukarno and use opportunities 
that might arise through his channels; meanwhile, Sjahrir would 
stand aloof so that there was a leader with whom the Allies could 
do business in the event of Japanese defeat.47 Neither man offered an 
alternative to reliance on one or other of the rival imperial powers. 
With the communists neutralised by repression there was no 
other strategy on offer. Consequently Indonesia saw ‘no maquis 
or even underground networks in the sense of groups engaged 
in sabotage, spying, or subversion’.48 The only attempt to build 
a serious resistance movement under Japanese occupation was 
initiated by Amir Sjarifuddin, leader of the most left-wing of the 
pre-war legal parties. He accepted 25,000 guilders from Holland 
to mount a campaign.49 It was unlikely that any movement that 
might assist the return of the Dutch would gain a foothold and his 
organisation was quickly penetrated by the occupation secret police 
and eliminated.50 Beyond this, there were only three tiny organised 
groupings on Java. Merely forums for discussion and composed 
largely of students studying medicine and law, they drew on an 
extremely narrow, privileged layer.51 There were isolated examples of 
sporadic resistance, from peasants in Aceh, to an Islamic movement 
in South Kalimantan, but as one author writes: ‘none of these forms 
of popular resistance seriously threatened Japanese rule, and all met 
with terrible consequences.’52
The decision of people like Sukarno or Hatta to tie themselves 
to the coat-tails of Japanese imperialism did not arise purely from 
the difficulties of resistance, but was the consequence of a political 
choice. With the possible exception of Poland, in every country 
considered so far, people’s war was shot through with issues of social 
change. But the nationalist leaders’ stress on national struggle to the 
exclusion of class issues removed an important motive for ordinary 
people to resist.53 In sum, the power and brutality of imperialism 
(both Dutch and then Japanese), coupled with the character of 
Indonesia’s national leadership, stymied the development of a 
people’s war. 
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The situation changed dramatically during the closing stages of 
the Second World War. The people’s war may have been a late 
arrival on the scene, but it was able to simultaneously challenge the 
Japanese, the Dutch, their British backers, and the Indonesian elite. 
The turnaround was assisted by the weakening position of Japan. 
The USA was vastly superior in economic strength and manpower, 
and Japan suffered defeats at Midway (June 1942), Guadalcanal 
(February 1943) and the Aleutians (August 1943). The forces 
occupying Indonesia were now needed elsewhere and soon only 
eight of the original 23 battalions remained.54 
The end of Japanese rule was swift. On 24–25 February 1945 
the US Air Force began the series of raids that culminated in 
the Tokyo firestorm that killed 100,000 people – initially more 
than at Hiroshima. Four days afterwards in Java the Japanese 
announced the formation of an ‘Investigation Committee for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence’. Not only was its title 
highly tentative, it did not even meet until 28 May, and achieved 
little. Its successor, the slightly more boldly named ‘Preparatory 
Committee for Independence’ was established on 7 August – the day 
after Hiroshima.55 Finally Japan promised immediate independence, 
but before this all-too-obvious manoeuvre could be carried out 
Japan surrendered. The terms accepted on 15 August 1945 required 
that in Indonesia Japan must maintain ‘the status quo, while firmly 
securing peace and good order, until the day when the transfer of 
everything to the Allies is completed’.56 Previously Japan had chosen 
to ban the Indonesian flag; now, in a thrilling 360 degree turn, they 
banned the Indonesian flag once more! The only difference was that 
this time it was at Allied insistence.57 
Even though Sukarno’s carefully nurtured hopes of backing 
from Tokyo had turned to dust, he still hesitated to declare 
independence.58 Liberation would require a people’s war from 
below, and it was at this moment that it appeared – in the form 
of the pemuda (youth), a point stressed in Anderson’s classic Java 
in a Time of Revolution. ‘Youth’ may seem a vague and arbitrary 
category. The age difference between the Sukarno generation and 
pemuda leaders was only twelve years, for example.59 One writer 
therefore objects to Anderson’s use of the term, as it is ‘a ubiquitous 
adjective – as in “pemuda consciousness”, “pemuda tradition,” 
“pemuda nationalism,” and “pemuda revolution” … abstractions 
without substantiation’.60 It is valid because the blot of repression 
and collaboration had crippled the generation that lived between 
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the destruction of the PKI in the 1920s and 1945. Only the young 
were free from this past; and their impact was immediate.
In the early hours of 16 August, a group of pemuda kidnapped 
Sukarno and Hatta to compel them to immediately declare 
independence.61 The two leaders temporised and were released. 
But later that day they approached Japan’s Admiral Maeda, who 
was known to be sympathetic to the national cause. He was one of 
several officers who thought that if Tokyo granted independence 
even at this late stage it might secure Japan a long-term ally. Others 
like Yamamoto, the Japanese commander in Java, intended to strictly 
enforce the surrender terms. He refused to receive Maeda and the 
Indonesian nationalists, or even call a meeting of the Preparatory 
Committee. Instead, he deployed troops to prevent a mass meeting 
in Jakarta and imposed a radio blackout. Faced with an impasse 
and the momentum created by the pemuda Sukarno, despite his 
misgivings, proclaimed independence on 17 August.62 
It was uncertain this would succeed as former imperialist rivals 
had reconciled their differences. Sukarno could declare himself 
President and Indonesia independent, but the Japanese authorities 
might remain in charge until the Dutch returned. To forestall this 
the movement of educated urban youth expanded to encompass 
armed militias and mass insurrection. The people’s war was born. 
Targets ranged from an unholy alliance of British, Dutch and 
Japanese troops, to local Indonesian officials and individuals who 
had profited from occupation. 
There were also tensions between the pemuda and the very 
government they had just done so much to establish. At state 
level youth representatives constituted just one-sixth of the 135 
invited to form the new Central Indonesian National Committee 
(KNIP). The rest, says Anderson, were ‘professional men who had 
been appointed to the various top-level pseudo-legislative and 
pseudo-party organisations of the Japanese period’.63 At local level 
Sukarno declared that the clique of Indonesian administrators who 
had faithfully served both Dutch and Japanese masters, must not 
be treated ‘as secretaries, clerks or petty foremen [but given] the 
proper place it deserves’.64 
International relations were another controversial area. Sukarno 
and Hatta’s closeness to the Japanese put them at a disadvantage 
when dealing with the Allies. By contrast, Sjahrir had kept his 
distance and so in his pamphlet, Our Struggle, he could plausibly 
call for a thorough elimination of remaining imperialist influence. 
The new Republic must start by: 
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purging itself of the stains of Japanese fascism, and curbing 
the views of those whose minds are still under the influence 
of Japanese propaganda and indoctrination. Those who have 
sold their souls and their honor to the Japanese fascists must be 
eliminated from the leadership of our revolution [and] regarded 
as fascists themselves … .65
Such statements won pemuda support and in November 1945 
they compelled Sukarno to downgrade his role as President to 
a ceremonial one, and appoint Sjahrir to dominance as Prime 
Minister.66
Our Struggle condemned the Japanese, but embraced the rival 
victors of the Second World War:
so long as the world we live in is dominated by capital, we are 
forced to make sure that we do not earn the enmity of capitalism 
… Indonesia is geographically situated within the sphere of 
influence of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and imperialism; accordingly, 
Indonesia’s fate depends ultimately on the fate of Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism and imperialism … [Indonesia is] in harmony with the 
political ambitions of that Giant of the Pacific, the United States.67
The timing of this statement was highly significant. At the very 
moment it appeared ‘Anglo-Saxon imperialism’ was engaged in 
invading the country to prepare for the return of the Dutch, and 
Sjahrir had negotiated an agreement giving ‘recognition by the 
Republic of all claims by foreign nationals for the restitution and 
maintenance of their rights and properties…’68
A comprehensive alternative to both the Sukarno and Sjahrir 
was penned by the ‘the enigmatic and legendary’69 Tan Malaka, a 
former leader of the PKI who had pursued an independent course 
in his long exile. His movement ‘Persatuan Perdjuangan’ (Union 
of Resistance – PP) rejected both imperialist camps: ‘We are not 
willing to negotiate with any one else before we obtain our 100 
percent freedom and before our enemy has left our shores and our 
seas in good order. We are not willing to negotiate with a thief in 
our house.’70
If negotiations were excluded, how was it possible to deal 
with the imperialist ‘thief’? Malaka’s solution was to engage the 
people in an offensive based on an ambitious social and military 
programme: ‘Why should the factories and the agricultural estates 
not be confiscated before freedom is obtained 100 per cent? Why 
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should they not be distributed among the masses? Because if they 
have become the properties of the masses, they will be able to fight 
as lions if the enemy ever comes back.’71
The difference between Sjahrir and Tan Malaka concerned 
their interpretations of the Second World War. The former saw 
it as the victory of one imperialism over another, and hoped the 
Anglo-Saxons could be peacefully persuaded to accept independence. 
The latter saw the Second World War as a people’s war, ‘a national 
revolutionary movement … backed by the full mobilized force of 
popular hopes and energies’.72
Sjahrir’s strategy was discredited within six months of 
independence. By February 1946 the British had invaded to restore 
the Dutch, and the Republican government had been forced to flee 
Jakarta for the relative safety of inland Yogyakarta. Malaka’s PP had 
now grown to massive proportions. Its demonstration in the new 
capital was 8km long.73 Isolated and despised, Sjahrir’s government 
resigned, and it seemed the PP programme of people’s war would 
become government policy. But this was not to be. Enormous though 
it was, the mass movement’s birth was very recent, and it lacked the 
sort of organisational coherence given by experienced communist 
party cadres to resistance movements elsewhere. Sukarno realised 
the PP was too heterogeneous to seize power, and banking on its 
unstable coalition falling apart, he defiantly reappointed Sjahrir as 
PM. Tan Malaka was arrested on trumped up charges and the PP 
quickly disintegrated. It seemed the people’s war could bring an 
independent state into existence, but lacked the ability to control it. 
This was not the end, however. The pemuda fought on at 
community level, because they saw independence as more than an 
affair simply for national politicians. One feature of this second 
level of action was the so-called ‘social revolutions’. For example, 
on 1 September a pemuda council suggested ‘all enterprises 
(offices, factories, mines, plantations, etc.) must be seized from 
the Japanese …’. Over the next fortnight Jakarta’s radio and tram 
workers took control over the enterprises they worked for.74 So 
complete was the process on the railways that by October ‘it was 
formally announced that all railway stations in Java were no longer 
under the control of the Japanese army; not a single Japanese soldier 
was allowed to enter any railway station, office or workshop’.75 
In Semarang pemuda captured civil buildings while workers 
did the same in local plantations and factories.76 Surabaya’s oil 
refinery workers led the way in developing self-organisation in that 
major port.77
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Lucas’s case study of social revolution in Pemalang gives a sense 
of events in the countryside. The movement was driven by anger at 
village heads who had administered Japan’s occupation policies.78 
Pemuda groups with titles like Movement of the Arab Youth of 
Indonesia, the Chinese Youth Irregulars, Hizbullah (Army of God), 
and the largest – Indonesian Youth Generation – sprang up. The 
variety of these bodies shows that, as one pemuda explained: 
‘Ideology was not important … We were united then with the one 
aim of destroying the corruptor cliques.’79 The activists carried out 
tasks ranging from the free distribution of cloth, control of the 
movement of goods, security, and the staging of community plays.80
Pemalang continued to suffer from rice shortages, and revenge was 
visited upon those local officials and hoarders felt to be responsible. 
One method was ‘dombringing’, publicly parading culprits wearing 
a necklace of rice to the accompaniment of clanging tin pots and 
wooden clappers. ‘The essence, then, of these dombring actions was 
a symbolic, public unmasking and shaming of officials rather than 
intimidating or killing them.’81
Violence was not excluded, however. An official was killed for 
his role in cloth distribution under the Japanese, while the homes 
of others were looted and burnt. At the local sugar refinery the 
administration was overthrown.82 As Lucas explains, the strength 
of this spontaneous mass movement ensured that virtually all 
officials and collaborators were purged by the end of 1945. 
However, the weakness that afflicted the people’s war nationally – 
its sudden birth and lack of well-established organisation or cadres 
– meant that during the social revolutions the ‘corruptor cliques’ 
were often replaced by competing ‘alternative elites, ethnic and 
communal groups’.83
The comparative success of the ‘social revolutions’ was not to 
the taste of the central state, however. Turning on those who had 
brought him to power, Hatta declared there was ‘too much popular 
sovereignty’.84 The result in Pemalang was a series of mass arrests 
by the TKR (the new state army) during December 1945. One of 
the jailers explained the purpose of repression: ‘People were being 
taught a lesson … They were lined up in the town square and 
whipped until they were half dead.’85 Many revolutionaries spent 
years in captivity.
There was a third level of people’s war activity too. This provided 
the clearest expression of the dual nature of the Second World War, 
and involved confronting imperialist forces still fresh from settling 
their internecine conflicts. The former Allied and Axis enemies 
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joined together to attack Indonesia in successive waves, with the 
Japanese prominent at first, then the British, and finally the Dutch. 
Each will be considered in turn. 
In the last days of their rule Tokyo had recruited local auxiliary 
forces to assist in repelling an expected Allied invasion. One 
formation was the Peta which had involved 35,000 in Java and 
20,000 in Sumatra.86 Even during the war it could sometimes turn 
against its master, as Peta uprisings at Blitar, Kroja and Njomplon 
showed.87 After the war it posed a real threat to the Japanese. So 
before news of the VJ Day surrender had filtered through, ‘fully 
equipped, camouflaged and battle-ready army units’ of Japanese 
disarmed and disbanded such militias,88 with Sukarno’s approval.89 
The next service Japan provided was to facilitate the landing of 
British forces under Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia Command. This 
went smoothly everywhere except Surabaya.90 
However, the first clash occurred in October 1945 at Semarang. 
After independence many former militiamen became pemuda 
‘irregulars’. Anderson calls them ‘a swarming mass of heterogeneous 
armed groups that grew up from the bottom’. Often led by former 
officers both the imperialists and the Indonesian government 
found these very difficult to control.91 The British regarded them 
as ‘terrorists’ or ‘extremists’. According to the surrender terms 
the Japanese in Semarang were instructed to restore order there.92 
However, in many places Japanese troops had little motivation 
to comply with commands from former enemies, and many were 
torn between strict adherence to surrender terms of the Allies and 
facilitating the Indonesian Republic by default. The Japanese lashed 
out against the Indonesians in Semarang because, on nine separate 
occasions the British demanded that they do so, and also because 
the pemuda had forcibly disarmed a nearby Japanese force. The 
situation escalated into five days of bitter fighting which left Tokyo 
in control, but at the cost of around 2,000 Indonesians dead, against 
roughly 500 Japanese.93 
The Japanese were not the only imperialist army having difficulties 
in Java. After landing Britain soon realised it was too weak to 
control the whole island and so confined its forces to key cities. 
In a conciliatory (but hypocritical) move the commander for all 
Indonesia, Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, gave de facto 
recognition to the Republic, promising ‘the British have no intention 
of meddling in Indonesian internal affairs ... .’94 
London had charged Mountbatten’s forces with a three-fold 
duty: firstly, to disarm and repatriate the Japanese; secondly, to 
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rescue Allied internees held in Japanese camps but now menaced by 
Indonesians; and thirdly, to prepare for the return of the Dutch.95 
The first objective was almost immediately abandoned, because 
with only 45,000 troops Britain was too weak to confront hostile 
Indonesians on its own. Japan had required 70,000 soldiers to hold 
Java and that was when the population was co-operative. The Battle 
of Semarang led to a new warmth between the former enemies. 
When a British officer arrived there to investigate Japanese war 
crimes, Tull, the commander, removed him96 and reported that the 
Japanese ‘fought with incredible gallantry …’. Mountbatten’s own 
political advisor praised their ‘devotion to duty’,97 and Christison 
went so far as to recommend one Japanese Major for a Distinguished 
Service Order.98
So instead of repatriating the defeated troops as originally 
intended, Mountbatten told Christison to ‘Re-arm the Japs and 
take them under command’ for use in combat and support roles 
alongside Anglo-Dutch forces now fighting across the island.99 To 
one British officer this was an ‘Alice in Wonderland situation’.100 The 
policy evoked disgust amongst some of the lower ranks. In January 
1946, a Staff Sergeant Barker wrote the following to Ernest Bevin, 
the current Foreign Secretary:
Two Jap sentries stand at this billet door, as I write, armed 
with loaded British rifles, and a Bren Machine Gun with 13 full 
magazines. We sleep securely, thinking ‘Hell have we descended 
to THIS? Our tortured P.O.W comrades must be writhing in their 
jungle graves; what did they die for?’101
The second British objective concerned Japan’s prisoners. Many 
Indonesians were deeply hostile to these Dutch, Eurasians, and 
their families, a British report warning in typically racist terms, 
that without protection the natives would ‘sally out to indulge their 
tastes for murder and loot …’.102 Nonetheless, the risk of violence 
was real. For example, in Bandung, between December 1945 and 
March 1946, 1,500 (including Chinese who were seen as Dutch 
allies) were kidnapped or murdered.103 
So, the rescue of internees could be presented as the humanitarian 
face of the British mission. The truth was more complicated, for 
as one writer explains, it was intended that few internees would 
leave Indonesia: ‘The vast majority … would be gathered into areas 
where they could be given medical treatment … so that they could, 
in due course, resume their pre-war lives in a country where Dutch 
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authority was being restored by the British.’104 Violence against 
innocent civilians was regrettable, but the fact the British were there 
to reimpose the old arrangements was undoubtedly a provocation. A 
promise to end colonialism might well have eliminated the hostility. 
In October/November 1945 the issue of evacuating internees 
precipitated the most important engagement of the independence 
war. The port of Surabaya was a designated transit point for Japan’s 
former prisoners, and, uniquely for Java, this town had a militant 
working class tradition associated with employment at its large 
naval base.105 When the British landed on 25 October they ignored 
numerous posters saying ‘Remember the Atlantic Charter’ because, 
as one officer wrote: ‘My orders were to proceed into Surabaya 
and secure a position. Anyone not in Allied uniform and carrying 
arms was to be shot.’106 The pemuda had other ideas. They had 
fortuitously obtained large quantities of Japanese arms because 
a self-important Dutch naval officer, unhappy with relying on 
Britain, had flown ahead and demanded the Japanese surrender 
their weapons to him. Since he had no means of holding them they 
fell into Indonesian hands.107
When Britain’s Brigadier-General Mallaby realised he lacked 
the ability to disarm the pemuda, he decided instead to prioritise 
internee evacuation. The armaments issue was set aside and joint 
British-Indonesian committees were formed. Mallaby’s plan was 
scuppered when, the very next day, the British authorities in Jakarta 
airdropped leaflets warning all Indonesians to surrender their 
weapons within 48 hours or be shot. An eye witness described 
the Indonesians’ reaction: ‘Everywhere people were saying the 
same thing: “Of course, the Allies aren’t our enemies, but … 
We’ll fight!”’108 The outcome was an uprising in which around 
140,000 Indonesian TKR troops and pemuda attacked Britain’s 
4,000-strong 49th Indian Infantry Brigade.109 The latter might have 
been obliterated had not Sukarno again assisted occupying forces, 
and called a ceasefire. 
This time the Indonesian President’s authority was challenged. 
A popular local radio presenter called Bung Tomo used his Allah 
for Radio Rebellion station to warn the: ‘Leaders of the Indonesian 
people [that] if you gentlemen negotiate with the British and Dutch, 
this means the possibility that our people will be stripped naked once 
again … .’110 Sukarno’s ceasefire broke down almost immediately; 
Mallaby was killed; and the President had to step in a second time: 
‘I have ordered all fighting against the Allies to cease … there is no 
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reason yet for groups among the people to take the law into their 
own hands… .’111 
The new ceasefire lasted until the internees were safely evacuated. 
Then the British tore it up. To revenge Mallaby Christison 
announced: ‘I intend to bring the whole weight of my sea, land 
and air forces and all the weapons of modern war against them until 
they are crushed.’112 Surabaya’s punishment lasted three weeks and 
has been summarised in these terms:
British forces now consisted of about 6,000 Seaforth Highlanders 
strengthened by 24,000 ‘battle-hardened’ troops of the Fifth 
Division, 21 Sherman tanks, eight Thunderbolt and 16 Mosquito 
planes, and divisional artillery. Indonesian forces were neither 
countable nor accountable. They took shape from within and 
against imperial history, Dutch, Japanese and now, incidentally 
British. They expressed the spirit of Surabaya and the ideal 
of merdeka [liberation]. Their casualties were incompletely 
numbered. The British counted 1,618 corpses, and another 4,697 
Indonesians who died of wounds.113
Though Britain won in the short term, the people’s battle at Surabaya 
would ensure their triumph in the longer term. 
Elsewhere Christison ordered the destruction of Bekasi, where 
20 British troops survived a plane crash but had then been attacked 
by Indonesians. Air and ground strikes led to 200 houses being 
burnt down and many dead. As one historian explains: ‘Although 
the British occupation of Indonesia had assumed the character of 
a war, it is clear that captured Indonesians were not treated as 
prisoners of war, as the British had treated the Japanese in Burma. 
Indonesians captured in the act of offering armed resistance were 
shot as a matter of routine.’114
It was events such as these that led Nehru to say ‘… there is a 
perilous resemblance between these wars of intervention carried on 
by Britain and that other war of intervention, which fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany waged …’.115 By the end of its occupation in 1946 
British forces had sustained some 2,400 casualties, but inflicted 
death and injury on an estimated 31,000 pemuda.116
Holland was the last and weakest of the three imperialisms to 
act. Its government had learnt nothing from its own occupation by 
the Nazis, the Dutch representative saying of the Javanese: ‘We are 
their father and mother; they can’t manage without us.’117 Whether 
out of arrogance, natural proclivities, or an attempt to prolong 
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British assistance by provoking trouble, Dutch troops behaved 
outrageously whenever possible. One British Major complained that 
they targeted ‘youths and children’. ‘Split heads and broken limbs 
[became] almost hourly occurrences … Gunshot wounds, generally 
in the stomach or legs [were] so frequent as to be commonplace.’118 
It was to these forces that the British wished to hand Indonesia. 
It might be argued that to use the term ‘a people’s war against 
imperialism’ in the context of Indonesia is inappropriate. Was this 
not simply a ‘national war’ for independence? This would be a 
mistaken interpretation because the dividing line was between the 
militant pemuda, and both the imperialists and people like Sukarno, 
a man who collaborated with the Japanese and later on with the 
British (as his role in Surabaya showed). The hostility of the new 
Indonesian government to the ‘social revolutions’ was symbolised by 
the Indonesian government representative in Sumatra who requested 
foreign intervention against his own ‘irresponsible youths’. He asked 
the British commander to ‘deal with them severely … if only Allied 
troops would teach them a lesson, his position would become much 
more secure’.119
The imperialist war that began with the invasion of Java in 1942 
had not faltered in 1945. It only concluded in 1947, but although 
there is not space here to provide the details, in the end, the combined 
forces of Japan, Britain and Holland failed to crush the people’s war. 
After a protracted struggle Indonesia consolidated its independence. 
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vietnam – anti-Imperialist 
Breakthrough
Shortly after the formal end of the Second World War, General 
Vo Nguyen Giap of the Vietnamese Liberation Army met General 
Leclerc, the (misnamed) ‘liberator of Paris’,1 and greeted him with 
these words: ‘the first resistance fighter of Vietnam is happy to meet 
the first resistance fighter of France.’2 In 1946 the French returned 
to shell the port of Haiphong killing 6,000 civilians in a bid to 
restore their former rule. Vietnam’s fightback lasted 30 years and 
not only expelled the French but humbled America, the world’s 
greatest superpower.3 The contrast between Giap’s rhetoric, and 
the people’s war he was compelled to undertake, symbolised the 
conundrum that was the Second World War. Was it a struggle for 
freedom or to preserve established power? 
French Indochina had comprised Vietnam’s three provinces 
(Tonkin in the North, Annam in the centre, and Cochinchina in 
the South) plus Cambodia and Laos. To the world France claimed 
its officials there were performing an ‘immense task … for the sake 
of the Indochinese population’.4 In Paris the language was different: 
‘No country in the world … offers as many resources … There are so 
many industries to be created! So many brilliant financial operations 
to be performed! So what are you waiting for? Go ahead!’5 By the 
1930s ‘brilliant’ financial operations had concentrated two-thirds 
of the colony’s production in foreign hands6 and provided European 
civilians with an income 102 times greater than that of the peasants.7 
Such a regime inevitably depended on the sword, so over half of 
the 42,000 European residents were soldiers.8 
The impact of this colonial background on the Second World War 
period is disputed. According to the Indochinese Communist Party 
(ICP) the growth of an indigenous ruling class was so stunted that 
meaningful social divisions among the Vietnamese were effaced. Its 
leader, Ho Chi Minh said he was therefore following ‘the instructions 
in The Communist Manifesto: The proletariat of each nation should 
… build itself into a national class and make itself become national.’9 
If true it would have ruled out a people’s war with its social and 
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economic overtones, and stood Marx’s famous dictum – ‘Workers 
of the World Unite!’ – on its head. However, the ICP’s premise it 
was possible to ‘graft communism on to patriotism’10 was false. 
Though few in number, the per capita income of wealthy 
Vietnamese landowners and businessmen actually exceeded that 
of European civilians, and was 122 times greater than that of the 
peasantry.11 The Second World War further widened this social 
divide in several ways. As the colony was isolated from France it 
had to provide its own administrators, and the number of middle 
and top posts doubled. By 1944 the managing directors of 75 of 
the 92 corporations operating were Vietnamese.12 The French had 
deliberately expanded the power of local landlords so as to provide 
its regime with a domestic social base, and a mere 6,200 people 
owned 45 per cent of rice-growing land in the south. In the Red River 
valley 2 per cent of households possessed 50 per cent of land.13 The 
arrival of world war added rising food prices, hoarding, speculation, 
fabulous profits for the few, and immiseration for the majority.
Establishing the social dimension does not diminish the 
importance of the national issue. From 1941 Vietnam found itself 
oppressed by not just one imperialist power, but two! Japan viewed 
Vietnam as an important staging post for its Chinese campaign. 
Whereas Tokyo overturned European administrations in the 
Philippines, Malaya, Burma and Indonesia, in Indochina it signed 
a treaty with Vichy France. Governor-General Jean Decoux, an 
arch-Pétainist who imprisoned Jews and Gaullists, was permitted 
to remain in office in return for allowing Japanese bases.14 To 
Vichy’s diplomats it was ‘a miracle to have maintained, in the 
midst of the sphere controlled by Japan, a peaceful, prosperous 
“island” on which western civilization and ideas are successfully 
asserted’.15 Astonishingly, when France was liberated de Gaulle 
retained Decoux’s services. He feared that disturbing Decoux’s 
regime would open the way for the Chinese and their US backers 
to intervene, even more than he disliked Pétainist cronies. 
So the Free French government in Paris must take responsibility 
for Tonkin’s famine of 1945. As with Athens or Bengal this 
was man-made. Equitable food distribution could have avoided 
starvation16 even though poor weather and pests had reduced the 
northern rice crop by one-fifth.17 But the French army shipped ten or 
more boatloads of rice out of the affected area every day.18 Hoarders 
and speculators, many of them local, completed the job. In Tonkin’s 
capital, Hanoi, food prices rose 373 per cent in just three months.19 
Officials described seeing ‘corpses, which are shrivelled up on the 
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roadsides with only a handful of straw for clothes as well as for their 
burial garment. One feels ashamed of being a human.’20 Estimates 
of the death toll reach up to two million.21
Then the Japanese swept away what remained of French power. 
In November 1944, with the US poised to re-take the Philippines, 
Japan’s Southern Army transferred its General HQ from Manila to 
Saigon, and on 9 March it took sole control of Vietnam.22 Tokyo’s 
takeover had a significant political impact (although famine victims 
noticed little difference as grain requisitions continued).23 
The Japanese restored the Annamese Emperor Bao Dai to his 
palace in Hue and endowed him with fictitious independence and 
nominal powers over all Vietnam. By collaborating with the Axis 
Bao Dai, and the various nationalist parties who worked with him, 
sacrificed any claim to leadership in a future people’s war. That made 
it easier for ICP to become the undisputed leader of the struggle 
for independence.
However, the ICP did not adopt this position in a straight forward 
manner. Its strategy gradually evolved from subservience to the 
Allies to open people’s war against them. To understand why, it 
is necessary to follow the Party’s tortuous course under the twin 
impact of French repression and Stalinist politics.
The ICP’s founding statement in 1930 aimed: ‘To make Indochina 
completely independent’, by overthrowing ‘French imperialism 
and Vietnamese feudalism and reactionary bourgeoisie’. The ICP 
would ‘confiscate all the plantations and property belonging to 
the imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary bourgeoisie and 
distribute them to the poor peasants’.24 These aspirations gave 
the Party a difficult start in life, and that same year defeat of the 
‘Nghe Tinh Soviet’ movement led to the detention of thousands of 
communists. 
A decade later the ICP loyally committed itself to the Communist 
International’s popular front policies that were an exact opposite 
of the 1930 position:
1. For the time being the Party should not put forward too exacting 
demands (national independence, parliament, etc.). To do so is 
to play into the Japanese fascists’ hands. It should only claim 
democratic rights, freedom of organization, freedom of assembly, 
freedom of the press and freedom of speech, general amnesty 
for all political detainees, and freedom for the Party to engage 
in legal activity.
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2. To reach this goal, the Party must strive to organize a broad 
Democratic National Front. This Front should embrace not 
only Indochinese but also progressive French people residing 
in Indochina, not only the toiling people but also the national 
bourgeoisie.
3. The Party must assume a tactful, flexible attitude towards the 
national bourgeoisie, strive to draw them into the Front and 
keep them there … .
If the national bourgeoisie were now welcome allies, Trotskyists, 
who still advocated many policies the ICP itself embraced in 1930, 
were the enemy: ‘there can be no compromise, no concession. We 
must do everything possible to unmask them as agents of fascism 
and annihilate them politically.’25
Despite revising its policies and making overtures to the French, 
the ICP did not escape anti-communist repression following the 
Hitler–Stalin Pact.26 Arrests so disrupted internal links that the 
party’s central apparatus no longer exerted the monolithic authority 
common to communist organisations.27 The leadership were unable 
to prevent members from being drawn into doomed uprisings 
against the French at Bac Son in the North and Cochinchina in the 
South. Marr describes how the latter was crushed:
[A]ircraft, armoured cars, and artillery were used to destroy 
whole villages ... For want of sufficient handcuffs or chains, 
detainees had their hands and feet pierced with telegraph wire. 
When all existing prison facilities were full, the French packed 
detainees onto ships moored in the Saigon River. No one knows 
how many people died in this ‘white terror,’ but the number 
almost surely exceeded two thousand. Up to eight thousand were 
detained, some later dying in jail or being executed. On the other 
side, three Frenchmen and thirty militamen or local Vietnamese 
notables were killed.28
Such experiences reinforced the ICP leadership’s wariness of 
engaging in a people’s war.
As evidence of the difficulties the ICP faced, Ho Chi Minh was 
compelled to live abroad from 1911 to 1941 under numerous aliases. 
A leading opponent of colonialism rebuked him with these words: 
‘we shouldn’t reside overseas and introduce back our leadership. 
Instead we should return to the homeland’. He answered that this 
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was pointless since: ‘local combatants are all closely watched and 
hotly pursued on their own soil.’29 He changed his outlook during 
the Second World War. Ho then issued this ‘Letter from Abroad’:
Now the opportunity has come for our liberation. France itself 
is unable to help the French colonialists rule over our country. 
As for the Japanese, on the one hand, bogged down in China, 
on the other hampered by the British and American forces, they 
certainly cannot use all their strength against us. If our entire 
people are solidly united we can certainly get the better of the 
best-trained armies of the French and the Japanese. Fellow-
countrymen! Rise up!30
Even now progress was slow. On the eve of gaining power in the 
August 1945 revolution, the party still counted no more than 5,000 
members (a third of whom were in jail). Its army was of a similar 
size.31 The Japanese had 57,000 troops in Vietnam, and thousands 
more seasoned Allied troops were waiting in the wings to crush 
any post-war independence movement.32 These conditions led the 
Vietnamese ICP to adopt a cautious strategy.
Playing down popular initiatives Ho cautioned against precipitate 
mass struggle as this was ‘likely to lead to the dispersal of physical 
and human resources’.33 Instead, he advocated a three-stage plan 
following the Chinese CP model. First, the party cadre would 
establish a revolutionary base in a secluded spot.34 Later the 
peasantry would be recruited, and in the final stage the party would 
launch an assault on the towns and seize power. Ho Chi Minh had 
been a Comintern functionary for many years, and if he still paid 
lip service to the proletariat, in practice he relegated mass action to 
rubber-stamping the actions of the Party and wrote off the urban 
working class.
The first tentative step in his programme was the formation of 
an ‘Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam’. Its 
title boldly pointed to the eventual goal but expressly fell short of 
direct confrontation. As Ho put it, ‘the name … shows that greater 
importance is attached to its political than to its military action’.35 
Then, in May 1941, came the decision to create the Viet Nam 
Doc Lap Dong Minh (Hoi) [Vietnam Independence League], or 
Vietminh. Marr explains how this positioned:
[W]orkers and peasants side by side with those landlords, 
capitalists, mandarins, soldiers, intellectuals, clerks, and 
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shopkeepers increasingly antagonized by outrageous Franco-
Japanese behaviour and prepared to struggle for Vietnam’s 
national liberation … The Viet Minh would identify itself entirely 
with one side in the global confrontation, those who soon styled 
themselves the Allies.36
The price for seeking friendship with this faction (which, it must be 
remembered, included de Gaulle’s French) was to defer working-class 
and poor peasant demands in favour of a ‘national liberation 
revolution’.37 Therefore the Vietminh renounced redistribution of 
land, a key issue, as it provided the livelihood of 90 per cent of the 
population. According to Neale, part of the explanation for the 
stance of the ICP can be put down to its social origins:
First it recruited educated men … Then those people recruited 
and led the villagers they knew… They were the decent minority 
of the landlord class. They hated the corruption and brutality of 
their class. They wanted to sweep away the old order and replace 
it with a modern industrial state … This meant the Communist 
Party was always deeply ambivalent about land reform.38
So strenuous were Ho’s efforts to forge a cross-class alliance 
that foreign commentators were uncertain as to whether he was a 
communist or not. The Times, for example, published this report: 
‘There seem to be only two parties of any significance at the moment, 
the Viet-min and the Communists.’39 Ho’s ‘frontist’ strategy went so 
far as the formal dissolution of the ICP (in November 1945), which, 
as one writer says, ‘was a gesture without precedent or parallel in 
the history of the international Communist movement’.40
Modifying policies did not guarantee that Allied assistance, 
however. With Russia out of reach, Ho turned to warlords linked 
to Chiang Kai Shek, the Chinese nationalist leader. They operated 
on the Sino-Vietnamese border and could provide weapons and a 
safe haven if retreat became necessary. Hopeful of their support, 
in February 1941 he established himself in a cave in Cao Bang, a 
mountainous border area.41 The precarious nature of Ho’s position 
was underlined when he was held captive for a year by a previously 
co-operative warlord. Since Chinese help had proved unreliable42 
he sought alternative sources of aid. At one point he even declared 
himself ‘ready to shake hands with the French who are truly and 
thoroughly resolved to resist the Japanese …’.43 General Giap 
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duly made contact with France’s Commander Reul, but an accord 
proved elusive.44
American aid was a better option. There were signs the USA 
might help the Vietminh and oppose the restoration of French 
colonialism. When Roosevelt discussed Vietnam with Stalin at the 
Teheran Conference in 1943 they agreed ‘100% [that] France should 
not get back into Indochina’. The President added that the USA 
was considering with its Chinese client ‘a system of trusteeship 
which would have the task of preparing the people for independence 
within a definite period of time, perhaps 20 to 30 years.’45 Such 
paternalism fitted post-war plans. Europe’s Asian possessions 
were to be cracked open and subjected to America’s overwhelming 
economic dominance, with four policemen ultimately ruling the 
world: Russia, Britain, USA and China. France was not yet part 
of this future.46 
But American friendship towards the Vietminh would be 
shortlived. As the Second World War drew to a close Cold War 
winds began blowing. Chiang’s Nationalist China collapsed 
while de Gaulle’s France was needed to counter Russian influence 
in Europe. Therefore, four days before he died in April 1945, 
Roosevelt killed off his trusteeship plan.47 By May the US Secretary 
of State was claiming, disingenuously, that his government had been 
‘entirely innocent of any official statement … questioning, even by 
implication, French sovereignty over Indo-China.’48
These shifting sands of US government policy sowed confusion 
in the East Asian theatre. For example, the US Air Force flew many 
sorties to help the French during their brief resistance to Japan’s 9 
March coup.49 Yet soon afterwards OSS agents worked with Ho 
Chi Minh and even enrolled him as an agent50 and a team under 
Major Allison Thomas parachuted in to train Vietminh fighters.51 
Although the US supplied only 12 per cent of its weapons52 the 
psychological boost for the Vietminh was considerable as it became 
associated with the victorious Americans.53 
By VJ Day the US had swung decisively towards supporting 
French claims and abandoning Ho. Major Thomas was the Allied 
officer best placed to receive the Japanese surrender in Hanoi, but 
was told by his superiors that ‘under no circumstances’ was he to do 
so. He found this ‘stunning news’ and ‘extremely disheartening’ but 
discerned the reasoning behind his orders. America dare not be seen 
co-operating with Ho because ‘the French were our Allies and the 
Vietminh party was a secret party working against the French …’.54 
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So despite all efforts Ho failed to obtain consistent support from 
any of the relevant Allies – France, China or the US. Yet his strategy 
remained attentist and tied closely to an expected Allied landing. As 
late as 12 March 1945 the ICP Central Committee said:
we should not only wait for the Allied forces to get a firm foothold, 
we must also wait until they are advancing. At the same time, we 
must wait until the Japanese send forces to the front to intercept 
the Allied forces, thus relatively exposing their rear, before we 
launch the general insurrection.55
Nonetheless Ho’s approach was not bound hand and foot to 
imperialism. He was not so naïve as to take announcements such as 
the Atlantic Charter at face value and, while waiting for the Allies, 
also envisaged a mass movement to counter any re-imposition of 
French rule. 
In the meantime the Vietminh generally avoided conflict with 
Japanese forces. Between March and May its operations cost Tokyo 
around 50 men.56 Tonnesson suggests that the Japanese found this ‘a 
nuisance’, but not one comparable to the resistance in Yugoslavia, 
or to the Chinese Red Army: ‘the few clashes do not amount to 
more than incidents. There was never enough fighting to speak of 
armed struggle.’57
Everything changed when looming defeat loosened the grip of 
Japan. A power vacuum suddenly developed enabling the aspirations 
of ordinary Vietnamese to find expression. The Vietminh benefited 
from this despite its miniscule size and orientation on tightly 
organised military formations. It became the rallying point for a 
people’s war in the North, and also a major force in the South. 
Marr describes the complex relationship between the mass popular 
movement from below and the narrow layer of communists:
While most of the upheavals in August were sparked by Viet Minh 
slogans (created or cleared by experienced ICP members), and 
while almost everyone came to identify with the Viet Minh flag, 
soon to become the national standard, many local groups calling 
themselves Viet Minh had almost no idea of what the organization 
stood for, much less possess any connections with the Tong Bo 
(General Headquarters). The hundreds of ‘people’s committees’ 
and ‘revolutionary committees’ that replaced the assorted royal 
mandarins and appointed councils … were far from being mere 
appendages of the central authority or fronts for ICP cadres. 
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Many of these committees sought revenge for past injustices or 
projected radical social revolutionary aspirations ... .58
People’s war occurred because official ICP policy was disregarded 
on a mass scale. Rejecting the politics of class compromise many 
demanded land redistribution and started ‘a property upheaval 
from below that no government could control’.59 The French 
authorities in Tonkin noted the accelerating rhythm with just four 
‘Vietminh incidents’ recorded during 1942–43, but 80 in 1944.60 In 
famine districts the local Vietminh gave organised expression to the 
widespread need for grain. Demonstrations armed with spears and 
machetes became commonplace, with over 75 warehouses affected 
in the Red River Delta alone.61
By the summer of 1945 this seething discontent had intensified 
and the ICP had to respond. In June the Vietminh declared a 
‘liberated zone’ in the North and 100,000 people, or one in ten 
of the population there, enrolled in its militia.62 At this time the 
Vietminh had only 80,000 adherents in the rest of the country. 
On 12 August it called for a general uprising, and the next day 
‘Military Order No. 1’ ordered an attack on the Japanese with a 
view to seizing their arms.63
Nonetheless, the ICP’s ability to control and direct the on-going 
people’s war remained limited. In particular, the difficulty of 
communicating across this 1,650km strip of a country meant that 
between late 1940 and June 1945 there was no direct contact between 
the leadership in the North and Cochinchina!64 Different southern 
currents challenged the Vietminh organisation for leadership. One 
was the Vanguard Youth. Originally a French-inspired scouting 
and sports organisation, it was politicised by war and had a mass 
following, but it lacked the Vietminh’s coherence due to the great 
variety of political currents and religious sects that jostled for 
dominance within its ranks.
Another rival was Trotskyism which rejected the ICP strategy of 
a cross-class alliance working in stages (from revolutionary base, 
to the countryside, and finally the towns). This current had many 
adherents in Cochinchina, and in the 1939 elections to the Colonial 
Council eclipsed the communists by attracting the overwhelming 
majority of votes.65 The Trotskyist leader, Ta Thu Thau, rejected 
the notion that one could ‘graft communism on to patriotism’. He 
insisted a choice must be made between ‘socialism or nationalism’ 
because, although the world was ‘divided politically into nations, 
[it] tends to form an economic whole …’. So the division between 
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exploiters and exploited was greater than between capitalist states. 
In Vietnam this meant workers and peasants faced a two-headed 
enemy – colonialism ‘dragging behind it the native bourgeoisie’.66 
Ta Thu Thau believed that the Second World War presented an 
opportunity ‘to take advantage of the war between the capitalist 
nations to emancipate the proletariat’.67 For this to happen clear 
class demands had to be put forward.
Japan’s sudden surrender wrecked Ho Chi Minh’s strategy 
of co-operating with advancing Allied forces as a step towards 
eventually gaining power. The Vietminh did triumph, but events 
occurred in reverse order to the leadership’s expectations. As 
Tonnesson writes, the ICP found itself:
on the sidelines in August, when the opportunity for a classical 
city-revolution suddenly presented itself. In Hanoi, Hue and many 
provincial centres, the August Revolution was carried out – more 
or less spontaneously – by enthusiastic youth and second-level 
cadres while the party leaders were stuck in their ‘war capital’, 
an out of the way little place they called Tan Trao.68
It was the nationalist Democratic Party in Hanoi which called 
the first mass demonstration, on 16 August, insisting that only 
a ‘revolution by all citizens’ would be enough to frustrate the 
ambitions of the various imperialist forces. However, that Party was 
outmanoeuvred by a Vietminh supporter. She took the rostrum and 
led the crowd in cheers for her organisation. As the only nationally 
organised, disciplined, cadre party in the revolutionary mix, the ICP 
and its Vietminh front held a trump card. It quickly made up for 
lost time. Defying the central leadership’s attentism, the Communist 
Regional Committee called for a seizure of power. On 19 August 
a crowd of 200,000 accomplished this while demoralised Japanese 
troops stood aside.69
Again, contrary to Ho’s ideas, action in towns inspired the 
countryside, not vice versa. Rural activists poured into Hanoi for 
advice, followed by tens of thousands of villagers.70 At the same 
time the revolution burst through the limitations of ICP policy. 
Marr writes that despite the Vietminh leaders’ determination to 
avoid radical demands:
Events in many rural districts of Vietnam in late August 
went well beyond political transfer of power, involving social 
revolutionary behaviour the consequences of which no one could 
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predict at the time. The administration established by the Viet 
Minh in Hanoi became as much a prisoner of the thousands of 
revolutionary committees emerging around the country as the 
directing authority.71
The contradictions opening up between the people’s understanding 
of the purpose of the Second World War and the ICP brought in 
the question of land. On 30 July 1945 the Party reiterated its 
programme, such as preservation of existing land tenure:
After the victory of the Revolution, when our country becomes 
independent, the land of rich people is not to be distributed to 
the poor people. We will confiscate only the land and property 
of aggressors and traitors. Anyone who says that the land of rich 
people must be distributed to the poor deliberately divides the 
people’s united front and certainly deserves punishment.72
But the revolution ignored such strictures. In North Annam 
and Tonkin committees shared out land and confiscated the 
wealth of the rich. Elsewhere, 30,000 miners formed a ‘workers’ 
Commune’ establishing equal pay for all, and controlling not only 
the collieries but public services, railways and telegraphs. This 
organisation survived until the Vietminh arrested its leadership in 
November 1945.73
Still more troubling for the ICP was the turn of events in the south, 
where competition was strongest. When Japan surrendered here 
local communists mobilised in a village 40km from Saigon. They 
intended to approach it only later.74 But 100,000 marched through 
the Cochinese capital behind the banner of a ‘United National 
Front’75 and the Vanguard Youth led the way in seizing power.76 
For a time it looked as if the ICP had lost the initiative entirely.77
In this maelstrom Trotskyist slogans were popular: ‘Land to the 
peasants! Nationalisation of the factories under workers’ control! 
People’s committees!’78 These calls both reflected and inspired the 
actions of the landless in the provinces of Mytho, Travinh, Sadec, 
Longxuyen and Chaudoc.79 Workers in the Phu Nhuan district 
declared their committee to be the ‘sole legal power in the area’, 
an example followed elsewhere.80 Within three weeks over 150 
independent revolutionary committees were established.81 
But the ICP, with its Stalinist roots, was not about to abandon the 
South to others. After half a million marched through Saigon on 25 
August, a Southern Provisional Executive Committee was formed 
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to unite the various currents in one body. The Vietminh quickly 
manoeuvred to win most positions82 and then turned on its rivals. 
Following Ho Chi Minh’s policy that ‘All those who do not follow 
the line set out by me will be broken’,83 several Trotskyists were 
executed, a notable early casualty being Ta Thu Thau. 
As well as reining in the revolution, Ho wooed the imperialists. 
On 2 September he broadcast from Hanoi the ‘Declaration of 
Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’ (DRV). This 
began with a direct quotation from the USA’s Declaration of 1776, 
and followed up with words lifted from France’s 1791 ‘Declaration 
of the Rights of Man’.84 Ho predicted that since the ‘Allied nations 
… have acknowledged the principles of self-determination and 
equality of nations [so they] will not refuse to acknowledge the 
independence of … a people who have fought side by side with the 
Allies against the fascists during these last years’.85 
Following this line in Cochinchina, Tran van Giau, the ICP leader 
of the Provisional Executive Committee discouraged the only thing 
that could counter imperialism – mass activity.86 He announced the 
disarming of all non-governmental organisations on 7 September, 
saying: ‘Those who call the people to arms and above all to fight 
against the imperialist Allies will be considered provocateurs and 
saboteurs.’87 This was the day after the first Allied troops had 
disembarked, but before they could establish their authority. 
In Hanoi the DRV survived, not so much through an alliance 
with imperialism but because arguments amongst the Allied powers 
provided a breathing space. Roosevelt was determined to bolster 
China, and the US Commander, General Wedemeyer was ordered 
‘to prevent any British and French political activities’ in areas under 
his control.88 By contrast, the commander of British forces, General 
Gracey was told to ‘liberate Allied territory in so far as your resources 
permit’.89 Of course, the ‘Ally’ was France, and the territory in 
question was to be ‘liberated’ from the Vietnamese themselves. To 
resolve this row the US and Britain struck a deal at the Potsdam 
Conference. Vietnam was divided between ‘the China Theater’ of 
operations north of the 16th parallel, and Mountbatten’s South East 
Asian Command in the south. De Gaulle was disappointed but too 
weak to intervene. He thought, rightly, that these divisions ‘fatally 
compromised’ imperialist efforts.90
Ho was fortunate that the Chinese were more interested in 
corruption and plunder than long-term occupation of North 
Vietnam on their own account, and they tacitly recognised the Hanoi 
government.91 It was a different story in Cochinchina. Although 
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the Vietnamese reminded General Gracey that they ‘fought side 
by side with the Allies against the fascists’, his response could not 
have been more blunt: ‘I was welcomed on arrival by the Viet 
Minh, who said “Welcome” and all that sort of thing. It was a very 
unpleasant situation, and I promptly kicked them out. They were 
obviously communists.’92 
Gracey had no qualms about following Mountbatten’s injunction 
to ‘rely on the Japanese and French forces to enforce your orders’.93 
He had a Japanese unit assist his Gurkhas in expelling the Provisional 
Executive Committee from its offices.94 On 21 September, he banned 
all demonstrations, processions, public meetings and the carrying of 
arms by Vietnamese. The day after martial law was imposed groups 
described by The Times as ‘members of the French maquis’95 were 
unleashed on the southern capital. In fact most were French soldiers 
and Legionaries linked to the Vichy regime from the time of Decoux. 
Some were even Waffen-SS newly freed from Japanese prisoner of 
war camps.96 They ran ‘rampage through the city, cursing, beating 
up, detaining, and otherwise offending any native encountered’.97 
In response the Vietminh called a general strike. Open war 
followed. One eyewitness recounted: ‘The crackle of gunfire and 
the thud of mortars soon resonated through the city, as armed 
Vietminh squads attacked the airport, burned the central market 
and stormed the local prison to liberate hundreds of Vietnamese 
inmates’.98 Numerous French civilians were killed soon after.
Since local French forces were so chaotic Gracey withdrew them 
(pending the arrival of units from France on 5 October) and fell back 
more heavily on the Japanese. They were deployed in combat roles, 
the official history of 20th Indian Division recording that: ‘All the 
dirty work, to fight and disarm the Annamites (Vietnamese), was 
assigned to the Japanese troops.’99 Thus a bizarre coalition of Allied 
victors and defeated Axis, Japanese jailers and jailed collaborators, 
worked together to oust Vietnamese rule in their own country. By 
Febuary 1946 British forces had lost 40 soldiers, France 106, and 
Japan 110. Against this were set at least 3,026 Vietnamese. 1,825 
were victims of the French, 651 of British forces, and 550 died at the 
hands of the Japanese.100 The last British forces withdrew in March 
1946, leaving the French in control south of the 16th parallel and 
determined to extend their power north of it. 
Ho’s attempt to straddle the two wars proved unsuccessful. 
Wooing imperialism to assist independence did not bear fruit. 
Though the belated promotion of mass action did bring victory in 
Hanoi, it left the enemy in power in the south. As we saw at the 
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beginning of this chapter, the presence of two wars was summed 
up in the contradiction between the hopes of General Giap and 
his eventual actions. This can now be elaborated upon. In early 
September 1945 he had argued:
The great powers in the democratic front have declared that they 
were fighting for equality among nations, so there is no reason 
why they would help French imperialism return to repress and 
exploit the Vietnamese people.
We and the whole world cannot imagine that after having, of 
our own volition, stood on the allied side to fight the Japanese 
fascists in Indochina, after having contributed bones and blood 
to the struggle of the allies on the Pacific front, we would be 
considered by the allies as having to live under the yoke of slavery 
of the French colonialists, who were the very ones who agreed 
to let Fascist Japan occupy Indochina in order to make it a base 
for attacking the Philipines, Malaya, Burma, South China … .101
Yet it was this same man who masterminded the stunning defeat 
of the French army at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the eventual 
defeat of the Americans who stepped in afterwards. The thirty-year 
Vietnam War became the most important anti-imperialist episode of 
the twentieth century and a stirring example of the people’s war. The 
final outcome was an independent country, though one ruled by a 
dictatorial state capitalist regime. Many of the social and economic 
demands of ordinary people went unanswered in the process, and 
in the challenge set by Ta Thu Thau of ‘nationalism or socialism’, 
the government came down firmly on the side of the former.
In Vietnam, as elsewhere, the Second World War saw political, 
social, and economic elements blended in unpredictable combinations 
and producing unpredictable results. Ho Chi Minh’s initial policy of 
relying on various imperialist powers turned out to be flawed, and 
he came to a grudging acceptance that a people’s war was the only 
solution to the problem of independence: ‘The war is won. But we 
small and subject countries have no share, or very very small share, 
in the victory of freedom and democracy. Probably, if we want to 
get a sufficient share, we have still to fight.’102
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The conventional view of the war against the Axis admits the 
co-existence of official armies and the resistance, generals and 
privates, rich and poor, but stresses their harmony and joint 
endeavour to end the evils of the Axis regimes. However, differences 
between the participants were not variations upon a common theme, 
but reflected fundamentally contradictory processes at the level 
of aims, ideology, tactics, military and social structures. Between 
1939 and 1945 parallel wars were not an exception to the rule but 
occurred generally, if not universally. Apparent unity merely papered 
over the underlying cracks, the notion of the Second World War as 
a ‘single whole’ was a convenient myth.
An example of the disparity between the two elements was the 
presumed shared opposition to fascism. During the Spanish Civil 
War the Western Allies chose Franco over the Republic, and they 
continued to support him after the Second World War. Conflict 
with Germany only began after appeasement policies failed to curb 
Hitler’s territorial expansion into spheres of Franco-British influence. 
During and after the war the Allies were happy to work with Axis 
forces indirectly (take the example of Darlan, the abandonment 
of the Warsaw uprising or the collaborationist militias in Greece), 
or directly (using Japanese troops in Indonesia and Vietnam). So, 
despite the common commingling of the two together, the people’s 
anti-fascist war did not correspond to the Allied governments’ war 
on the Axis.
The parallel wars differed in other ways too. Allied ruling classes 
battled to defend their privileged status quo from internal and 
external threats, while popular armed struggle strove for real, all-
encompassing, human liberation and a more just, democratic future. 
Imperialists sacrificed life indiscriminately to achieve their ends; 
partisans and guerrillas defended local populations from aggression 
and agonised over the risks their actions posed for civilians. 
Conventional soldiers were subordinate to a rigid hierarchy and 
sworn to unquestioning obedience; fighters of the people’s war, 
whether in the soldiers’ parliament in Cairo, the ghettos of Detroit, 
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or the mountains of Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy, were conscious 
volunteers driven by ideological commitment.
The reader might justifiably ask whether categorising the Second 
World War as parallel wars on the Allied side is not the imposition of 
a blanket theoretical construct on what are simply disparate events. 
Why not, as most standard histories do, simply narrate ‘the facts’ 
(although in so doing they move from the extreme of assigning a 
single label to the entire 1939–45 conflict, to the other extreme of 
pulverising the period into a series of unrelated incidents connected 
only by military action)?
In one sense every historical event is unique and defies comparison 
with any other, because circumstances never repeat exactly. All 
overarching concepts shoehorn the richness of detail into an 
analytical framework. Nonetheless, history, and modern history 
especially, consists of interactions that are not limited to one 
moment or place and are not comprehensible without reference to 
a wide framework. The Second World War was the most graphic 
possible example. It was ‘the largest single event in human history, 
fought across six of the world’s seven continents and all its oceans’.1 
Therefore, alongside the detail, a discussion of connections between 
its manifold episodes reveals an historical truth. There was such a 
thing as the Second World War, so its underlying character can and 
should be investigated. And the discovery of parallel wars within 
it shows, to use the language of dialectics, that the Second World 
War represented a ‘unity of opposites’.
There is nothing startling about the idea that different sections of 
society had varying interests or behaved in different ways; nor that 
the formal declaration of war did not automatically suspend these 
differences. What was unique about the Second World War was that 
these tensions amounted to parallel wars rather than tensions within 
the same war. To understand why, it is necessary to briefly trace the 
long-term history of the state and warfare, arms and the people. 
In the Middle Ages state military power was decentralised, with 
barons running local armies in a loose relationship to the monarch. 
Wars involved relatively small numbers because primitive transport 
methods and weak central government meant large national armies 
could be neither assembled nor supplied on a long-term basis. The 
situation changed in 1789. The modern nation was born with the 
French Revolution whose motto was ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’. 
‘Fraternity’ included the idea that war (or at least defensive war, 
and all wars would henceforth be described as defensive) was for 
the people; but it was deeply ambiguous. Fraternity was symbolised 
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by the newly founded nation state that the masses defended from 
the surrounding aristocracies. But this self-same institution was also 
the embodiment of ruling-class interests, what Marx’s Communist 
Manifesto calls ‘a committee for managing the common affairs 
of the whole bourgeoisie’. Insofar as national states maintained 
freedom from foreign oppression they represented the interests of 
masses of people; insofar as they were a ruling-class instrument they 
protected domestic capitalism from external competitors.
The year 1789 also revolutionised army organisation. The 
assembled monarchies of Europe were fought off by a close alliance 
of the French government and the population. This involved the 
‘levée en masse’. Mobilisation on a scale hitherto unknown was the 
basis for Napoleon’s quarter-of-a-million strong Grande Armée, a 
body which showed the effectiveness of huge numbers, but also 
bumped up against the technical limits of the time. Aristocratic-
led mercenary forces tumbled before the Napoleonic juggernaut, 
and in 1812 its hundreds of thousands of soldiers, on foot and 
horseback, defeated Russia at Borodino and captured Moscow. 
However, over-extended communication lines, bad weather, and 
starvation eventually destroyed the Grande Armée. Only 90,000 
survived and Napoleon commented ruefully, that ‘an army marches 
on its stomach’. Advances in productive force had not kept pace 
with destructive force.
The nineteenth-century’s industrial revolution burst through 
these technical obstacles. Railways now moved troops and supplies 
rapidly and the scale of warfare expanded exponentially. This made 
possible the largest battles of the nineteenth century, at Gettysburg 
(1863) and Sadowa/Koeniggratz (1866). These had 170,000 and 
425,000 in the field respectively. By the First World War Russia 
deployed an army of 16 million, and Germany 13 million. Weaponry 
also became more deadly. Napoleonic-era muskets had a range of 
150 yards and fire rate of two rounds per minute. The First World 
War rifles reached up to a mile at a rate of ten per minute; machine 
guns 400.2 Casualties at the battle of the Somme in 1916 came to 
1.9 million alone, and on the first day the British army fired 943,837 
shells weighing 40,000 tons.3 Total war, launched by governments, 
but sustained by entire populations on the ‘home front’, had arrived.
During the French Revolution no-one could know if the language 
of national war of the people would be a durable concept, or 
depended on a particular political conjuncture – the life-and-death 
struggle between aristocratic society and modernising forces. In 
a prescient passage written at the time, Clausewitz noted that 
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contemporary warfare, being: ‘an affair of the whole Nation, has 
assumed quite a new nature’ but wondered if:
all Wars hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole 
power of the States, and, consequently will only take place on 
account of great interests closely affecting the people, or whether 
a separation of the interests of the government from those of the 
people will again gradually arise … .4
By the twentieth century the threat of the ancien régime was 
largely destroyed, and capitalism (now in its imperialist phase) was 
fully established. In Europe nationalism was consistently used to 
divide and rule the working class; exploitation by a local capitalist 
was much the same as exploitation by a foreign one; so it might be 
assumed that the readiness of ordinary people to sacrifice themselves 
in defending ‘their state’ would diminish. However, a countervailing 
tendency was equally influential. The predatory nature of capitalist 
competition and capitalist states drove many people to support 
their national governments against outside aggression. Therefore, 
in 1914 the question Clausewitz had posed about the stability of 
the government/people consensus in wartime was still unresolved. 
The First World War began with a frenzy of enthusiasm, as 
symbolised by the famous slogan on the Kitchener recruitment 
poster: ‘Your Country Needs You!’ Yet by 1918 millions would 
have agreed with the Bolshevik statement that: ‘Official patriotism 
is a mask for the exploiting interests.’5 The separation of people and 
governments that Clausewitz had postulated, manifested itself in 
revolutions that ended the war by sweeping away governments in 
Russia, Germany and Austria. Meanwhile, in the victor countries, 
mutinies, mass strikes and factory occupations were commonplace. 
The First World War did not create a people’s war alongside an 
imperialist war, but its opposite – people’s uprisings to stop an 
imperial war.
The Second World War differed significantly from the First World 
War in many other ways. Firstly, because the appalling memory 
of 1914–18, broken promises of post-war reforms, and inter-war 
socio-economic crisis, left a deep imprint on ordinary people, in 
1939 Allied governments knew that repeating simplistic pleas to 
patriotism would fail. So in documents like the Atlantic Charter 
they emphasised the fight for freedom even more insistently and 
threw out still more lavish promises of post-war improvements, both 
to engage the energies of the population and avoid a repetition of 
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the upheavals of 1917–19. Though Allied government intentions 
were no less imperialist than before, the people’s expectations of 
liberation and reform were at a higher level than during the First 
World War and more difficult to restrain.
Secondly, fascism and communism established a new ideological 
context. Fascism was explicitly a counter-revolutionary attempt 
to break working-class organisation at home, and also a policy 
of aggressive expansion at the cost of established imperialist 
powers. This first element was new and spurred ordinary people 
to fight fascism and uphold their freedoms and rights. The second 
element was not novel and in this sense the Second World War 
was, like the First World War, another round of jockeying for 
competitive advantage.
Thirdly, there were differences at the military level. The First 
World War often involved large-scale trench warfare that established 
clearly delineated, and fairly static, military fronts. The Second 
World War’s Blitzkrieg techniques made warfare far more mobile, 
bringing aerial bombardment and enemy rule to millions. Germany 
and Japan deliberately shifted military costs on to those they 
conquered. The result was famines and the hunt for manpower, 
the latter playing an important role in driving young men to join 
partisan bands. The immediacy of Axis aggression, whether in 
the London Blitz or under direct occupation, meant that fighting 
would not be left to government action alone, but became an urgent 
necessity for ordinary people.
Fourthly, Axis seizure of huge swathes of territory was usually 
accompanied by the emergence of quislings. The ruling-class instinct 
for survival was supplemented by their desire to have the Gestapo 
help them destroy working-class movements. Such collaboration 
disrupted the national illusion and the ideological hegemony that 
capitalism usually enjoys. Even those ruling classes that preferred 
Allied imperialism feared mobilising their own poor. The outcome 
was an attentism which left space for new forces to flourish. In Asia 
an additional factor was that the swift Axis onslaught in Europe 
weakened colonial states and opened new vistas for independence. 
To sum up, alongside a brutal imperialist war, the situation was 
uniquely favourable to movements from below seeking national and 
social freedom. That some of the fighting of 1939–45 exceeded a 
traditional defence of the capitalist state was therefore no aberration, 
but a logical outcome of prior development.
The people’s war had both weaknesses and strengths. As an 
amalgam of class and nation it was not viable in the long term. Often 
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its forces were rapidly dissolved (such as in Germany, or France). 
Even where it gained state power (e.g. Yugoslavia and Vietnam), the 
new governments would reassert the ‘national state’ as the managing 
committee of capitalism, and the ‘people’ would become the object 
of exploitation. And its military impact on the defeat of the Axis 
is debatable. Keegan is surely too critical when he writes that the 
contribution of resistance movements to Allied victory was minimal 
and ‘must be seen, by any objective reckoning, as irrelevant and 
pointless acts of bravado’.6 In January 1944 Yugoslav partisans 
were tying down 15 German divisions, and the French resistance 
blocked the movement of twelve during D-Day.7 Nonetheless, these 
achievements pale against the hundreds of divisions deployed by 
Allied governments who enjoyed the inestimable advantages of 
taxation, the backing of wealth, arms industries, and the ‘legitimate 
force’ of well-equipped conventional armies.
But the people’s war was not confined to resistance movements 
alone. Millions in the conventional armies were determined to 
confront Axis oppression (and by implication oppression generally). 
This was clearly understood by the Allied governments who 
collectively donned the cloak of anti-fascism. Overy is correct to 
say that for ordinary people everywhere ‘the belief that they fought 
on the sight of righteousness equipped them with powerful moral 
armament’.8 This weapon was used against Germany, Italy and 
Japan, but could be turned on the Allies too.
To the question ‘Was the Second World War an imperialist 
war or a people’s war?’ the answer is ‘It was both’. However, it 
does not follow that the balance between the two was the same 
everywhere. Variations were partly due to subjective factors such as 
the communists. While the Hitler–Stalin pact was in force the CPs 
denounced the Second World War as imperialist, but they rapidly 
moved to spearhead people’s war after Operation Barbarossa. The 
prestige of association with the victorious Red Army helped build 
their following thereafter. The communists’ willingness to take the 
lead, at great personal risk, arose from a genuine commitment to 
social progress and justice. Yet this was tempered by their leaders’ 
slavish adherence to Moscow that often proved injurious to the 
very movements they did so much to build. That does not mean 
the people’s war was a manipulated communist construct. It is 
important to remember that it encompassed movements as diverse as 
the Quit India struggle (which the Indian CP opposed), the Warsaw 
insurgents, and the Double V campaign in the US.
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Objective factors also played a role. Countries caught between 
imperialist blocs – Yugoslavia, Greece, Poland and Latvia – provided 
the greatest variety in relations between people’s war and imperialist 
war. In Yugoslavia Mihailovich feared the partisans more than the 
enemy and collaborated with the latter. This left the British and 
Russians little choice but to back Tito’s partisans as the only force 
challenging the Axis. So ultimately people’s war and imperialist 
forces worked together. In Greece the communist-influenced EAM/
ELAS received some support from the Allies. However, since the 
‘percentages agreement’ assigned Greece to the British camp, 
Churchill bombed Athens and re-imposed the hated monarchy. 
The opposition between the two wars here was total and violent.
In Poland, the callous manoeuvring of Stalin, and the indiscriminate 
character of Nazi violence, united those Poles linked to imperialism 
with the mass of the population, in a common enterprise. The 
outcome was the Warsaw uprising that reflected both types of war, 
but which Stalin abandoned to German revenge. Latvia was so 
crushed between two rival imperialist blocs that its population chose 
to identify with one or other of these appalling alternatives. So a 
people’s war never materialised.
In the homelands of the Allied powers it was sometimes hard 
to spot the difference between those fighting fascism and those 
upholding empires. For the USA the fissure was along race lines 
with riots and armed clashes at home. In Britain the results of the 
1945 general election confirmed that the population and ruling 
class had been fighting separate, parallel wars. The widest gap was 
seen in France, where not only was the ruling class split between de 
Gaulle and Pétain, but the resistance grew up independently of both. 
The situation in Axis countries was generally less favourable to 
parallel wars. In Germany, a ruling class opposition only emerged 
at points when the country’s imperial interests were endangered. It 
did not welcome people’s war. Furthermore, repression so restricted 
mass action from below that it could only emerge after the Nazi 
regime was shattered from outside. The two wars then appeared as 
a clash between the Allies and Antifa resistance. A similar process 
might have happened in Austria had not the Allies, in an attempt 
to divide it from Germany, identified its ruling class (with its rotten 
track record of fascism and collaboration) with the anti-Nazi cause. 
It was therefore difficult for the people’s war to make headway there.
Italy was the exception because the hold of Mussolini slipped 
before the Allies could reach the north. The people’s war could 
therefore mount an effective challenge to both Nazi occupiers and 
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their Republic of Salò collaborators. Although General Alexander 
came close to inviting the Nazis to destroy the CLNAI, and it was 
hurriedly dissolved once the war ended, the Italian resistance left 
a lasting political legacy.
In Asia the relationship between imperialist war and people’s war 
was conditioned by the weakened hold of the European colonialists, 
and the false claim of the Japanese to be anti-imperialist themselves. 
In India resistance took the form of either a straightforward anti-
colonialist struggle (Quit India) or an attempt to use Japanese 
leverage to expel Britain (the Indian National Army). After hesitation 
on the part of Sukarno, Indonesia’s people’s war involved armed 
conflict with all the imperialist forces present – Japanese, British and 
Dutch. The Vietnamese Communist Party sought support from the 
Allies, but after failing to obtain this, engaged with mass pressure 
from below to develop a powerful anti-imperialist struggle.
In conclusion, the Second World War was unlike any other 
war. It brought unimaginable horrors – the Holocaust, nuclear 
annihilation, great famines, and civilian death on an enormous 
scale; but it is also remembered as ‘the good war’ that destroyed 
Nazism and fascism. As Clausewitz showed, warfare is not just 
a technical matter but reflects deeper political currents, and so 
these dual characteristics of the Second World War persisted after 
1945. If we can reverse his aphorism for a moment: in peacetime 
‘politics was a continuation of war, a carrying out of the same by 
other means’. So even after the guns fell silent inter-imperialist 
competition continued. The result was the Cold War. For its part, 
the people’s war transmuted into a successful, sometimes violent, 
struggle for decolonisation, plus a movement for the establishment 
of welfare states and decent living conditions. 
In the twenty-first century these components are still present. 
Imperialism lives on through interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and elsewhere, accompanied by a domestic onslaught on living 
standards occasioned by economic crisis. Fortunately, the people’s 
war also lives on through the struggle against imperialist wars, 
anti-racism and anti-fascism, as well as in defence of the welfare 
provisions bequeathed after 1945. As one veteran of the Second 
World War wrote recently: ‘The Resistance came at a very specific 
point in history … people had to fight back against a situation they 
found intolerable. But today we are facing intolerable situations, 
and against these we need the same sort of response.’9
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Year Imperialism & 
Imperialist War
Interaction Popular Movements 
& People’s War
1931 Japanese occupy 
Manchuria.
1933 Hitler becomes 
German Chancellor.







1935 Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia.
1936 Greek King installs 
fascist Metaxas. 
Franco’s coup in Spain.
Spanish Revolution.
1937 Stalinists lead 
counter-revolu-
tion in Barcelona.
1938 Japanese extend 
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Year Imperialism & 
Imperialist War
Interaction Popular Movements 
& People’s War
August Hitler–Stalin pact.
September Second World War 
begins. Germans and 
Russians partition 






January ZWZ (basis of 




April Nazis occupy 
Denmark.
Rescue of Danish 
Jews begins.
May British evacuation at 
Dunkirk. Churchill 
British PM.
June Italy joins war on Axis 
side. German defeat of 
France. Phoney war 
ends.
De Gaulle calls 
for resistance on 
BBC radio.
Beginning of French 
resistance.
July Baltic states made part 
of USSR.
August Russian absorption of 
Latvia complete.





January ‘March on 
Washington’ 
movement.
February Ho Chi Minh 
returns to Vietnam 
from exile.
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Year Imperialism & 
Imperialist War
Interaction Popular Movements 
& People’s War
March Yugoslavia joins Axis, 
counter-coup next day.
April Axis invasion of 






May Germany completes 
occupation of Greece.
Vietminh formed.







July Japanese invasion of 
French Indochina 
begins.
Popular uprising – 
Montenegro.
August Atlantic Charter (USA 





October Russian government 




December Japanese attack Pearl 




February Order interning US 
Japanese. Java & 




March Cripps mission to 
India. Japanese 
interned in US. Japan 
takes Java.
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Year Imperialism & 
Imperialist War
Interaction Popular Movements 
& People’s War
July First battle of El 
Alamein. Tide turns 
against Axis in North 
Africa.
August Quit India 
resolution passed.
September Leadership of Quit 
India falls to 
Congress Socialists.
October











February German defeat at 
Stalingrad.














repressed by new 
government.
Italians celebrate 
hoped-for end of 
fascism and war.
August





begins in north Italy. 
October Italy declares war on 
Germany.
Corsica becomes 
first part of France 
liberated.
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Year Imperialism & 
Imperialist War








January Red Army enters 
Poland. Japan’s 
offensive at Imphal.
INA in action at 
Imphal.
February Yalta conference 




April Right-wing purge 
of Greek army.
May
June D-Day landing in 
Normandy.
French resistance 
launch uprisings to 
support D-Day.
July Operation 
‘Valkyrie’ fails to 
kill Hitler.
Poland – Operation 
Burza (Tempest).
August Paris liberated. 
Warsaw Rising 
begins.
September ELAS gains control 











November Alexander orders 
Italian partisan 
ceasefire.
December Germans launch  
‘Battle of the Bulge’. 
Tonkin famine begins.
Battle for Athens. 
ELAS destroyed.
1945
January Red Army takes 
Warsaw.
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Year Imperialism & 
Imperialist War
Interaction Popular Movements 
& People’s War
February Firestorm in Dresden.
March Japan takes direct 
control of Indochina. 
Red Army enters 
Austria.







May Victory in Europe Day 
(8th) – VE Day.
Demonstrating 
Algerians 
massacred at Setif 
on VE Day.
Antifa movement in 
Germany.
June Vietminh creates 
liberated zone in N. 
Vietnam.
July Potsdam Declaration. Labour defeats 
Churchill in UK 
general election.
August Atom bombs on Japan. 





September Allies disembark in 
Saigon.
Fighting in Saigon 






October Battle of 
Semarang 
– Indonesia.
November Battle of 
Surabaya.
INA trial in Delhi.
December
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